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ABSTRACT 
 
RAPHAEL GINSBERG: Victims’ Deserve the Best: Victims’ Rights and the Decline of the 
Liberal Consensus 
(Under the direction of Lawrence Grossberg) 
 
 
The liberal consensus that dominated post-World War 2 politics has declined. 
Elements of the consensus in decline include a faith in expert knowledge, doubts concerning 
the universal benefits of unregulated capitalism and the possibility of socioeconomic 
mobility, and a robust conception of an interconnected society. These elements have been 
dislodged by a faith in personal experience as a guide for policy-making, the celebration of 
unregulated capitalism, a belief socioeconomic mobility, and the promotion of the traditional 
family as the true guarantor of socioeconomic viability, not government.  
The victims’ rights movement arose concurrently with the liberal consensus’s decline. 
Its main goal was to insert victims of crime into the criminal justice process. As a result of 
the victims’ rights movement, victims can now participate in sentencing hearings, 
prosecutorial decisions, and parole hearings. In addition, participants in the victims’ rights 
movement are instrumental in advocating for the passage of tough-on-crime legislation.  
The victims' rights movement buttressed four elements of the attacks on the liberal 
consensus. First, it elevated the traditional family over other forms of socioeconomic 
relations, displacing them from the primacy the liberal consensus accorded them.  Second, by 
maximizing victim-input in both the criminal justice and legislative processes, it valorized an 
experience-based expertise. Third, it denigrated a conception of an interconnected society by 
 iv 
 
elevating the needs of individual victims of those of society. Finally, by making political 
stars out of previously unknown victims, it presented a picture of American socioeconomic 
mobility.  
This dissertation links these four developments of victims’ rights to the decline of the 
liberal consensus. It also looks at how responses to domestic violence initially accorded with 
the liberal consensus by providing material support for victims, and how this response has 
been marginalized by the victims’ rights movement. It concludes by examining the ways an 
alternative conception of responding to victimization, restorative justice, which focuses on 
dialog rather than violence, complements the liberal consensus’s tenets.  
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Victims Deserve the Best: Victims’ Rights and the Decline of the Liberal Consensus  
Raphael Ginsberg 
 
The Bowden Case 
In 2009, North Carolina’s appellate courts considered the case of Bobby Bowden, a 
prisoner convicted of homicide in the 1970s, who had claimed that his sentence had expired. 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that his sentence, which had been treated as 
an indefinite ‘life’ term by the Department of Corrections, was actually defined by the 
legislature as a term of 80 years, to which various sentence reduction credits may apply. 
When the North Carolina Supreme Court declined to overturn this ruling, the apparent result 
was that Bowden, along with several other similarly situated prisoners, was entitled to 
immediate, unconditional release from prison.        
These judicial decisions provoked a furious response from Governor Bev Perdue, 
who blocked the inmates’ scheduled October 29 release by directing the Department of 
Corrections to deny the inmates their good behavior credits. Concern for victims played a 
fundamental role in her decision to prevent their release. At a press conference explaining her 
decisions, Perdue asked, bewilderingly, “What about the victims? Nobody’s talking about the 
victims.”1 At the press conference, she was accompanied by the head of a victims’ advocacy 
                                                 
1 Transcript of Bev Purdue’s news conference on file with author 
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group.2 According to news reports, Perdue made the decision “in the face of outrage from 
victims and their families.”3 
Mirroring Perdue’s logic, newspapers covering the inmates’ potential release and the 
Perdue’s intervention into the legal process placed victims’ family members’ and victims’ 
advocacy organizations’ views at the center of their coverage. Numerous articles noted 
victim opposition to and outrage concerning the possibility of the inmate’s impending 
release.4 The New York Times’ article about the matter included a quote from Thomas 
Bennett, executive director of the North Carolina Victim Assistance Network, stating “This is 
an outrage of justice.”5 A Winston-Salem Journal article also included Bennett’s views that 
the release of the inmates represented a “miscarriage of justice.”6 
Two separate articles included quotes from Rick Ehrhart, whose mother was killed by 
Bowden. The headline of one such article refers directly to him, reading “A Son Fights 
Inmate Release. Charlotte Man’s Mother’s Killer is up for Release.”7 In the article, Ehrhart 
declared that the inmates’ release was “just insane. To go from coldblooded murderer facing 
the death penalty to the possibility of parole to unqualified release? This is a tragedy of 
                                                 
 
2 Staff, “Release of killers is delayed,” The Fayetteville Observer, December15,  2009.  
 
3 Staff, “Perdue to Keep 20 in Prison,” Winston-Salem Journal, October 23, 2009.  
 
4James Romoser, “3 convicted in Forsyth to be freed,” The Winston-Salem Journal  October  22, 2009; 
Mandy Locke, “Inmates Quietly Pursue Release,” The News and Observer,” October 30, 2009;  Doug Clark, 
“Convicted Criminals Won’t go Free Yet,” The Sampson Independent. 20 November, 2009.  
 
5 Robbie Brown, “North Carolinians Bridle Over Plan to Free Inmates,” The New York Times. 
October17, 2009.  
 
6 Romoser, “3 convicted in Forsyth to be freed.”  
 
7 Mandy Locke, “A Son Fights Inmate Release. Charlotte Man’s Mother’s Killer is up for Release.  He 
was once sentenced to death,” The Charlotte Observer, October 29, 2009.   
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errors.”8 Similarly, in the second article he asked, “Do we do something that doesn’t make 
sense because of the literal meaning of the words in laws written without an understanding of 
what they could do?”9 In addition to his inclusion in news articles, The News and Observer 
ran an editorial written by Ehrhart, in which he explains his opposition to their release, 
describing Bowden's arguments as “solipsistic and specious.”10 His legal analysis, 
apparently, was newsworthy.  
Though it had previously declined to overturn rulings that deemed Bowden eligible 
for immediate, unconditional release, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled in 2010 that 
Bowden was not entitled to release, siding with Perdue and the Department of Corrections. 
Supreme Court Justices dissenting from the majority opinion argued that public outrage 
influenced the court’s reversal of its recent decision. In her dissent, Justice Patricia 
Timmons-Goodson argued,  
 
This is a hard case. The lives of the victim and his family have been 
forever changed by Jones’s criminal conduct. Public attention has been 
excited by the possibility of release of those previously committed to 
life sentences. The late United States Supreme Court Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes appropriately cautioned against allowing “immediate 
interests [to] exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what 
was previously clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled 
principles of law will bend.” Many would argue that the breaking point 
has been reached in this case.11  
 
                                                 
 
8 Locke, “A Son Fights Inmate Release.”  
 
9 Mandy Locke, “Lifer’s Fates Rest with the N.C. Supreme Court,” The News and Observer, February 
17, 2010.  
10 Rick Ehrhart, “Good Sense Would not Set Killers Loose.” The News and Observer, February 11, 
2010.   
 
11Goodson-Timmons, Patricia. Dissent Alford Jones v. Keller, 2010, 518PA09. Available at 
http://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=1&pdf=MjAxMC81MThQQTA5LTEucGRm.  
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As described above, much of the public outrage Timmons-Goodson points to concerned the 
alleged plight of victims’ families in the wake of the inmates’ release. Timmons-Goodson 
attributes the majority’s faulty decision to “immediate interests,” including those of victims 
and their families. Without the involvement of victims, Timmons-Goodson suggests, the 
majority would have ruled differently. Indeed, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled to 
allow the Bowden release to occur in the absence of victim-associated outrage when it 
declined to overturn the Appeals Court’s ruling in 2009.  
In this example, judges and other government officials made legal decisions on behalf 
of victims, and media outlets complemented this deference by positioning victims at the 
center of their coverage of the case. In telling the story of the Bowden case, media deferred 
to the victims’ version of it. Such deference plays a fundamental role in the victims’ rights 
movement. Throughout its 35-year history, the victims' rights movement has succeeded in 
increasing the deference paid to victims by the criminal justice system. Victims now play a 
direct and influential role in numerous stages of the criminal justice process from which they 
were previously absent. Laws have been passed in all fifty states guaranteeing victim access 
to the criminal justice system. Victims also have gained influence over the development and 
passage of criminal justice legislation and, as demonstrated above, executive and judicial 
decisions. Many of the ‘tough-on-crime’ laws passed over the last 30 years, including three-
strike laws and expansions in the use of the death penalty, were made in the name of the 
rights of victims or their families. In total, criminal law and the criminal justice system have 
now undergone a massive transformation as a result of the victims' rights movement.  
The victims’ rights movement emerged in the early 1980s.  It consists of numerous 
non-governmental organizations dedicated to specific criminal justice objectives, which are 
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primarily led by victims or victims’ family members themselves. The victims’ rights 
movement has been actively supported by both Republicans and Democrats at all levels of 
government, law enforcement, and numerous non-governmental organizations, such as the 
American Psychological Association and the American Bar Association.  
Contemporaneous with the ascent of victims has been the decline of the liberal 
consensus, which commentators agree dominated American politics in the decades following 
World War Two. Though seemingly unrelated, attacks on the liberal consensus and victims’ 
rights share assumptions and efforts. Both have successfully compelled government to defer 
to private interests: victims and their families in victims’ rights, private businesses and free 
markets in attacks on the liberal consensus. In addition, attacks on the liberal consensus and 
victims’ rights valorize a conception of the family in conflict with a broader society 
supported by government. Finally, both victims’ rights and attacks on the liberal consensus 
privilege experience over knowledge as the proper basis for policy-making authority, 
consistent with the media’s broader reliance on experience as the foundation and source of 
knowledge. The similarity between attacks on the liberal consensus and victims’ rights is the 
focus of this dissertation.  
 
A Brief History of Victims’ Rights 
 
In the following history of the American victims’ rights movement, I consider the 
comprehensive role of advocacy groups, conservative think tanks, professional organizations, 
and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which worked with government to 
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change criminal laws and policy. I also highlight the speed and enthusiasm with which 
powerful government actors endorsed and worked to institute victims’ rights measures.  
Before the emergence of victims’ rights in the early 1980s, the crime victim’s role 
was limited to that of witness in America’s criminal justice system. Victims were routinely 
interviewed by the police, but were otherwise only involved in a criminal case if they were 
called to testify when a case went to trial. They played no role in plea bargaining, sentencing, 
or parole decisions. Also, they played no role in the creation of criminal justice policy. All of 
this changed with the enactment of victims’ rights reforms.   
Powerful government actors invoked the term “victims’ rights” in the early 1970s. 
However, these invocations differed markedly from the meaning connoted by the term 
“victims’ rights” today. In 1970, Vice President Spiro Agnew lamented that the “rights of the 
accused have become more important than the rights of victims in our courtrooms.”12 Also in 
1970, President Richard Nixon pledged that he would “continue to appoint judges who have 
an awareness of the rights of the victim as well as the right of the accused.”13 One of Nixon’s 
Supreme Court nominees, Lewis Powell, proclaimed in an article entitled “Crime Victim 
Rights of Concern to Powell,” that “the time has come for concern for the rights of citizens to 
be free from criminal molestation of their persons. In many respects, the victims of crime 
have become the forgotten men of our society.”14 
 Though all three individuals explicitly cite the rights of victims in a manner similar to 
today’s invocations, the rights they referred to differ from those promoted by victims’ rights 
                                                 
12 Warren Weaver, “Agnew Deplores ‘Permissiveness.’ Says his Political Mission is to Arouse a 
Desire for National Self-Discipline,” The New York Times, September 26, 1970.  
 
13 Robert Semple, “R. Nixon Sharpens Drive on ‘Thugs.’ Urges end to ‘Appeasement of ‘Hoodlums’—
Agnew See Congress Gains,” The New York Times, November 1, 1970. 
 
14 Don Irwin, “Crime Victim Rights of Concern to Powell,” The Los Angeles Times, October 22, 1971. 
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as it exists today. As demonstrated by Powell’s quote, Nixon, Agnew, and Powell all 
conflated non-criminals, who were in their lexicon all potential victims, with actual victims. 
They did not assert that crime victims themselves should have due process rights nor that the 
punishment of offenders somehow reflected on the worth of crime victims, both of which 
became normative victims’ rights arguments. None made any effort to institute victims’ 
rights reforms. Instead, they insisted that Supreme Court decisions such as Miranda and 
Mapp had demonstrated undue solicitude for defendants by expanding their due process 
rights, making it harder to prosecute criminals, and leaving them free to victimize law-
abiding people, i.e., crime victims anew. Victims’ rights was not yet available as a 
comprehensive discourse to Nixon, Agnew, and Powell.  
Frank Carrington was the pivotal figure in the development of the current concept of 
victims’ rights. A lawyer, he created the term “victims’ rights” in the early 1970s, 
disseminating it in newspaper articles and congressional testimony, and fully articulating 
many of victims’ rights key positions in his 1975 book The Victims, published in association 
with the conservative Heritage Foundation.15 As the leader of the tough-on-crime NGO 
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Carrington testified before Congress in 1972 in 
support of the death penalty and described his organization as, “Frankly, a victim-oriented 
organization,” and argued that “perhaps the rights of potential victims and actual victims 
should be weighed much more heavily in the balance, than the rights of the convicted 
killers.”16 In The Victims, Carrington argued that victims suffered because of their limited 
                                                 
15 Carrie Rentschler, Second Wounds: Victims’ Rights and the Media in the U.S. (Durham: Duke 
University Press), 39 
 
16 Hearing Before the House of Representatives Judiciary Subcommittee. H.R. 3243, H.R. 193, H.R. 
17796. To Abolish the Death Penalty under all Laws of the United States, and for other Purposes. 92nd 
Congress. 15, 17. 1972. Statement of Frank Carrington.  
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role in the criminal justice process, and that offenders and victims exist in a zero-sum game, 
articulating due process protections and perceptions of leniency as coming at the expense of 
victims’ well-being and perceptions of their personal worth.17 Accordingly, The Victims 
called for increasing the role of the victim in the criminal justice system, limiting defendants’ 
due process rights, and expanding the use of the death penalty in order, he argued, to affirm 
the value of the victim’s life.    
Carrington quickly garnered institutional support for his victims’ rights ideas, from 
both conservative political leaders and putatively non-partisan organizations. Carrington’s 
views were embraced by prominent conservatives. United States Republican Senator James 
Buckley wrote The Victims’ introduction, and read it into the May 15, 1975 Congressional 
Record.18 Carrington himself was placed into positions of policy-making power, where he 
successfully promoted his victims’ rights positions. In 1981, Attorney General William 
French appointed him to the Attorney General’s Task Force on Violent Crime, assembled 
three months after Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency.  
The Task Force recommended victims’ participation in prosecutorial and sentencing 
decisions. It also recommended the establishment of a Task Force on Victims of Crime. 
Formed in 1982, the Task Force on Victims of Crime included prominent law enforcement 
figures, and, again, Frank Carrington (as well as, interestingly, evangelist Pat Robertson). 
The release of its ‘Final Report’ is credited as being a “catalyst for a decade of advances in 
victims’ rights.”19 According to Carrie Rentschler, “the task force report of 1982 signaled the 
                                                 
 
17 Frank Carrington, The Victims (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1975). 
18 James Buckley, foreword to The Victims. 
 
19 United States Department of Justice, New directions from the field: victims' rights and services for 
the 21st century (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 1998). 
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national arrival of victims’ rights, evidence that its discourse and political practice were part 
and parcel of a national policy vision of victims.”20 In addition to the Task Force on Violent 
Crime’s recommendations for expanded victim participation, its “Final Report” supported 
higher bail amounts and the end of the exclusionary rule. It also called for limiting 
defendants’ due process rights, reasoning that victims benefit from, and should therefore 
have a right to, the conviction and punishment of offenders. Inspired by the report, in 1982 
the United States Congress passed the Victim and Witness Protection Act, which established 
the right of victims to present their views on sentencing to judges and required prosecutors to 
solicit victims’ views before negotiating plea deals.21  
In addition to his work with the Federal government, Carrington worked with 
influential professional associations to promote victims’ rights. He chaired the American Bar 
Associations’ (ABA) Victims’ Committee, and in 1985 the ABA issued guidelines 
concerning the treatment of victims, recommending that victims have the right to confer with 
prosecutors about plea deals and offer sentencing statements.22 He participated in a 1983 
National Judicial College Conference, in which more than 100 judges met and passed a 
resolution in support of victim participation in the criminal justice process.23 Altogether, 
Carrington was instrumental in incorporating government and important professional 
organizations into the nascent victims' rights movement. Carrington’s work had become 
political doctrine, and his specific notion of victims’ rights continues to dominate victims’ 
rights discourse.  
                                                 
 
20 Rentschler, Second Wounds.  
21 See Bill Summary & Status 97th Congress (1981 - 1982) S.2420 CRS Summary). 
 
22 American Bar Association, Guidelines for Fair Treatment of Crime Victims and Witnesses. 1985.  
 
23 Diane Kiesel, “Crime and Punishment: Victim rights Movement Presses Courts, Legislatures.” 
American Bar Association Journal 10 (1984). 
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A number of NGO’s formed in the late 1970s and early 1980s to promote criminal 
justice reforms in the name of victims’ rights. Many of these groups were connected to one 
another and to government.  They focused on three primary objectives. First, they worked to 
provide material and psychological support to victims, an objective that receded in 
importance as victims’ rights developed. Second, they sought to establish the right of victims 
to participate in the criminal justice system. Third, they pushed for harsher sentences for 
offenders. These organizations remain in existence, primarily working to make sentences 
harsher and maximize victim participation.  
An early victims’ rights NGO was Parents of Murdered Children (POMC). POMC 
was formed in Ohio in 1978 by Charlotte and Bob Hullinger, whose daughter was murdered. 
It established support groups for families of murder victims around the country and 
organized annual conventions to allow parents and supporters to network and develop ideas 
for how to maximize mutual victim support. The organization also advocated for victim 
participation, such as its Parole Block program, which called for victims’ and victims’ family 
members to testify in parole hearings, primarily, as the program’s name indicates, to voice 
their opposition to parole. POMC also had a tough-on-crime agenda. It advocated for limiting 
death penalty appeals to increase executions. James Knoll, leader of the Houston Chapter of 
POMC, complained that because of multiple appeals filed by death row inmates, “Death-
sentenced people have made a mockery of our system.”24 In the same articles his wife added 
“It’s a just punishment, definitely a deterrent.”25  
                                                 
24 “Death Penalty Edicts Compound Confusion, Say Critics of the Court,” The Wall Street Journal, 1 
May 1984.  
 
25 Ibid.  
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The most wide-ranging organization is the National Organization of Victim 
Assistance (NOVA), formed in 1975. NOVA’s initial activism involved organizing 
conferences about victims’ needs and offering training to those providing services to 
victims.26 However, NOVA supported victim-participation in the criminal justice system as 
well. In 1979, NOVA “incorporated the growing demand for victims to have legitimate 
access to the criminal justice system into a new policy platform on victims’ rights.”27 In 
1984, Mario Gaboury, NOVA’s legislative specialist, argued that “victims should have a 
right to participate at any stage of the judicial proceedings, from plea bargaining to parole.”28  
In supporting both victims’ services and victim participation, NOVA worked to 
conflate the two. As victims typically sought convictions and harsh punishment through their 
participation (though not always), the conflation of victims’ services and victim participation 
led to a second conflation, that between tough-on-crime policies and victims’ services. A 
logical chain developed in which victims’ services were equated with victim participation, 
victim participation was equated with punishment and conviction, and, accordingly, victims’ 
services were equated with conviction and punishment. This chain worked to solidify the 
most questionable element of victims’ rights: the contention that punishment and conviction 
themselves are a victim’s right.  
Another strand of the emergent victims’ rights movement involved the efforts of 
victims’ family members to pass legislation making sentencing laws harsher, increasing 
victim participation, and making it easier to obtain convictions. Victims’ family members 
                                                 
 
26 Marlene Young, “Victims’ Rights and Services: A modern Saga,” in Victims of Crime, ed. by Robert 
Lurigio et al., (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1997).  
27 Young, “Victims’ Rights,” 197 
 
28 Leslie Maitland Werner, “U.S. Parole Unit to Seek Testimony from Victim,” The New York Times, 
June 1 1984.  
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cited the victimization of their family member to justify the policy and sentencing changes 
that they sought. An early example is the work of Roberta Roper, who began working to 
change criminal legislation after her daughter was raped and murdered in Maryland in 1982, 
and her murderers received sentences Roper deemed unjustly short. In January, 1983, Roper 
began working to eliminate the use of voluntary drugs and alcohol as a mitigating 
circumstance in first degree murder cases, to give juries the option of life without parole 
instead of life with the possibility of parole, to allow coconspirators to be eligible for the 
death penalty, to make victim impact statements mandatory, and to limit the availability of 
parole.  
Roper claimed that her advocacy made her “the voice and the presence of the victims 
who cannot be here.”29 Passing such laws, she argued, countered the harm inflicted by the 
crime, as her efforts worked “to make sure that something good will come of this tragedy.”30 
Such victim-led efforts have been extraordinarily successful. In the Roper case, Delegate 
Dennis Donaldson said that the Roper legislation is “the kind of thing that you need two or 
three years to get passed.”31 Instead, it took three months, as Maryland’s governor signed 
laws instituting three of the five measures Roper wanted passed in April, 1983.32 Legislators 
admitted that the passage of the legislation was not solely dedicated to reducing crime and its 
                                                 
29 John Feinstein, “Three Bills Advance to Stiffen Md. Murder Terms,” The Washington Post, March 
11 1983.  
 
30 Feinstein, “Three Bills.”  
 
31 John Feinstein, “1,000 Rally for Tough Criminal Sentencing,” The Washington Post, January 17, 
1983 
 
32 John Feinstein, “A Year of Holding the Line; Legislature Toughens Criminal Laws, Eases Up on 
Banks.” The Washington Post, 13 April 1983.  
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harm but also “designed to show Roper supporters the legislature was responsive to their 
concerns.”33  
Early victims’ rights efforts achieved immediate results. For example, by 1985, 
twenty-five states had programs that facilitated victim involvement in parole hearings. The 
victims’ rights movement continues to exist, though many of its goals have been achieved 
nationally. Thirty-three states have amended their constitutions to include  victim 
participation, such as the right to attend trials, testify at sentencing hearings and parole 
hearings, and confer with prosecutors, and all fifty states have laws guaranteeing victims 
such participation rights. Many of the tough-on-crime legislative efforts that resulted in 
massive prison populations were led by victims and their families. For example, the 
campaign to pass California’s three-strike law was led by the fathers of two murder victims. 
Chapter three of this dissertation explores one such victim-led effort at length. In that 
chapter, I consider the work of Mark Lunsford, who, after his daughter Jessica was murdered 
by a convicted sex offender, sought to pass laws toughening laws for sex offenders in states 
across the country.  
However, efforts to improve victims’ services have not been a priority for the 
victims’ rights movement, and consequently, have not been as successful. Victims’ services 
are not considered a victim’s right. In fact, none of the thirty-three state victims’ rights 
constitutional amendments include a right to victims’ services, only participation in judicial 
or parole proceedings. When the term ‘victims’ rights’ is invoked, it typically refers to victim 
participation and the conviction and punishment of offenders, and not victims’ services, such 
as time off of work, or medical and psychological treatment on demand.    
                                                 
 
33 Feinstein, “Three Bills.”  
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The Liberal Consensus 
 
It is commonly agreed that a specific liberal consensus dominated American politics 
following World War II. In addition to its commitment to containing communism worldwide, 
there were four elements of the liberal consensus.  
First, the liberal consensus held that American capitalism could provide prosperity for 
all, but only if assisted by a “degree of economic management by government.”34 According 
to historian Iwan Morgan, by Dwight Eisenhower’s 1952 election, “the parties were no 
longer divided on the issue of whether the government should manage the economy.”35 
Historian Godfrey Hodgson notes that during the predominance of the liberal consensus, 
even conservative economists noted that “we are all Keynesians now,” committed to using 
government fiscal spending and tax policy to prevent capitalism’s inherent tendency towards 
unemployment and inflation.36 Keynesian policies would enable government to “fly the 
economy like an airplane, trimming its speed, course, and altitude with tiny movements of 
the flaps and rudder.”37 Also, without government assistance, the poor will be trapped in 
poverty. Law professor Ian Haney-Lopez notes that the notion existed under the liberal 
                                                 
34 Iwan Morgan, Beyond the Liberal Consensus: A Political History of the United States since 1965, 
(New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994), 2. 
 
35 Morgan, Beyond the Liberal Consensus, 10.  
 
36 Godfrey Hodgson, America in Our Time, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1977), 99. 
 
37 Hodgson, America in Our Time, 79 
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consensus “since the creation of the modern welfare that large-scale forces immune to 
personal effort largely trapped the poor.”38 
A second element of the liberal consensus was the preservation and extension of the 
New Deal’s government programs, which included federal public housing programs, social 
security, and unemployment insurance. Accordingly, both Truman and Eisenhower protected 
and expanded New Deal programs. For example, Truman extended social security benefits 
and Eisenhower created the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. A third aspect 
involved a vision of labor relations. Under the liberal consensus, corporate leaders accepted 
the power of labor unions, who, in turn, acknowledged management rights and rejected the 
need for fundamental social and economic change.  
The fourth element of the domestic liberal consensus was a faith in scientific 
knowledge’s ability to solve social problems. According to Hodgson, the liberal consensus 
held that “[s]ocial problems can be solved like industrial problems: The problem is first 
identified; programs are designed to solve it, by government enlightened by social science; 
money and other resources—such as trained people—are then applied to the problem.”39  
Generally speaking, the liberal consensus had faith in a Keynesian management of the 
economy, subscribed to the need for a moderate welfare state as well as viable unions, with 
economic management, welfare, and labor protections obviating the need for fundamental 
socioeconomic change, and believed in the superior ability of scientific knowledge to address 
social problems.  
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Challenges to the Liberal Consensus 
 
In the following section I briefly describe four ways in which the liberal consensus 
has been attacked. First, I describe criticisms of the liberal consensus’s concept of society. 
Second, I consider the glorification of capitalism and attack on government intervention into 
the economy. Third, I look at allegations that welfare has destructive effects on the traditional 
family. Finally, I consider criticisms of expert authority, the conception of authority that 
underlay liberal consensus policy-making.  
 
The attack on the liberal consensus’s conception of society 
 
Supporters of the liberal consensus vigorously asserted a comprehensive notion of 
society. Political decisions on issues such as education, healthcare, and welfare assumed an 
interconnected society in which the fate of each individual is tied to how they are situated 
within societal relations. For example, a poor person will have difficulty succeeding in the 
market without government assistance. According to this way of thinking, politicians must 
attend to the configuration of social relations themselves to enable those in subordinate 
positions to thrive, even if not at the same level as those in higher socioeconomic positions. 
Accordingly, Franklin Roosevelt termed insuring the right to an “economic and political life, 
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liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” a “social problem[]” requiring “social controls.”40 
Government acted as society’s representative, working to achieve its interests.  
Conservative critics have long assailed the importance of society and the need to 
attend to social relations. According to them, social relations play little role in individual 
outcomes. In fact, Margaret Thatcher denied the existence of society altogether in 1987, 
declaring that there is “no such thing as society” there are “only individual men and women, 
and…families.”41 Instead of being dependent on social relations, outcomes are matters of 
aptitude, determination, and self-interest. Prominent intellectuals argued that there are great 
costs in attending to social relations, as it necessarily entails limiting individual freedom and 
the power of self-interest and rationality. In the 1930s, Joseph Schumpeter argued that the 
space for individual decision-making must be maximized to capitalize on entrepreneurial 
self-interest and rationality, which are otherwise stunted when social concerns limit their 
freedom. Also, individuals should have ultimate control over resources, as they will 
rationally exploit them for their own good. Policies that attend to social relations, such as 
addressing wealth inequality, substitute inferior social decision-making for superior 
individual.  
In addition to seeing social relations as central to life outcomes and a need to 
reformulate them, champions of the liberal consensus contended that society is an entity with 
the right to appropriate individual resources and to redistribute them to its members. 
Accordingly, politicians must make individual property available for redistribution and to 
ensure that the appropriated property is usefully distributed. Critics of the salience of society 
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object to the societal appropriation of resources, holding that individuals have a right to their 
property that is greater than society’s. For example, in Tax and Spend: The Welfare State, 
Tax Politics, and the Limits of American Liberalism, Molly Michelmore describes working 
class and middle class resentment that their tax dollars were being used to support the poor 
through welfare programs that emerged in the 1970s.42 Recently, supporters of the Tea Party 
movement claim that their property is protected from redistribution by the Constitution of the 
United States and the principles embraced by the Founding Fathers.43 
This privileging of the individual over society dovetails with the ascent of 
neoliberalism that began in the 1970s. Lawrence Grossberg connects assaults on the concept 
of society to the promotion of neoliberal capitalism. According to Grossberg, “neoliberals are 
radical individualists. Any appeal to larger groups…or to society itself, is not only 
meaningless but also a step towards socialism and totalitarianism.”44 As John Clarke 
describes neoliberal thinking, we live in a world “constituted out of individual interests and 
their interactions in markets,” of “[e]nterprising individuals seeking to provide for 
themselves and their families.”45  
Clarke argues that attacks on society seek to renaturalize inequality. Prior to such 
attacks, opponents of racial, gender, and economic inequality argued that such inequality was 
a result of social relations, rather than “natural” forces. Clarke suggests that new “‘anti-
social’ projects seek to locate differences somewhere other than the ‘social’… [t]hey attempt 
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Liberalism, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 119-122.  
 
43 See Elizabeth Price Foley, The Tea Party: Three Principles (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012).  
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to locate difference and inequality in discursive realms where they will once again become 
safe and manageable.”46 For example, the wants and needs that drive economic decisions are 
conceived of as natural, as if people have a natural drive to consume and work. Another 
“natural” characteristic is an individual’s moral character, which is an essential element of 
any person. Ronald Reagan saw morality as a “natural” factor determining socioeconomic 
status; he viewed the marketplace as a place that “rewarded good character and punished 
bad,” and he emphasized “moralistic, individualistic interpretations of a person’s 
socioeconomic status.”47  
Biology is another “natural” characteristic cited to explain inequality. For example, if 
racial minorities and women are either explicitly or implicitly accepted as inferior to white 
men, their subordination is expected and unproblematic. Altogether, according to “natural” 
thinking, we are not social creatures, but biological, geographic, or moral creatures. It is not 
government’s job to disrupt natural differences and the inequality that derives from them. By 
contrast, those who defend a vigorous concept of society find society to be “unnatural.” In 
their view, the promotion of “natural” explanations for inequality ignores social explanations 
for inequality. Such social explanations include, among many others, racism and inferior 
educational resources. These explanations of inequality underlay the liberal consensus’s 
welfare policies and economic intervention, which sought to reformulate socioeconomic 
relations that were detrimental to women, racial minorities, and the poor.  
Again, in the liberal consensus, government acts as society’s agent. Without society, 
government represents nothing, and loses its license to actively address social relations, for 
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they do not exist. Accordingly, efforts to disarticulate the concept of society are reflected in 
changes in governmental policy. Utilities have been privatized, school vouchers introduced, 
and proposals made to privatize Medicare and Social Security. Welfare is no longer 
guaranteed for poor people with children and work requirements for recipients have been 
imposed. These changes to welfare were done in the name of personal responsibility to care 
for oneself and one’s family, instead of a social responsibility to care for society’s poor who 
are victims of disabling social relations. If people cannot cope, it is because of natural 
deficiencies no ‘society’ can ameliorate.  
 
The celebration of laissez-faire capitalism 
 
The liberal consensus was supportive of capitalism and critical of socialism and 
communism. However, it doubted that unregulated capitalism worked to the advantage of the 
majority of Americans. Therefore, politicians subscribing to the liberal consensus introduced 
a variety of measures to regulate American capitalism, including welfare, work safety 
regulations, financial regulations, Medicare, price controls, and labor legislation, between the 
1930s and 1970s. These measures sought to limit the excessive concentration of power 
corporations and other large businesses obtained in unregulated capitalism, and to provide 
necessary goods, such as unemployment compensation and healthcare, the capitalist market 
could not guarantee on its own.  
Reagan and his ideological allies challenged this consensus. According to Reagan, 
instead of protecting and supporting Americans, government regulation and spending harmed 
them. He sought to reduce spending and regulations in order to unshackle the market from 
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government, and, as he put it in 1981, “Unleash the energy and genius of the American 
people, traits which have never failed us.”48 Reagan “insisted that the market aided the needy 
more capably than welfare,” generating “jobs and prosperity for all.”49 According to Gareth 
Davies, Reagan thought “poverty could be eliminated, if only capitalism—a universally 
efficacious and just economic system—were liberated from the leviathan state.”50 Rather 
than concentrating power and depriving Americans of their livelihoods, capitalism 
comprehensively disseminated prosperity.  
Neoliberalism contests the liberal consensus’s insistence on the need for government 
intervention into the economy. Neoliberalism calls for laissez-faire economic policies, 
opposing government regulation of industries, and welfare spending, among other forms of 
government intervention. In the 1990s, neoliberal champion Bill Clinton signed legislation 
deregulating the financial industry and ending guaranteed welfare for poor people with 
children. According to neoliberals, government intervention limits the capitalist market’s 
beneficial capacities. Neoliberals see the market as the most democratic, moral, and rational 
economic system. According to neoliberals, as Lawrence Grossberg observes, the market is 
“everything the United States is supposed to stand for, including the very meaning and 
practice of democracy and freedom.”51 Also, contrary to liberal notions that unregulated 
capitalism rewards avarice, neoliberals find the market to be, according to Grossberg, “an 
agent of morality, rewarding good behavior and punishing evil.”52 
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Conservatives believe that markets are the most rational mechanism for allocating 
resources. Government cannot move with adequate speed to account for changing economic 
conditions, do not have the profit motive that drives the efficiency of private enterprise, and 
lack the necessary information to make informed choices to account for diverse preferences 
and interests. Therefore, as much as possible should be marketized, including schools, 
utilities, prisons, and healthcare, in order to take advantage of consumer expertise and private 
enterprise’s efficiency. Altogether, because of the market’s immense and obvious virtues, 
limiting its reach and intervening into its operation is irrational, undemocratic, and immoral.  
 
 Welfare’s disruption of the traditional family 
 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, what welfare was known as before 1996’s 
welfare reform ended guaranteed welfare payments for poor children, was established during 
the New Deal. It was expanded throughout the 1960s and 1970s. It was intended to guarantee 
families with children a sustaining livelihood. However, welfare’s critics argued that instead 
of improving livelihoods, welfare harmed families’ quality of life.  
According to its critics, welfare destroys traditional two-parent families, or prevents 
their formation in the first place. Critics allege that providing money for each child born to 
single-mothers welfare provided incentives for having additional children. Also, 
disqualifying two-parent families creates a financial incentive for parents to not get married. 
Such arguments gained legitimacy after the 1985 publication of Charles Murray’s Losing 
Ground, which purported to statistically prove the destructive effects welfare had on two-
parent families.  
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These arguments underlay welfare reform efforts begun in the 1980s and succeeding 
in the 1990s. Lisa Gring-Pemble found that participants in Congressional hearings and 
debates that preceded the 1996 passage of the Personal Responsibility, Work, Opportunity, 
and Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)—which ended welfare’s entitlement status and imposed 
work-requirements on its recipients—blamed welfare specifically for instituting a vicious 
cycle of poverty. According to these claims, welfare impaired its recipients’ ability to 
participate in American economic life because of the injuries it inflicted on the traditional, 
two-parent family. The Congressional debates sought to affirm marriage as the foundation of 
society, “the crucible of American civilization: families safeguard core values by transmitting 
them to their children, a process that ensures a thriving and productive citizenship.”53 If the 
family is interrupted by welfare, so is the transmission of American values necessary for 
thriving in America, especially in its job market to subsequent generations.  
Celebrations of the traditional family became shorthand for attacks on structural 
efforts made by liberals to reduce poverty and racial inequality. Dana Cloud, examining the 
rhetoric of both the Democratic and Republican candidates for the presidency in 1992, asserts 
that the family values arguments that underpinned attacks on welfare had larger goals than 
discrediting welfare alone, but aimed to “emphasize[] personal responsibility rather than 
social context,” enabling the argument’s purveyors to reject the “material redress of 
economic need or the remediation of structural racism.”54 Instead of being the result of 
structural forces in society and the economy, welfare’s critics sought to portray the problems 
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of America’s poor as problems with its families. Ruth Sidel argues that “the demonizing of 
poor single mothers has been an integral part of the recent onslaught on the safety net.”55  
 
The crisis of expert authority 
Social science research and knowledge underlay many of the liberal consensus’s 
projects. Political decisions were conceived of as technical and not ideological decisions, 
based on social scientific findings derived from the rational application of scientific methods. 
Contesting its purported apolitical character, critics have alleged that the academic 
knowledge utilized in the liberal consensus’s project was corrupted by academia’s alleged 
relativism, which accepted all cultures and cultural practices as equal and worthy of respect. 
Critics charged that by validating alternative worldviews, relativist research abandoned the 
work of great Western philosophers and literary figures, the ideas of early-American political 
thinkers, and the basic American traditions of respect for family life and governmental 
authority, especially the police and military.  
 There is long history of the denigration of academic knowledge. The ridiculed 
‘egghead’ figure emerged in the 1950s, denoting intellectuals, including academics. Aaron 
Lecklider notes that ‘eggheads’ were constructed as anti-populist and dedicated to attacking 
traditional value systems.56 The egghead was also subversive, “so detached from the populist 
structures of American politics and the day-to-day operations of American industry that he 
could manage nothing more productive than to take out his frustrations by cooking up nasty 
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theories about the society that sustained him.”57 Vice President Spiro Agnew regularly 
inveighed against academics in the late 1960s and 1970s. He charged that in academia, “The 
lessons of the past are ignored and obliterated…a spirit of national masochism prevails, 
encouraged by an effete corps of impudent snobs who characterize themselves as 
intellectuals.”58 
In the decades following Agnew’s vitriol, the academy, especially the social sciences, 
has been criticized for its alleged relativism and political correctness. According to Allan 
Bloom, in today’s academy, relativism “is a moral imperative because its opposite is 
discrimination. This folly means that men are not permitted to seek for the natural human 
good and admire it when found, for such discovery is coeval with the discovery of the bad 
and contempt for it.”59 To its critics, the goal of academic research is to denigrate Western 
culture and promote leftist politics, minority cultures and alternative lifestyles. Academic 
critic and Hoover Institution fellow Victor Davis Hanson argues that the academy seeks to 
demonstrate “that the West—and the United States in particular—is inherently pathological, 
and has habitually oppressed the ‘other’ (at least when it was not borrowing or stealing the 
latter’s culture and superior ideas).”60 Hanson finds that academics resort to unethical means 
to prove the depravity of the West. They construct this narrative of Western exploitation by 
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“using selective evidence, applying asymmetrical standards of criticism,” and when “facts 
intervene, they are ignored or explained away.”61 
 Critics charge that academics find fundamental capitalist concepts necessarily 
exploitative and oppressive. According to Manhattan Institute fellow James Piereson, “our 
colleges and universities” argue that Western oppression “result[s] in large part [from] the 
nation’s commitment to property, individual rights, and the free market.”62 Therefore, 
allegations of oppression are tantamount to attacks on these concepts as well, enabling 
unjustified criticisms of capitalism. Hanson sees a tight relationship between attacks on 
Western civilization and leftist policy efforts. He argues, “Once the anti-Western narrative is 
canonized, all sorts of curriculum experts, community activists, special consultants, and 
politicians are needed to translate the new academic wisdom from the university to the 
pragmatic applications in the real world,” such as welfare and capitalist regulation.63 Leftist 
politics are ‘dividends’ of narratives critical of Western exploitation. 
 According to such critics, these misguided and corrupt academic practices mar the 
integrity and usefulness of any policy work that emerges from the academy. For example, 
according to this way of thinking, social science-informed welfare systems that provide 
money to single parents implicitly denigrate the value of traditional  two-parent families. 
Rehabilitation efforts deriving from psychology and sociology that attempt to engage with 
the socioeconomic circumstances of offenders’ lives ignore universal standards of conduct 
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and offer excuses for deviant behavior. Similarly, wrongly blaming capitalism for inequality 
and suffering ignores its obvious beneficence.   
 Altogether, academia’s detractors allege that academic experts have abandoned 
valuable traditions and clear standards of good and bad in their efforts to establish the 
legitimacy of minority cultures and non-traditional lifestyles in the United States. Critics of 
knowledge-based expertise have sought to replace expert knowledge with common sense, 
whose authority derives from life-experience rather than knowledge. Hence, knowledge of 
family finances provides a similar authority to evaluate macroeconomic policy. “Making it 
on one’s own” reveals the folly of welfare, and having friends of multiple races shows that 
racism is over. These views should, it is held, trump academic research, because the lived 
experience substantiating them cannot be wrong.64  
  
 
Role of the Media in Elevating Experience 
 
Media played a great role in elevating experience above expert knowledge. News 
accounts of issues and events are routed through individual narratives and confessions. For 
example, stories about taxes will focus on the condition of one taxpayer and, importantly, his 
or her feelings about his tax situation, instead of offering a macro-level analysis of tax codes 
and their history. However, a thinned out version of experience emerges in media accounts, 
one devoid of the nuance and complexity that expert knowledge, at its best, examines and 
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describes. Any individual narrative can be an avenue to understanding social complexity, but 
that is not the task of individual narratives in current media. Rather, they simply provide 
anecdote and personal confessions in place of analysis. This trend complements and 
buttresses victims’ rights efforts to elevate experience over expertise.  
 
Theoretical Orientation 
 
This discussion of my theoretical orientation begins by describing my cultural studies 
approach, which involves its contextualism, anti-essentialism, and anti-anti-essentialism, its 
concept of articulation, and an emphasis on the study of conjunctures. I also explore the 1978 
book Policing the Crisis, coauthored by Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John 
Clarke, and Brian Roberts. This text exemplifies the use of the concept of articulation to 
examine political change, and serves as an inspiration for this project.    
 
Cultural Studies  
Cultural studies uses objects and events to better understand contexts and 
conjunctures. Lawrence Grossberg describes cultural studies as a radically contextualist 
project, in which the “context is the beginning and end of our researches.”65 Examining any 
object or event is only constructive to the degree that it illuminates the dimensions and 
relations of a specific context. Contexts are articulated unities of many relations and 
practices, with articulation understood as the “ongoing effort (or process) to make, unmake, 
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and remake relations, structures, and unity (on top of differences).”66According to Stuart 
Hall, an articulation is a “form of connection that can make a unity of two different elements, 
under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute, and 
essential for all time.”67 The linkages produce the unities, not vice versa, as apparent 
unities—events, objects, practices—are only articulations of relations. Cultural studies’ 
understanding of contextualism is defined by the ‘‘idea of ‘relationality’, an idea that 
postulates a relation that precedes—is more fundamental ontologically—that the terms of the 
relationship.”68 
In understanding events and objects relationally, cultural studies seeks to avoid 
universalisms and essentialisms, insisting on the contingency and overdetermined quality of 
all contexts and the objects formed within them. Cultural studies’ anti-essentialism derives 
from its acceptance “that there are no guarantees of identity or effects outside of the 
determinations of a particular context.”69 Accordingly, any object or event within a context is 
determined by its relationship with other objects or events; the context can be seen as a unity 
that can be articulated in multiple ways. Therefore, as the context is continually rearticulated, 
objects, events, and identities determined by the relations of that context are subject to 
rearticulation as well.  
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This definition of anti-essentialism accepts that identities and effects exist, even if 
they are neither permanent nor essential. Paul Gilroy terms this insistence on identity and 
effects anti-anti-essentialism. In The Black Atlantic, Gilroy utilizes the concept to reject both 
essentialist notions of a pure reproduction of an absolutely exceptional black culture as well 
as efforts to totally dismiss and deconstruct black culture itself. In the former, the effects are 
guaranteed across contexts; in the latter, by contrast, the effects of blackness are dispelled in 
all contexts. In contrast to both positions, Gilroy’s anti-anti-essentialism finds blackness to be 
a “coherent (if not always stable) experiential sense of self,” that is “the product of social 
practices.”70 Though lacking an essence, blackness exists by virtue of the consistency of 
social practices, developed in response to, among other things, racism. Denying blackness’s 
existence is, according to Gilroy, a denial of “the undiminished power of racism itself and 
forsaking the mass of black people who continue to comprehend their lived particularity 
through what it does to them.”71 
As with Gilroy’s understanding of black racial subjectivity, the victims' rights 
movement itself and the victims articulated within the victims' rights movement are 
articulating relations and practices, rather than expressing a natural response to victimization 
or of the needs of a natural victim him/herself. The questions and problems of victims' rights 
movement’s addresses and shapes could be articulated differently, with, consequently, the 
victim produced in the victims' rights movement differing as well. For example, victims' 
rights could have been articulated in terms of social support for victims. Also, victims could 
have been articulated as psychologically unaffected by the criminal justice system’s 
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treatment of offenders. As Hall puts it, there is “no necessary, intrinsic, transhistorical” 
content to either the category victims or the victims’ rights movement.72 Nevertheless, 
following Gilroy’s anti-anti-essentialism, there is a consistent set of social practices in the 
victims' rights movement itself that produces a coherent victimhood and brings real political 
and social effects. In the victims' rights movement, victims expect and pursue participation, 
prosecution, and punishment. These expectations and the actions that seem to necessarily 
follow create a stable victim-identity, one who needs participation in the criminal justice 
system and harsh punishment of offenders to heal from the crime.  
Understanding the articulation of victims’ rights enables a more nuanced diagnosis of 
the current conjuncture. A conjuncture, like a context, is “a complex overdetermined and 
contingent unity.”73 In a conjunctural moment, the social formation is “fractured and 
conflictual.” In such a moment, one in which an accumulation of contradictions puts the 
social formation as a whole into crisis. 74 According to Hall, understanding conjunctures has 
been the central task of cultural studies. As quoted by Grossberg, Hall says that the 
‘‘commitment to understanding a conjuncture is what from the beginning we thought cultural 
studies was about.’’75  
This dissertation examines how victims’ rights was articulated to and operated within 
the struggle between the liberal consensus and its conservative critics in the current 
conjuncture. The struggle over the liberal consensus has cast into doubt the role of 
government in supporting the poor, with its critics maintaining that government’s role in 
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assisting the poor should be minimized. Victims’ rights coheres with numerous elements of 
attacks on the liberal consensus. It valorizes an experienced-based conception of authority; it 
promotes a conception of the traditional family as one that guarantees socioeconomic 
viability, yet whose integrity is threatened by government programs; victims’ rights presents 
an egalitarian picture of socioeconomic relations; finally, it is an attack on the integrity of the 
concept of society. Each of these elements of victims’ rights contradicts the liberal 
consensus, thereby bolstering conservative critics in their struggle with the liberal consensus 
in the current conjuncture.  
 
Policing the Crisis  
Policing the Crisis’s primary analytical focus is the discursive articulations of crime, 
culture, and politics. Focusing on Britain between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, it describes 
the crisis of the post-war consensus of social welfare spending and government economic 
intervention. It examines a series of articulations of varying scales, beginning with the 
articulation of a supposed epidemic of muggings committed by black youths in the early-
1970s. Muggings were seen, for example in the newspaper The Daily Mirror, as a 
“frightening new strain of crime.”76 This “epidemic” was all the more frightening because the 
perpetrators of these muggings were assumed to be black, who were relatively recent arrivals 
to Britain, and perceived as threatening to white British identity.  
However, Policing the Crisis demonstrates that far from being a new phenomenon, 
mugging was simply a new label for a crime that had existed for a century: robbery or assault 
with intent to rob. Also, the book explains that the rate of increase in its occurrence was 
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slowing when the problem was purportedly emerging. Policing the Crisis’s authors conclude, 
“The facts about the crimes which both the police and the media were describing as ‘novel’ 
were not new; what was new was the way the label [mugging] helped to break up and 
recategorize the general field of crime.”77 It was the way in which it was articulated as an 
epidemic, not the crime itself, which emerged in the early 1970’s.  
Judges, politicians, and the police argued that the mugging epidemic was caused by 
the criminal justice system’s lenient treatment of criminals. Their analysis of mugging’s 
causes and the argument for solving mugging was as follows: “rapid increase in crimes of 
violence plus ‘soft’ sentencing policy equals need to return to traditional ‘tough’ or deterrent 
measures.”78 The answer to mugging was to get tough on muggers, through enhanced police 
tactics and longer prison sentences.  
This approach to mugging implicitly defended a specific construction of British 
identity, threatened by criminality itself. Criminality signaled the decline of a certain tough 
British identity characterized by “self-reliance, self-control, the self-sacrifice for long-term 
goals and the competitive struggle which alone yields reward for the individual and the 
family.”79 Criminals, by contrast rejected self-reliance and self-control, taking the easy route 
to quick money by preying on other people rather than working for themselves, gaining 
rewards “without a day’s honest toil.”80 By being tough on them, the criminal justice system 
insisted on the virtue of disciplined self-reliance and self-control.  
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Muggers represented a double threat to British identity, as they not were not just 
criminals, they were black criminals. Blacks were seen as inferior to whites as a result of 
England’s colonial history, which had conquered “barbaric” peoples around the globe. The 
same people the British had colonized had, however, recently begun to arrive to live in 
England, disrupting the purity of white England.81 The press readily identified muggers with 
these immigrants, by identifying both the muggers as black and the areas in which the 
muggings occurred and the muggers lived as black. Black muggers represented a two-fold 
assault on British identity: both on its superior whiteness and its virtue of self-control and 
self-reliance.   
 Policing the Crisis describes the supposed mugging “epidemic” as just one of many 
articulations of the crisis of the post-war British consensus. In addition to criminals 
subverting British self-reliance and self-control, anti-war protesters were taking over 
university buildings; political militants spoke of “bringing the war back home;”82 rock stars 
and the counter-culture were glorifying sex and drugs and degrading the traditional family; 
miners were constantly on strike; and welfare recipients indolently wiled their days away. 
Mary Whitehouse, a Christian conservative and leading critic of the so-called ‘permissive 
society,’ articulated the aforementioned challenges together:  
The ‘Permissive Society,’ with its much vaunted ‘freedom,’ is now seen 
for what it is—a bitter and destructive thing. The arts are degraded, law 
is held in contempt and sport fouled by outbreaks of vandalism and 
violence. The national purse takes the strain of a health service 
overburdened with increasing abortion, drug addiction, mental 
disturbance, alcoholism and an epidemic of venereal disease.83 
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Just as the government needed to get tough on criminals, it needed to get tough on strikers, 
the counterculture, and welfare recipients. The problem with governing according to the post-
war consensus, the nascent conservative wing of the Conservative Party held, was the 
inability to be tough on any of these groups. Accordingly, Conservatives proposed cracking 
down on pornography, organized labor, and drug addicts, and instituting special courts with 
limited due process rights for countercultural political groups.  
In addition, resolving the crisis of the postwar consensus required getting tough on 
the British economic system itself. Under the post-war consensus, the government intervened 
into the economy in many ways, such as, for example, setting wages and prices and directly 
owning and managing industries. It also distributed welfare to the poor and expanded 
infrastructural and educational resources. In doing these things, it protected both businesses 
and the poor from the vicissitudes of the free market. However, this British social-democratic 
version of capitalism appeared to be in crisis, mired in a recession, with the post-war 
consensus seemingly without social-democratic options to lift the economy out of recession. 
It could not raise taxes without antagonizing the middle class, it could not cut spending 
without losing union support, but could not stay the course regarding spending without losing 
international credit. The Conservative Party’s solution included the painful measure of “deep 
surgical incisions” of welfare cuts.84 It also called for a “return to the discipline of the free 
market” by ending price controls and government subsidies.85 Without government’s 
assistance, businesses would fail and the poor would suffer, but the self-reliant and self-
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disciplined Brit articulated by the Conservative Party would weather the storm and be the 
stronger for it.  
Policing the Crisis is an exemplar for this dissertation’s project. It demonstrates the 
articulated character of social phenomena. The so-called mugging epidemic did not reflect 
statistical or historical reality. Instead it was an articulation of a new, ominous 
development—mugging—in British life. Similarly, victims do not appear in their natural 
form in victims’ rights, but are articulated as wounded, vengeful people. Both the mugger 
and the victim could be articulated differently; indeed, both have been at different historical 
junctures. Policing the Crisis also shows the centrality of articulatory work in political 
struggle. In order to advance their political and economic agenda, British conservatives 
articulated a series of sites as in crisis and then articulated them together to create the 
impression of a general crisis in the direction of the country. My dissertation describes some 
of the articulatory work done by American conservatives to achieve their goals. The 
promotion of victims’ rights stresses the importance of deference to individuals, not society. 
Finally, the British post-war consensus and the American liberal consensus shared many 
features, including support for organized labor and government interventions into the 
economy. In this dissertation, I endeavor to discuss the decline of the liberal consensus 
through victims’ rights just as Policing the Crisis examines the crisis of the post-war British 
consensus through the mugging “epidemic.”  
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Cultural Studies and Victims’ Rights 
  
 There has been limited cultural studies work on victims’ rights. Two books offer 
cultural studies analysis of victims' rights. Both share the assumption that victims and 
victims’ rights are articulations rather than expressions of or a response to some sort of 
natural victim-identity. Carrie Rentschler’s Second Wounds: Victims’ Rights and the Media 
in the U.S, however, for the most part, does not link victims’ rights to other political 
movements, as I attempt to do. In the other, Governing Through Crime: How the War on 
Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear, Jonathan Simon 
devotes one chapter to linking victims’ rights to other political developments, specifically 
attacks on the liberal consensus.  
 
Carrie Rentschler’s Second Wounds: Victims’ Rights and the Media in the U.S. 
 Carrie Rentschler’s Second Wounds: Victims’ Rights and the Media in the U.S. 
considers the work of non-governmental organizations devoted to advancing victims’ rights, 
by examining materials such as their websites and media training materials distributed to 
journalists. She focuses on the work of what she terms “secondary victims,” close family 
members of murder victims and others directly harmed by the criminal act. Rentshcler seeks 
to account “for how people come to occupy the political subject position of victim when they 
are the secondary victims of crime,” and the discursive dimensions of that occupation.86 She 
finds that the secondary victim phenomenon has expanded the forms of victimization. It is no 
longer only those who were directly victimized who count as victims in the criminal justice 
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and political systems, but their family members as well, who now influence legislation and 
participate in the criminal justice system.    
 For example, Rentschler looks at victims’ rights organizations’ training materials 
about engaging with the press and finds that they construct encounters with the press as both 
therapeutic for and potentially destructive to secondary victims. Also, she points out the ways 
that the portrayal of child victims of the Oklahoma City bombing in The Oklahoman mirrors 
the rhetoric of the anti-abortion movement by focusing on the untimely death of innocent 
victims. In this latter example, Rentschler links victims' rights discourse to seemingly 
unrelated discourse, that of the anti-abortion movement. This maneuver of articulating 
seemingly unrelated discourses is one I also attempt in my dissertation, linking the victims' 
rights movement to neoliberalism and the decline of the liberal consensus. However, such 
linkages are not the focus of Rentschler’s book, as her analysis primarily involves the ways 
various types of victims' rights materials provide a language of secondary victimization.  
We share the assumption that the victims' rights movement is an articulated discourse 
rather than a natural response to victimization. We both assume that victims constructed by 
the victims' rights movement are articulations rather than natural expressions of 
victimization. She argues against victims' rights assumptions of the natural vindictiveness of 
victims by focusing on the works of victims’ organizations critical of the tough-on-crime 
orientation of the victims' rights movement, such as Murder Victims Families for 
Reconciliation. These organizations deny that the use of violence enables secondary victims 
to heal from the crime’s trauma, a central tenet of victims’ rights.  
 
Jonathan Simon’s Governing Through Crime 
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Jonathan Simon’s Governing Through Crime shares my approach and focuses on the 
decline of the liberal consensus. In it, Simon argues that beginning in the 1960s, federal 
legislation valorized the crime victim as a figure worthy of concern and respect, making the 
crime victim, in Simon’s words, an “idealized political subject.” By “idealized political 
subject” Simon means a figure that demarcates the “proper scope and approach of 
government,” “whose circumstances and experiences have come to stand for the general 
good.”87 Simon argues that in American politics, how government addresses the plight of 
crime victims now sets the terms for how government should address other political issues.  
According to Simon, the construction of the crime victim as an idealized political 
subject began with the 1968 “Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,” which, among 
other provisions, authorized wire-tapping without a court order under certain circumstances 
and provided millions of dollars in grants to law enforcement agencies to develop new law 
enforcement programs. He argues that “Crime victims themselves remain just beneath the 
surface of the 1968 Act.”88 Simon’s evidence for the presence of crime victims in the 
legislation is Lyndon Johnson’s repeated expressions of concern for crime generally, rather 
than any provisions addressing victims in the legislation or explicit references to victims in 
political discourse. Talking about crime, Simon suggests, is tantamount to talking about 
victims, a conflation frequently made by politicians beginning in the late 1960s.   
By the 1990s, the victims’ rights movement was firmly established. Simons notes that 
in contrast to the 1968 “Safe Streets” act, crime victims are explicitly addressed in 1994’s 
“Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act.” The act provided victims and their 
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families the right to make statements concerning sentencing and parole decisions, “equivalent 
to the opportunity accorded to the offender to address the sentencing court or parole board.”89 
Simon suggests that the act promotes a certain kind of victim voice, that of “extremity, anger, 
and vengeance.”90 Victims, in Simon’s view, are not only angry with offenders, but with the 
alleged treachery of liberal government that enables victimization. Liberal government’s due 
process protections, “adversary process, bail, and parole [allows] people known (or believed) 
by the police to be criminals to leave prison early (or evade it altogether)” to victimize anew. 
91  
This analysis did not always prevail. Simon discusses how civil rights advocates and 
feminists blamed racial and sexual violence on racial and gender domination. The state’s 
failure to prosecute racial and sexual violence “constituted searing proof of the extreme 
asymmetries of race and gender relations, forms of violence that belied the claims of a moral 
foundation to existing hierarchies.” By contrast, victimization after victims’ rights has 
nothing to do with social domination, but is concerned with “big government itself,” its 
“elitism, poor morals, and perhaps corruption.”92 Racism and sexism are discarded as 
explanations in favor or liberal treachery and decadence.  
Once differentiated from the civil rights’ and feminist critiques of social hierarchies, 
the crime victim is easily linked to another ‘victim’ identity: that of the taxpayer outraged by 
liberal government, who is “victimized by government, threatened with the loss of wealth 
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and even the ability to own a home by an avaricious political establishment.”93 This linkage 
makes the besieged taxpayer an idealized political subject, whose interests are of paramount 
importance. Just as politicians have sought to align themselves with crime victims, 
lawmakers have striven to “never appear adverse to the interests of a political subject that is 
both taxpayer and (potential) crime victim.”94 Simon argues that crime victims “are in a real 
sense the representative subjects of our time. It is as crime victims that Americans are most 
readily imagined as united.”95 Political movements that link to victims’ rights capitalize on 
the universality of the crime victim subject, thereby universalizing their interests as well.   
Simon emphasizes the linkages between crime policy and larger American political 
formations. In examining the link between victims’ rights and the articulated plight of the 
American tax payers, Simon indirectly illuminates the connection between victims’ rights 
and the decline of the liberal consensus. As discussed above, critics of the liberal consensus 
argued that its efforts to redistribute resources via taxation violated the rights of taxpayers, a 
contention that implicitly questioned the salience of the concept of society underlying liberal 
redistributive efforts. This type of linkage is precisely what I attempt to expose throughout 
my dissertation.  
But Simon devotes just one chapter of his book to questions of crime victims. My 
analysis considers many elements of the victims’ rights movement that Simon does not, 
including the phenomenon of famous victims and prosecutors and judges making legal 
decisions on behalf of victims. I also examine articulations of crime victims, specifically 
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victims of domestic violence, before the ascent of victims’ rights. Finally, I look at several 
other ways victims’ rights relates to the liberal consensus, including its impact on the status 
of authority,  and its articulations of the traditional family and socioeconomic mobility.  
 
Relationship between Victims’ Rights and Civil Rights and Feminist Critiques 
 
 At first blush, victims’ rights shares elements with feminist and civil rights critiques. 
All are concerned with gaining power for populations that previously lacked it. Also, all 
called for ameliorating the harm caused by victimization. However, victims’ rights and 
feminist and civil rights critiques actually share very little. For victims’ rights advocates, 
crime is committed by bad people only because they are bad. This analysis negates political 
and social analysis along the lines of feminist and civil rights critiques, as it roots the causes 
of victimization in the evil of perpetrators and nothing more. Further, victims’ rights 
advocates are aligned with tough-on-crime advocates, who blame crime problems on a 
criminal justice system that is insufficiently harsh on criminals by wrongly focusing on 
rehabilitation. Rehabilitation ideas are to some degree consistent with strains of feminist and 
civil rights thought, as all endorse providing socioeconomic resources to change life chances. 
Therefore, the victims’ rights movement opposes fundamental aspects of feminist and civil 
rights critiques.  
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Chapter Summaries 
 
The dissertation proceeds chronologically through the development of victims’ rights. 
Chapter one focuses on the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s; Chapter two describes the 1970s, 
1980s, and 1990s; chapter three examines the 2000s, and chapter four the 2000s and 2010s. 
Chapter one details the epistemological assumptions underlying the victims' rights 
movement. The rest of the dissertation moves from private to public spaces. Chapter two 
focuses on the ways the family is configured in anti-domestic violence activism, and the 
rejection of that configuration in current anti-domestic violence policy framed by the victims’ 
rights movement. This vision of the family contrasts with the victims’ rights vision of family 
relations I examine in chapter three. In addition to the examination of the victims’ rights 
family, chapter three discusses the public space of broader political and economic relations 
between the dominant and subordinate classes in America. Finally, chapter four focuses 
entirely on public relations: the centrality of the concept of society in the liberal consensus 
and theories of punishment, and its absence in victims’ rights.   
 The discussion of the liberal consensus does not move chronologically like my 
discussion of victims' rights. I examine Lyndon Johnson in chapter three, who served as 
president after Harry Truman, who is discussed in chapter four. This non-chronological order 
preserves the movement from private to public spaces in my dissertation.   
 
Chapter One 
Chapter one examines the rearticulation of the liberal consensus’s knowledge-based 
conception of authority by the victims’ rights movement between 1968 and 1983. In the 
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liberal consensus, authority in government was presented as if it was based on expert 
knowledge, founded on and gained through, primarily, academic education or professional 
experience. For example, a sociologist has authority to produce anti-poverty policy after 
studying poverty for years. By contrast, victims’ rights rearticulated authority as properly 
based on life experience rather than knowledge. Under this conception, experience gives 
people expertise in a specific area even without any specific knowledge of that area. For 
example, if one knows how one’s household spends money, one has authority about national 
fiscal policy.  
I begin the chapter by comparing Richard Nixon’s articulation of authority in his 
1968 presidential campaign to his articulation of authority as president.  During his 1968 
campaign, Nixon deployed the experienced-based articulation of authority, by arguing that 
Americans understood both the dimensions of and necessary solutions to America’s crime 
problem merely because they live in the United States. As president, however, he articulated 
authority as being properly based on expert knowledge, relying on experts to improve 
prisoner rehabilitation efforts in the federal system. Such experts included psychiatrists, 
criminologists, and sociologists. 
 This reliance on expertise stood in contrast to the work of another figure, Frank 
Carrington, discussed in this introduction, supported punishment as the proper solution to 
victimization. Carrington’s term “victims’ rights” was virtually absent from news coverage 
of crime victims in the 1970s, except in connection to him. Carrington utilized the experience 
of actual victims for his tough-on-crime advocacy.  
Carrington generally advocated increasing the role of the victim in policy decisions 
and in individual cases. He valorized the evidentiary value of victims’ experience, and 
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dismissed social science research precisely because it is based on knowledge rather than the 
experience of victims. I examine the continuities between Carrington’s work and the Reagan 
Administration’s Task Force on Victims’ of Violence, on which Carrington served. The Task 
Force released its influential report in 1982, the first major political document supporting the 
nascent victims' rights movement. The report, which covered a wide range of topics, 
including bail decisions, criminal procedure, and sentencing laws, was based primarily on the 
views of crime victims. Adopting Carrington’s logic, the report argues that victims should 
have more influence over sentencing decisions than social workers and psychiatrists because 
such experts lack the experience of victimization, making them illegitimate authorities. The 
report constitutes a fitting end to the chapter, as it demonstrates the increased acceptance of 
the authority of experience. Reagan, like Nixon, advocated for experience-based authority as 
a presidential candidate. However, unlike Nixon, he also utilized it as president. The chapter 
concludes by considering ways that the attack on authority dovetails with new conservative 
articulations.  
 
Chapter Two 
Chapter two examines a response to victimization rejected by the victims’ rights 
movement: comprehensive material services for victims. Bypassing material services 
preserves notions of the inherent goodness and self-sufficiency of the family, which is used 
as the basis of attacks on one of the central elements of the liberal consensus: the need for a 
(modest) welfare state. In this chapter I discuss a type of victimization that indicates that the 
family is not necessarily good or self-sufficient: domestic violence, a type of victimization 
that necessitates material support for victims. However, domestic violence policy developed 
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in such a way as to silence critiques of the traditional family and its attendant calls for 
material support. I suggest that this course of development was due to the hegemony of the 
victims’ rights’ model that privileged criminal justice responses to victimization over 
material support. Chapter two describes a path not taken in responding to victimization. My 
consideration of this unchosen path sets the stage for my discussion of the path chosen—
victims’ rights—described in chapter three, which not only preserved the traditional family, 
but glorified it.  
In chapter two, I describe how early-domestic violence activism in the 1970s rooted 
domestic violence in traditional gender roles and the socioeconomic subordination of women. 
It held that men were socialized to enforce their authority in the traditional family through 
violence, and that women were unable to escape abusive situations because they did not have 
the material resources to live independently of their abusers. Anti-domestic violence activists 
proposed providing comprehensive social welfare resources to victims to enable them to live 
independently of their abusers.  
This version of the family contests the conservative articulation of the traditional 
family. Conservatives articulate the family as a self-sustaining unit, able through its normal 
operation to materially and emotionally provide for its members. The gravest threat to this 
self-sustaining family is welfare, which, according to conservatives, provides incentives for 
women to have illegitimate children and fathers to leave families. Welfare and the family 
exist in a zero-sum game; supporting welfare enfeebles the traditional family, and strong 
traditional families make welfare programs obsolete. Accordingly, attacks on welfare since 
the 1980s focus their criticisms around its allegedly destructive effects on the family.  
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By contrast, for anti-domestic violence activists, the family was often a self-
destructive unit. Also, welfare enhanced the health of family damaged by domestic violence, 
and did not compromise it. It would appear that the anti-domestic violence articulation of the 
family had a strong case: millions of incidents of domestic violence occur annually, and 
many incidents are repeat victimizations. Conservatives, heading off the threat of anti-
domestic violence activism, fashioned their own domestic violence rhetoric, which absolved 
traditional family norms and female subordination of any responsibility for domestic 
violence. Instead, according to a 1984 report issued by the Reagan Administration, domestic 
violence was due to aberrant assailants, who commit assaults for no discernible reason but 
malevolence, a malevolence best remedied through aggressive prosecutions and sanctions. 
This version of domestic violence has carried the day, as even anti-domestic violence policy 
championed by Democrats—who are presumably more amenable to welfare support for 
victims—follows the Reagan report’s template of minimal welfare support for victims and 
vigorous enforcement of criminal violations. This version of domestic violence preserves the 
self-sustaining mythos of the family that underlies conservative attacks on welfare.  
I assert that the criminal justice emphasis in domestic violence policy receives 
political support because of the dominance of victims’ rights. Like conservative domestic 
violence policy, victims’ rights attributes violence to aberrant individuals rather than 
socioeconomic causes, and responds to victimization through harsh sanctions, rather than 
material support for victims. The early anti-domestic violence and victims’ rights approaches 
are fundamentally incompatible: only one could emerge as the response to victimization. 
Similarly, welfare and valorization of the traditional family are incompatible articulations, 
and only one could become the dominant way of addressing family structure. In the chapter’s 
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conclusion, I note that both victims’ rights and its valorization of the traditional family have 
carried the day.  
 
Chapter Three 
In chapter three, I examine the Mark Lunsford narrative, a victims' rights crusader 
whose daughter Jessica was raped and killed by a previously-convicted sex offender. Since 
his daughter’s death in 2005, Lunsford crusaded across the country demanding that states 
pass ‘Jessica’s Law,’ which dramatically lengthens prison terms and intensifies post-prison 
surveillance, mandating lifetime registration and electronic tracking. He has been very 
successful: over 40 states have passed versions of ‘Jessica’s Law.’ Through his campaign 
Lunsford became a media celebrity and has been treated as a policy authority by media 
outlets and powerful politicians.  
Lunsford is a novel political advocate. At the time of his daughter’s murder he was a 
high school dropout and dump-truck driver living with his parents in a trailer home in rural 
Florida. He presented himself as a tough-talking, salt of the earth motorcycle enthusiast, with 
long hair, jeans, and an ever-present baseball cap. Despite his socioeconomically subordinate 
location, Lunsford gained access to the highest levels of political power, meeting with 
powerful figures and playing a central role in the passage of sex offender legislation across 
the country. He embodied the possibility of socioeconomic mobility typically unavailable to 
the socioeconomically subordinate poor and working class. If Lunsford can reach such 
heights, perhaps socioeconomic subordination is not a barrier to enjoying socioeconomic 
mobility.  
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This chapter addresses the disarticulation of the liberal consensus’s contention that 
forms of capitalism can immobilize Americans and its attendant doubts about the necessary 
beneficence of unregulated capitalism. I contrast the optimism of the Lunsford narrative with 
Lyndon Johnson’s and Franklin Roosevelt’s descriptions of the inegalitarianism and 
immobilizing effects of the American economic and political system, and with the policies 
they put in place to minimize these effects. Roosevelt posited that without government 
intervention, big business would paralyze workers and consumers in their socioeconomic 
locations. Johnson argued that the poor would not be able to escape poverty without 
government assistance. By contrast, Republicans reject the position that unregulated 
capitalism necessarily immobilizes subordinate populations, most recently by advancing a 
‘job creator’ discourse that denies the adversarial character of capitalism and silences 
concerns about the exploitative character of big business and the inability of capitalism to 
ensure mobility. I argue that narratives like Lunsford’s strengthen discourses celebrating the 
socioeconomic mobility of capitalism by articulating an egalitarian political system in which 
economic subordination is no obstacle to socioeconomic mobility, and in which the rich and 
poor have identical socioeconomic and political objectives. It also advances this contention 
by glorifying family relations, which, as discussed in chapter two, are arranged in a zero-sum 
game with government socioeconomic support. In this instance, the discourse valorizing 
Lunsford’s fatherhood weakens the need for welfare.  
 
Chapter Four 
In chapter four I explore the absence of society from victims’ rights discourse. I 
utilize two different victims’ rights practices to make this case. The first is the practice of 
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enabling indirect and direct victims to view executions; my examples are John Ashcroft’s 
2001 decision to allow victims or victims’ family members to view McVeigh’s execution, 
and the Texas Board of Corrections 1996 decision to allow indirect victims to view 
executions. I examine the absence of any concept of ‘society’ from discussions of both 
decisions. The second practice I consider is that of inviting victims to influence prosecutorial 
and judicial decisions. I provide numerous examples from North Carolina and South Carolina 
between 2009 and 2012 in which prosecutors and judges cited victims’ interests as 
justification for their pleas or sentencing decisions. Society is not discussed when the 
propriety of victims participation is addressed; as a result of this absence, it is treated as if it 
had no interests in the course of the criminal justice system, and, ultimately, does not exist as 
a consideration.  
I argue that this excision of larger social concerns from criminal justice is 
unprecedented. Social needs have always been the central consideration in penological 
theory, from Kant and Hegel to recent conservative criticisms of rehabilitation. Whether 
punishment is justified in order to rehabilitate offenders, achieve retribution, deter future 
offending, or incapacitate dangerous offenders, society’s interests are central. I describe the 
ways that American criminal justice has historically used punishment to advance societal 
aims, to demonstrate society's historical centrality in penological practices. 
I counterpose the absence of society in victims’ rights to its centrality in two other 
discourses: Harry Truman’s Fair Deal and John Locke’s conception of political society. I 
conclude by arguing that, without the consideration of social needs or a conception of 
society, neither the liberal consensus nor the United States Constitution as a document 
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founding a political society are possible. In the latter case, the result is that the Constitution is 
reduced to a ratification of an economic community.    
 
 
Conclusion  
My conclusion presents restorative justice as an alternative to victims’ rights, one that 
accommodates the tenets of the liberal consensus. Restorative justice takes many forms, but 
generally is a response to victimization in which offenders, victims, and members of the 
community meet to discuss the best way to repair the harm caused by the offender’s 
victimization of the victim. There are many types of repairs, including restitution, apologies 
and the assumption of responsibility by offenders, and psychological, medical, and other 
types of material support. Restorative justice valorizes knowledge-based authority, rejects the 
existence of unlimited socioeconomic mobility, endorses a strong view of society, and asserts 
that the nuclear family is not enough to ensure the care of its members, all positions that 
accord with the liberal consensus.  
 
Personal Investment 
 
Both of my parents were public defenders when I was very young, and their 
representation of indigent defendants lingered in my head as a crucial method of protecting 
poor people as I was growing up and in college. In 1979, my mother appeared in a film 
entitled The Shooting of Big Man, which documented a criminal trial from the defendant’s 
arrest through his acquittal. My mother was one of his lawyers. Part of his defense involved 
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bringing the jury to the scene of the crime, a seedy hotel filled with drug addicts and violent 
crime, in order for the jury to understand the defendant’s state of mind when he shot the 
victim, a fearsome predator who robbed people and sexually assaulted women. By doing this, 
she assumed that the jury’s perception of the defense’s case depended on where the jurors 
were when they heard it. An assault that may have seemed unjustified when described in a 
courtroom appeared justified when portrayed in the Pearl Hotel. Who the jurors were, 
whether they were people who were going to convict or acquit, depended on where they were 
and what they were doing. No concrete juror essence transcended all contextual specificity. 
By contrast, the victims' rights movement insists on a concrete victim essence that exists 
outside of any specific context in which victims appear.  
Sadly, my mother was dead before the film was aired on ABC. After college, I 
worked as an investigator for the same public defender agency my parents served in the 
1970s. I interviewed hundreds of victims, asking every one of them, “What would you like to 
see happen in this case?” All almost of the victims answered this question in one of two 
ways. Some said they wanted the defendant to get help. Others said they thought the 
defendant should be punished so they would learn their lesson and not commit further 
criminal acts. Never did a victim tell me, “I want him to be punished because it would make 
me feel better,” or any other statement that connected their well-being to the defendant’s 
sentence. These anecdotes suggest that victimization does not create a concrete essence 
demanding punishment, as the victims' rights movement asserts.  
Perhaps, many—if not most—of them may have just been saying what they thought I 
wanted to hear, and they would tell the prosecutor something completely different.  This 
raises the question, who was the real victim, the one who wanted the defendant to reform 
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their behavior or the one that sought punishment to make themselves feel better? It is 
impossible to know. In each context victims, for understandable reasons, performed their 
victimhood differently depending on the demands of the situation. Victimhood, accordingly, 
was dynamic and contingent, and not the everlasting essence victims’ rights advocates 
articulate.   
Victims’ rights advocates cite this foundational victimhood to justify inflicting great 
amounts of pain on defendants and offender. While it never makes this aim explicit, the 
victims’ rights movement is primarily dedicated to increasing violence, through increasing 
prison sentences, making prison conditions harsher, and enabling more executions. Its 
justifies these increases in violence by citing their analgesic effect on victims, suggesting that 
a victim’s well-being depends on the suffering or death of another human being, a perverse 
and pathetic formulation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter One: Victims’ Rights’ Disarticulation of Expert Authority 
 
Introduction 
 
  In Nixonland, Rick Perlstein argues that Richard Nixon’s political style fractured the 
United States into two opposing political formations. One formation, which Nixon termed the 
‘Forgotten Americans,’ were white members of the working class, who supported the 
military, police, and traditional sexual and cultural mores, and also believed in the concept of 
American exceptionalism. Elites, on the other hand, were liberal city-dwellers and workers in 
the media and academy, corrupted by moral permissiveness, who held naïve political views 
that failed to account for the evils of communism and the counter-culture. They questioned 
the virtue and legitimacy of elected political leaders, the traditional family, and America’s 
role in the world, including its waging of the Vietnam War. According to Nixon, elites 
looked down upon Forgotten Americans for their “simple faiths of ordinary folk, their simple 
patriotism, their simple pleasures.”96  
To exploit this opposition, Nixon refrained from promising Forgotten Americans the 
educational or cultural resources needed to become elites. Instead, he pledged to stifle the 
elites’ insidious influence by celebrating traditional values and using them to shape federal 
policy. That is, he elevated Forgotten Americans above elites. Nixon and his allies 
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continually argued that the characteristics that seemingly marked elites as superior decision-
makers—their education and worldliness—were precisely what disqualified them as 
legitimate wielders of authority.  
Perlstein terms these two opposing formations, the Forgotten Americans and elites, 
the Orthogonians and Franklins, adopting these terms from the names of social groups at 
Nixon’s alma mater, Whittier College. At Whittier, Nixon was one of the Orthogonians, who 
were poorer, commuted to school, and continually strove to improve their social and 
academic position. Franklins, on the other hand, were Whittier’s “well-rounded, graceful” 
upper social caste, arriving at Whittier with the social and economic capital Orthogonians 
lacked.97 According to Perlstein, Nixon concluded that Orthogonians outnumbered Franklins 
at Whittier and in the United States, and a political candidate could win their support by 
appealing to their wounded pride and resentment for the imagined insults hurled and injuries 
inflicted by Franklins, rather than projecting a political vision in which Orthogonians 
endeavored to become Franklins themselves.  
Nixon successfully deployed this political strategy and won two presidential 
elections, the second in a landslide. However, Nixon’s attitude towards the opposition 
between Forgotten Americans and the elites was fundamentally different while he was 
president, when he depended on the elites he had previously denigrated to develop policy 
initiatives. This shift represents Nixon’s oscillating attitude towards the proper concept of 
authority, and this oscillation mirrors the larger struggle for the dominant articulation of the 
concept of authority between two opposing views. The first articulates authority as a properly 
based on life experience. The second articulates authority as properly based on knowledge 
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obtained through research and education. As a campaigner, Nixon valorized the first 
articulation; as president, he utilized the second.  
As in Nixon’s first victorious president campaign in 1968, Ronald Reagan’s 
successful 1980 presidential campaign appealed to authority predicated on experience rather 
than knowledge. For example, in his 1980 Republican nomination acceptance speech, he 
argued that the experience of economic hardship renders academic economic analysis 
obsolete: “Ours are not problems of abstract economic theory. Those are problems of flesh 
and blood; problems that cause pain and destroy the moral fiber of real people who should 
not suffer the further indignity of being told by the government that it is all somehow their 
fault.”98 In the same speech, he elevated the everyday knowledge of the people over that of 
economic experts and government bureaucrats by pledging that his economic policy will not 
be based on “any new form of [economic] tinkering or fiscal sleight-of-hand. We will simply 
apply to government the common sense we all use in our daily lives.”99 However, Reagan did 
not adopt Nixon’s shift to knowledge-based authority after his election, as evidenced in his 
promotion of victims’ rights early in his first term in office. Since its beginnings in the 1970s, 
the victims’ rights movement has relied upon experience-based conception of authority. In 
victims’ rights advocacy, victims themselves, whose authority is derived from their 
victimization, are the primary authorities, rather than academics or lawyers whose authority 
derives from knowledge gained through education or professional endeavors. Reagan 
embraced this conception of authority as both candidate and president.  
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In this chapter, I examine the changing articulations of authority in American politics 
between 1968 and 1982 that resulted in the dominance of experience-based authority in the 
victims’ rights movement. I begin by examining the contradiction between Nixon’s 
campaign-style, predicated on experience-based authority, and his major criminal justice 
policy initiative, prison reform, which was guided by knowledge-based authority. I then look 
at the work of Frank Carrington, a lawyer whose writings, published in the 1970s, pioneered 
much of the discourse of the victims’ rights movement and set the stage for its emergence in 
the 1980s. In addition to privileging victims’ opinions, he also condemned the philosophical 
and ethical foundation of knowledge-based authority, a condemnation he extended to a wide 
variety of actors, including social workers and professors whom he termed ‘anti-victim.’  The 
chapter ends with a discussion of Reagan’ 1982 Task Force on Victims of Crime, examining 
the similarity between the articulation of authority in the Task Force’s report and that used by 
Nixon in his 1968 campaign.   
In this chapter, I want to suggest that the adoption of an experience-based concept of 
authority by a sitting president and not merely a presidential candidate reflects the increased 
hegemony of the articulation of experience-based authority in many political issues, a change 
whose consequences are examined at the end of the chapter, and a change that works to 
promote conservative policy positions.  
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The Contradiction Between Nixon’s Campaign Style and Prison Reform Efforts 
 
Campaigning on Experience-Based Authority 
Nixon aggressively articulated the Franklin/elite versus Orthogonian/Forgotten 
Americans binary in his discussion of criminal justice during his 1968 presidential campaign. 
Criminal justice was central to Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign. The Chicago Tribune 
declared “Crime is Nixon’s Prime Issue.”100 Nixon’s Vice Presidential nominee Spiro Agnew 
repeatedly assailed Hubert Humphrey and Democrats for being ‘soft on crime’ and  
proclaimed that “the words ‘law and order’ are going to ring through the campaign…Richard 
Nixon uses the term as a pledge, as a commitment to America.”101 Nixon magnified the 
consequences of crime by tying them to America’s foreign policy prestige. In his 1968 
Republican nomination acceptance speech, Nixon claimed, a “nation that can’t keep the 
peace at home won’t be trusted to keep the peace abroad.”102 
He used issues such as ‘law and order’ to flatter the Forgotten Americans’ acuity, and 
held that Americans accurately evaluated problems of ‘law and order’ in the course of their 
everyday lives. The extensive measures Americans took to avoid victimization accurately 
reflected the severity of ‘law and order’ problems themselves, instead of representing a 
distortion of the problem.  Accordingly,  
It is not a Great Society when millions of women refuse to walk in their 
neighborhood or visit their parks after dusk—out of fear. It is not a 
Great Society when millions of men buy locks for their doors and 
watchdogs for their homes and rifles and pistols for themselves—out of 
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fear. The American people are bolting their doors and arming 
themselves because they are rapidly losing confidence in the capacity 
and determination of government to defend them and their families and 
their property from crime and criminals.103  
 
For Nixon, the fact that Americans thought there was a crime problem proved the existence 
of a crime problem and the risk of victimization, and thus demonstrated the need for Nixon’s 
aggressive ‘law and order’ policy proposals.  
Nixon articulated the magnitude of the crime problem as one immediately accessible 
to all Americans merely through their hearing and vision. In his 1968 Republican nomination 
acceptance speech, Nixon surmised, “As we look at America, we see cities enveloped in 
smoke and flame. We hear sirens in the night.”104 Witnesses to this battleground included 
“the great majority of Americans, the Forgotten Americans, the non-shouters, the non-
demonstrators.”105 Forgotten Americans, qua Forgotten Americans, had not gone to school to 
learn criminology, nor had they worked in the criminal justice system. Instead, they “work in 
American factories, they run American businesses. They serve in government; they provide 
most of the soldiers who die to keep it free. They give drive to the spirit of America.”106 In 
specifying vocations that do not require post-secondary education, Nixon implicitly confirms 
the authority of those without such an education, who authority is possible precisely because 
of that lack of advanced education.  
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According to Nixon, the Forgotten Americans also had the ability to execute 
authoritative legal analysis. In his nomination acceptance speech he proclaimed, “Let us 
recognize that some of our courts in their decisions have gone too far in weakening the peace 
forces against the criminal forces in this country,” referring to 1960s Supreme Court 
decisions protecting due process rights. His use of the word ‘recognize’ suggests that 
Forgotten Americans reach undeniable legal conclusions rather than subjective conjectures. 
Forgotten Americans see, not interpret. This estimation of Forgotten American’s legal 
acumen exemplifies Nixon’s flattering of layman authority. During his speech, Nixon shifted 
from referring to Forgotten Americans as ‘they’ to ‘us,’ thereby including himself among the 
Forgotten Americans critical of the Supreme Court. Criticisms of the Warren Court were 
common from conservative legal practitioners, academics, and politicians, a group that 
included Nixon. However, he conflates the Forgotten Americans’ legal sensibility with that 
of conservative legal elites by using ‘us’ in the above quote. Forgotten Americans, he asserts, 
are as ‘elite’ as these elites.  
Nixon’s aggrandizing of the Forgotten Americans’ authority occurred through the end 
of Presidential campaign. It became, as the New York Times noted, his “usual apostrophe.” 107 
In early September Nixon contrasted “working men” with “shouters and protestors and 
demonstrators,” the latter a catch-all category that included academics, civil rights leaders, 
celebrities, and anti-war protestors; in other words, Franklins.108 In late September, Nixon 
pledged to “hear not only the clamorous voices of the organized, but also the quiet voices, the 
inner voice—that voices that speak from the heart and the conscience. These are the voices 
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that carry the real meaning and the real message of America.”109 In October, he dismissed 
liberal and left-wing portrayals of America as a ‘sick’ society by arguing that the Forgotten 
Americans “weren’t sick…or if they were sick, they were sick because of what’s happened in 
the last four years [under Lyndon Johnson].”110 Their own health, rather than the 
pronouncements of experts, stood as the testament to the direction of the country. Altogether, 
every invocation of Forgotten Americans by Nixon glorified their epistemological authority 
cited in his nomination acceptance speech.   
 
 
Governing with Expert Authority 
The valorization of experienced-based authority in Nixon’s campaign was 
contradicted by the articulation of authority guiding his criminal justice policies while 
president. Despite Nixon’s assertions during his campaign that personal experience and 
observation constitute the proper basis for policy-making authority, his prison reform effort, 
begun in 1969, relied primarily on the work of academics, attorneys, psychiatrists, and social 
service providers. Such figures’ authority derives from knowledge and expertise, and the 
legitimacy of their authority was compared unfavorably to the Forgotten Americans during 
his campaign.  
The primary goal of Nixon’s prison reform proposals was to improve the 
effectiveness of rehabilitation efforts for prisoners in federal custody. His proposals utilized a 
variety of resources, including educational opportunities, psychological therapy, and drug 
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and alcohol addiction treatment. Nixon argued that improving rehabilitation efforts would 
both benefit federal inmates and serve as a model for state and municipal prisons. Speeches 
delivered by Nixon, Congressional testimony by members of his cabinet, and the report of a 
Task Force on Prisoner Rehabilitation convened by Nixon called for expanding scientific 
research into correctional methods, and cited research findings demonstrating the existence 
of successful rehabilitation methods to justify an increase in resources devoted to such 
programs.    
 In his November 13, 1969 “Statement Outlining a 13-Point Program for Reform of 
the Federal Corrections System,” his first statement on prison reform, Nixon proclaimed:  
Many correctional programs are based more on tradition and assumption 
than on theories which have been scientifically tested. Few of our 
programs have been closely studied to see just what results they bring. 
Clearly the poor record of our rehabilitative efforts indicates that we are 
doing something wrong and that we need extended research both on 
existing programs and on suggested new methods.111 
 
The difference between experience-based authority and knowledge-based authority is evident 
in this starting point of his prison reform effort. It derogates an emphasis on “tradition” and 
“assumption,” both hallmarks of the ways the Forgotten American makes political decisions.  
At the conclusion of his speech, Nixon directed his Attorney General, John Mitchell, 
to organize a task force to find ways to improve rehabilitation and report back within six 
months. Mitchell did not look to Forgotten Americans for input on ways to improve 
rehabilitation. Instead, the Task Force on Prisoner Rehabilitation was composed entirely of 
professional, medical, and academic experts, whose work and political positions utilized 
knowledge gained through research. Task Force members included: Emroy Hodges, a 
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psychiatrist who examined methods of predicting juvenile delinquency; Karl Menninger, a 
psychiatrist who argued that criminality could be reduced via psychiatric treatment and 
criticized punishment-based correctional models; and criminologist Norval Morris, an 
innovator of methods designed to improve prisoners’ outcomes upon their release.  
The Task Force released a report in April, 1970, entitled “The Criminal Offender—
What Should Be Done?” The report opens with an unequivocal endorsement of the value of 
research in improving correctional policy: “We concluded early that there was no need for us 
to search for new ideas about rehabilitating prisoners. The voluminous literature on the 
subject overflows with excellent ideas that never have been implemented nor, in many cases, 
even tested.”112 The report attributes the failure to implement and test such ideas to the 
“almost total lack of basic data about offenders,” preventing “precise knowledge about what 
kinds of correctional programs succeed with what kinds of offenders.”113 It goes on to argue 
that “we are sure that many ongoing correctional programs would be strengthened or altered 
or abandoned, and many new ones would be organized, if correctional authorities knew a 
little more about the way offenders of various kinds respond to treatments of various 
kinds.”114  
In addition to calling for increasing the amount of data on prisoners available to 
researchers, the report endorses the utilization of existing knowledge in developing new 
correctional facilities and programs. Its recommendation of specialized mental and narcotics 
treatment prisons called for compliance with best practices and a reliance on the United 
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States Public Health Service, because of the “great amount of knowledge it has acquired over 
the years from operating its institutions for addicts.”115  
Lastly, the report endorses rehabilitation methods developed through years of 
research, application, and evaluation. For example, the report calls for expanded community 
corrections programs, which bypass adjudication and imprisonment in order to provide 
access to “community pre-adjudication services of many kinds: diagnostic, therapeutic, 
counseling and guidance, educational, employment, the entire spectrum.”116 The Forgotten 
American was not involved in the development of the disciplines on which these services are 
predicated. The Forgotten American’s common sense method of analysis does not resemble 
that required to develop, for instance, therapeutic techniques. Business owners and factory 
workers could not, without education and training, provide many of the services available 
through community corrections programs.  
The report complemented additional efforts by Nixon’s cabinet members to 
implement prison reforms, which were similarly predicated on the authority of expert 
knowledge and scientific research. In a 1971 speech to the first National Conference on 
Corrections, Attorney General John Mitchell proposed establishing a National Corrections 
Academy, which would serve as “center for correctional learning, research, executive 
seminars, and development of correctional policy recommendations,” that “cover the whole 
range of correctional disciplines” and “[p]rovide a continuing meeting ground for the 
exchange of advanced ideas on corrections.”117 He also described the groundbreaking of a 
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federal corrections facility in Butner, North Carolina that would “provide treatment for and 
research on special groups of offenders, including the mentally disturbed.”118 Mitchell’s 
successor, Richard Kleindienst, continued such efforts into Nixon’s second term, including 
the wider use of rehabilitative techniques.119Norman Carlson, Nixon’s director of prisons, 
testified before the Subcommittee on National Penitentiaries in 1972 that “Recent research 
indicated that one third of all offenders being committed to Federal institutions have serious 
histories of drug usage. We now have ten intensive programs in operation for the treatment of 
these offenders,”120 which are directed by “professionals in behavioral science…such as 
psychiatrists.”121 The reliance on traditional experts in Nixon’s prison reform program was 
characteristic of his approach to addressing criminal justice issues while in office.  
 
Frank Carrington and the Foundations of the Victims’ Rights Movement 
 
The work of Frank Carrington in the 1970s cleared the ground for the emergence of 
victims’ rights and the Task Force in 1982. Carrington valorized the authority of victims’ 
experience and he excoriated various figures involved in the criminal justice system, such as 
attorneys, judges, social workers, and prison reformers for being, as he saw it, anti-victim, 
because, in part, they valued knowledge more than victim experience. In opposing victims to 
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such professionals, he replicated the opposition between Forgotten Americans and elites 
Nixon articulated during his 1968 presidential campaign.  
Before becoming Executive Director of the Americans for Effective Law 
Enforcement (AELE), an organization devoted to a range of conservative criminal justice 
objectives, Frank Carrington worked as both a treasury agent and a legal advisor to the 
Denver Police Department. Throughout the 1970s, he worked at various non-governmental 
organizations advocating for new legal and policy responses to criminal victimization.  As 
described in the introduction, Carrington promoted his policy ideas in newspaper editorials, 
law review articles, as well as The Victims (1975) and Neither Cruel Nor Unusual (1978), 
books presaging many of the victims’ rights arguments that eventually achieved dominance. 
His victim advocacy proposals challenged criminal defendants’ due-process rights and called 
for tougher sanctions, and he vigorously celebrated and promoted the death penalty.  
Carrington was an early pioneer of the term ‘victims’ rights’ to refer to the disparate efforts 
described below; it was not—and is not—a term anti-domestic violence or anti–rape activists 
utilized in their efforts to prevent victimization and improve post-victimization experiences. 
Carrington’s prominence as a victims’ rights warrior throughout the 1970s led to his 
inclusion on the 1982 President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime, which I examine later in 
this chapter. 
Carrington called for changing both civil and criminal laws to assist victims. While 
his ideas about criminal and civil law differed from one another regarding the treatment of 
defendants and offenders, in both contexts Carrington sought to reduce the power of judges, 
attorneys, and prison officials. Carrington championed the use of civil suits by victims to 
obtain financial damages. In such suits, victims did not sue offenders, but third-parties who 
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enabled their victimization. For example, a child’s family sued the State of Washington, 
alleging that it acted improperly when a psychiatric institute placed a patient on out-patient 
status who subsequently molested and murdered their child.122 In another, a woman 
successfully sued a motel chain who provided faulty door locks.  
Similar to the Forgotten Americans’ resentment of institutional, knowledge-based 
expertise, Carrington viewed successful suits against businesses and state institutions as a 
way of holding “faceless bureaucrats” accountable for the consequences of their decisions, 
“to force them to confront the now remote and anonymous victims of wrong decisions.”123 
Through these types of lawsuits Carrington sought to bring elites face to face with the ugly 
truth of their complacent business practices and naïve institutional investment in scientific 
knowledge: they can lead directly to rape and murder. Carrington hoped that through 
successful victim lawsuits against third parties, institutions would learn to keep the specter of 
victims’ suffering foremost in their decision making, rather than deferring to business 
considerations or the dictates of psychiatric practice.  
In addition to promoting the use of civil suits, Carrington also advocated changing 
how defendants’ and offenders’ due process rights were adjudicated in order to, as he saw it, 
increase victims’ well-being and respect previously unrecognized victims’ rights. 
Carrington’s connection between, on the one hand, victim well-being and the integrity of 
their rights, and, on the other, the criminal justice system’s treatment of offenders, was 
cemented in the 1970s, and remains hegemonic today. For Carrington, the two terms exist in 
a negative relation with one another: strengthening victims’ rights necessarily weakens 
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offenders’ and defendants’ rights, and, conversely, vigorously protecting defendants’ and 
offenders’ due process rights compromises victims’ rights and harms victims. 
Carrington began articulating policies tough on offenders and defendants to victims’ 
rights and well-being in the 1970s, long before any explicit victims’ rights discourse or 
legislation emerged. His early victim advocacy took the form of attacks on offenders and 
defendants. For example, Carrington devoted a chapter of his book The Victims to criticizing 
the exclusionary rule, asserting that any protections defendants derive from the constitutional 
protection against illegal search and seizure result in injuries to the victim.124 In 1972 
Congressional testimony, he described the AELE, primarily dedicated to promoting tough 
crime policies, as “frankly a victim-oriented organization.” In a 1976 article, Carrington 
argued, “Everything we do is geared to the victims of crime. We are seeking a balance 
between the rights of victims, who are primarily ignored, and the accused.”125  
Carrington saw a criminal justice system suffering from a tremendous imbalance in 
defendants’ and offenders’ favor. In a 1972 letter to the New York Times concerning the 
California Supreme Court’s decision to outlaw the death penalty, Carrington alleged that the 
court’s ruling “exhibits a total contempt for the actual and potential victims of murderers.”126 
In his advocacy, Carrington shift the balance of rights, privileges, and protections in the 
victims’ favor. In 1972 Congressional testimony he argued, “Perhaps the rights of potential 
victims and actual victims should be weighed much more heavily in the balance, than the 
rights of the convicted killers… [the AELE] believe[s] that many of those who advocate for 
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the abolition of the death penalty evidence a highly unrealistic and loftier disregard for the 
plight of the actual victims of countless murderers.”127  
In his journalism and Congressional testimony, Carrington never spelled out the 
specific ways that defendants’ and offenders’ rights diminish whatever rights victims 
possess. Journalists writing about Carrington and his efforts similarly failed to explain the 
opposition between defendants’ and offenders’ rights and victims’ rights. For example, in a 
1976 article, Carrington states his intent to “balance” victims’ and offenders’ rights, by, 
among other things, fighting against the exclusionary rule. The articles make no attempt to 
explain the link between due process protections and victims’ rights and well-being. A 1977 
article discussed Carrington’s promotion of civil suits, stating, “It should be noted 
that…Carrington may not be overly preoccupied with the rights of criminals,” citing his 
“disinterest in talk of criminals’ rights or rehabilitation if it takes precedence over victims’ 
rights.”128 Though at the time of its publication the concept of victims’ rights was novel and 
not widespread, the article failed to explain how rehabilitation and due process rights affect 
victims, or how they in any way could take precedence over victims’ rights. This omission 
was characteristic of journalism covering the early-victims’ rights movement, an omission 
that surely eased the emergence of victims’ rights on a broader platform in the early 1980s.  
Carrington’s writing and advocacy articulated a series of antagonisms dividing 
American culture and politics in the 1970s. These antagonisms varied in scope, starting on a 
micro-level antagonism between individual victims and offenders and defendants (Carrington 
conflated offenders and defendants), and expanding to cohere with the national dichotomy 
Perlstein described in his Nixonland: Franklins versus Orthogonians, i.e., the Forgotten 
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Americans besieged by crime versus the elites whose policy positions and scientific 
attachment allegedly nurture criminality. 
In American law, criminal cases are termed state v. defendant and not victim v. 
defendant. This formulation follows from the thought of John Locke. As recounted in greater 
detail in chapter four, Locke’s social compact theory held that exiting the state of nature and 
creating society requires the state to assume prosecutorial and punishment responsibilities 
from individuals. According to Locke 
 
all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the 
community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, 
and the same to all parties; and by men having authority from the 
community, for the execution of those rules, decides all the differences 
that may happen between any members of that society concerning any 
matter of right; and punishes those offences which any member hath 
committed against the society, with such penalties as the law 
established.129  
 
Therefore, historically, the fundamental antagonism in American criminal cases is between 
defendants and the state, rather than defendants and victims. Nevertheless, Carrington treated 
as axiomatic that the fundamental antagonism is, in fact, between defendants and victims.130  
Carrington posited a second antagonism, one between victims of capital murder and 
their families on one side and capital punishment’s opponents on the other. In arguing that 
capital punishment abolitionists oppose victims, he reduced debates about capital punishment 
to the stark question “who are you for, the criminal or the victim?” and concluded that 
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abolitionists are for the criminals and against victims.131 Carrington conceded that many 
abolitionists may reject the anti-victim label and abhor the crimes committed by those on 
death row and the suffering caused by those crimes. However, it is “utter nonsense” that one 
can be both anti-death penalty and supportive of victims, for “if you go to bat for the 
‘sanctity’ of the life of a murderer, you are by definition taking a stance completely opposed 
to his victims.”132 What, according to Carrington, prevents an abolitionist from being both 
supportive of and sympathetic to victims and  against capital punishment? According to 
Carrington, because abolitionists “fight so tirelessly to spare the life of Richard Speck” who 
murdered eight women in 1966, “they are at the same time saying that the lives of [his 
victims] are of little consequence.”133 He asked, “Were the lives of those eight student nurses 
worth nothing more than an easy jail term?”134 According to Carrington, abolitionists have 
the power to establish the ‘worth’ and “consequence” of a victim’s life, and by opposing the 
death penalty they devalue those lives In other words, an offender’s death is a form of 
currency, exchangeable for the ‘lives’ of the deceased victims. As a result of this, not 
executing the offender establishes that victims’ lives are worthless.  
Because victims of capital crimes are dead, the meaning of a victims’ life is not, 
strictly speaking, meaningful for the victim him or herself. Instead, the worth and 
consequence of a deceased victim is only meaningful to the friends and family of the victim. 
Accordingly, the antagonism is between abolitionists and the victims’ friends and family. 
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The rationales underlying each sides of the antagonism Carrington constructs are 
fundamentally different. For abolitionists, their advocacy is based on the acceptance of a set 
of abstract principles concerning justice. For them, killing someone is wrong, even if they 
hate the person on death row. For family members, their opposition to abolitionists is 
predicated solely on love for their dead family member. In framing the issues of capital 
punishment by setting up an antagonism between abolitionists and family members, 
Carrington forced the question of the basis on which policy decisions should be made: 
abstract principles or felt emotions.  
Carrington’s third antagonism existed between those who advocated for due process 
protections for defendants and victims themselves. He described it as a “common-sense 
thesis…that the victims of crime should have some rights too, but that their rights have 
become more and more attenuated as our criminal justice system pursues its single-minded 
concern for the rights of criminals.”135 The ‘victims’ Carrington referred to here are not the 
same victims as those in the first antagonism, who have already been victimized. Instead, 
Carrington employed a dynamic temporal framework by including in the category ‘victim’ 
both those who have been the victims of a crime and those who may, in the future, be a 
victim of a crime. Those who insist on constitutional rights for the accused, Carrington 
claimed, enable guilty people to escape conviction if their rights are violated during the 
crime’s investigation; those guilty then proceed to commit more crimes and produce more 
victims. That is, even if you have not been victimized yet, you are already a victim.  
The final antagonism Carrington articulates is between those he termed 
‘permissivists’ and, again, victims. ‘Permissivists,’ for Carrington, not only advocate for 
robust due process rights, but are also critical of the American criminal justice system’s 
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racial disparities, abysmal prison conditions, or excessive focus on punishment as a primary 
correctional objective. Carrington belittles a 1973 Wisconsin bill that proposed limiting 
imprisonment to only those offenders whose record indicates that there is an imminent 
danger of substantial physical harm if released, effectively eliminating punishment as a 
justification for imprisonment. He argues that the rejection of the permissivist ideas would 
enhance future victims’ rights and well-being. Crime will be reduced through, “in large 
measure, the removal of the contrived and artificial rights for the criminal…the cessation of 
excessive and unwarranted leniency towards those accused or convicted of crimes on the 
theory that society should ‘take a chance’ with the safety of society in the hope that the 
object of leniency will not victimize again. [The end of leniency] will produce a 
corresponding increase in the rights of a law-abiding citizen not to be victimized.”136  
Carrington anticipated the dismissal of his pro-victim position as a “mindless, 
simplistic, or an extremist solution” to crime.137 Of course, Carrington saw his pro-victim 
stance as anything but simplistic, mindless, or extremist, and claimed that enhancing the 
rights of the victim at the expense of the rights of criminals “is mindless, simplistic, or 
extremist only if it can be correctly stated that the attitudes and convictions of the great 
majority of the United States are mindless, simplistic or extremist.”138 This analysis is 
quintessentially Nixonian, as the imagined criticisms of permissivists do not weaken but 
substantiate the rightness of pro-victim forces. The facts that permissivists disagree with 
them shows that the pro-victim forces are correct. Carrington characterizes positions held by 
elites that were contrary to his as referendums on the superior intellectual and moral instincts 
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of the pro-victim, Forgotten Americans. Elites not only promoted policies that let robbers run 
wild, but their promotion of these policies proved that they thought pro-victims forces were, 
as Carrington put it, mindless, simplistic, or extremist. Again, to Carrington, being thought of 
in this manner actually proved the correctness of his positions.   
According to Carrington, the divide between pro-victim and anti-victim forces is due 
to the differences in each side’s profession, and the concomitant differences in the 
sensibilities of those in each profession.  Carrington argued that his position that “[c]riminals 
cause crime. It’s as simple as that” is one that is “not fashionable among certain liberal social 
scientists.”139 However, liberal social scientists who advocate for criminal justice reform fail 
to reduce crime because of the inherent limitations of their social location: “those willing to 
take a chance with the security of the law-abiding are generally social tinkerers who view the 
problems of crime and criminals from relatively safe, ivory-tower positions: the courts, the 
higher echelons of the corrections establishment, the quiet meeting rooms of special 
commissions and study groups, and the college campuses.”140  Carrington approvingly cites 
Winston Moore, executive director of the Cook County Department of Corrections, who 
noted that “some administrators unwisely fall victim to self-appointed ‘experts’ who lack 
pragmatic knowledge about and experience with inmates or institutions. But these experts’ 
have obtained funding from foundations, government, and private sources to conduct ‘social 
experiments’ with inmates.”141 Articulating these people to the wider cultural struggles 
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exploited by Nixon in his 1968 Presidential campaign, Moore claims that “these are the same 
people who were helpless in attempts to control campus unrest in recent years.”142 
Carrington’s list of anti-victim permissivists reads like a murderer’s row of Franklins, 
including  
Composer Leonard Bernstein, who threw a fund-raising part for members of 
New York’s Black Panther party, ‘a group of racists, many of whom advocated 
criminal activity’; radical firebrand lawyer William Kunstler, who denounces 
‘respected political figures’ like Nelson Rockefeller; New York Times associate 
editor Tom Wicker, ‘the voice of permissiveness for that permissive 
newspaper’; former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, ‘prophet and public 
relations front man,’ whose book about crime was the ‘bible of 
permissiveness’; and Daniel Ellsberg, ‘the admitted thief of the Pentagon 
Papers.’143 
 
This anti-victim mafia is contemptible to Carrington not just because of what they do or say, 
but who they are. They are representatives of the left-wing intelligentsia and artistic elite, the 
well-born, and the defenders of the Warren Court’s legal decisions. Carrington presages the 
rhetorical style of the Reagan’s Task Force on Victims of Crime’s report by extensively 
using anecdotal accounts of everyday victims to substantiate his arguments. Dozens of 
detailed accounts of horrible crimes appear throughout both The Victims and Neither Cruel 
Nor Unusual. In one twelve page section in The Victims dealing with the Miranda Rule, 
Carrington recounts the murders of Doris Murphy, police officer Earl Berendes, a girl shot to 
death by a sniper, the shooting of Senator John Stennis, a knife attack in New York requiring 
150 stitches, and the kidnapping of a waitress by a marine. This approach enables Carrington 
to avoid making difficult, logical arguments by offering anecdotes as arguments in 
themselves; it also works to marshal the power of blood-and-guts imagery, whose visceral 
                                                 
 
142 Carrington, The Victims, 168.   
 
143 Summarized in Andrew Karmen, “The Victims by Frank Carrington (book review),” Contemporary 
Crises 6 (1982): 308.   
 76 
 
impact desiccates the competing rhetorical force of statistical or theoretical analysis. Finally, 
orienting a tough-on-crime argument around innocent victims creates an adversarial 
rhetorical situation in which the victim is on the tough-on-crime side, which forces the liberal 
side to oppose not only tough-on-crime arguments but the victim him/herself.   
These anecdotes offer an intentionally unwieldy form of truth that may in fact prove 
very little but work to affectively overwhelm arguments made by experts whose authority is 
based on knowledge. Anecdotal examples and victim testimony offer both experience and the 
body itself as vehicles of a form of truth lacking in scientific or legal analysis. In his 
introduction to The Victims, which he entered into the May 15, 1975 Congressional Record, 
Senator James L. Buckley celebrated the superiority of bodily and experiential truth over 
statistical and scientific evidence and abstract philosophical systems. In the beginning of the 
introduction, Buckley produced statistics purporting to demonstrate increased levels of 
criminal activity in the United States. He subsequently devalued the informative value of 
these statistics by claiming  
 
But one cannot fully appreciate the meaning of these figures until they are 
understood and seen in human terms, in terms of the victims of these crimes: 
the store clerk murdered in a holdup, the young girl raped on her way home 
from school, the elderly widow whose purse and monthly social security check 
were stolen, the young couple who returned to find their apartment ransacked 
and their significant possessions taken, or the body of the slain policeman…the 
ultimate reality of crime can only be felt when it reaches out to touch us, or 
when we see the bodies or look into the faces of the victims of crime.144  
 
Buckley argues that crime’s “ultimate reality” is only detectible through the victims’ bodies 
and testimony, suggesting adequate and responsible criminological analysis requires bodily 
examination and personal testimonials. This requirement implicitly limits or even disqualifies 
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analyses that attempt to aggregate, quantify or abstract crime issues and otherwise disembody 
crime, as they necessarily obscure access to crime’s ‘truth.’145  
Altogether, Carrington’s work forces liberals to answer the question, ‘can experience 
be wrong?’ He argued that anti-rehabilitation positions are based on the raw experience of 
victimization, and a pro-death penalty position on familial love. To insist on rehabilitation or 
oppose the death penalty suggests, as Carrington saw it, that familial love is not real and the 
victimization did not occur. Victims’ rights’ use of victims’ experiences forces politicians to 
choose between the obviousness of families’ and victims’ injuries and abstract arguments and 
statistics, and they have consistently chosen familial love and physical pain.   
 
Reagan’s Victims’ Rights 
 
Ronald Reagan won the California governorship in 1966, running an unapologetically 
conservative campaign assailing soft-on-crime governance and the emergent counter-culture. 
In 1968, he received substantial support to be the Republican Party’s Presidential nominee. 
While Nixon ultimately won the nomination, for conservative activists such as William 
Rusher, “the Reagan momentum…offered evidence ‘that the troops are in good shape for the 
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future.’”146 In 1976, Reagan mounted an unsuccessful challenge to incumbent Gerald Ford 
for the Republican nomination, portraying Ford’s foreign policy as soft and emphasizing his 
own social conservatism. Between 1976 and 1980, Reagan sought to reorganize the 
Republican Party’s appeal, moving it away from its country-club image to attract “the man 
and the women in the factories, for the farmer, for the cop on the beat.”147 Reagan believed 
he could use social conservatism to win working class support for economic conservatism, 
thereby breaking the new deal coalition.  
 Reagan’s 1980 campaign represented the success of his efforts to reorganize 
American politics. He attracted working class support through his social conservatism and 
hawkish foreign policy, while advocating for a newly emergent supply-side economics, 
which argued that tax cuts would pay for themselves by creating economic growth. His faith 
in tax cuts was accompanied by a contention that no matter the virtue of their intentions, 
government programs had baleful consequences; in his 1981 inaugural address he declared 
“government is not the solution to our problems, it is the problem.”148  
As described in the beginning of this chapter, Reagan’s 1980 campaigning style 
resembled Nixon’s 1968 campaigning style in its glorification of the wisdom of the 
American people gained simply through their experience of living in America, implicitly 
denigrating knowledge-based authority in the process. However, unlike Nixon, Reagan 
continued to glorify the epistemological value of experience after assuming the Presidency.  
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An example of this glorification of layman authority was his victims’ rights efforts. 
Reagan established the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime by executive order on 
April 23, 1982, declaring “the innocent victims of crime have frequently been overlooked by 
our criminal justice system, and their pleas for justice have gone unheeded and their 
wounds—personal, emotional, and financial—have gone unattended.”149 The Task Force’s 
final report was released in December, 1982.  
The President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime differed in two significant ways 
from Nixon’s 1970 Task Force on Rehabilitation discussed above. The first difference was 
the composition of the Task Force. The members of the Task force on Rehabilitation 
included corporate attorneys and anti-poverty activists, but most were academics. By 
contrast, the Task Force on Victims of Crime was composed primarily of law enforcement 
personnel, including four prosecuting attorneys, a police chief, a former treasury agent 
(Frank Carrington), and a psychiatrist who worked with the FBI. In general, the Task Force 
on Rehabilitation’s members were not directly involved in the administration of prisons; by 
contrast, the majority of Task Force on Victims of Crime’s members were directly involved 
in the criminal justice process.  
The second and more significant difference concerned each Task Force’s 
methodology. The Task Force on Rehabilitation primarily utilized existing research findings 
to arrive at and justify its findings and recommendations. Similarly, The Task Force on 
Victims of Crime’s stated methodology included “compiling and analyzing as much printed 
material as we could acquire from governmental, academic, professional and private 
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sources.”150 However, despite this statement, little analysis of relevant printed material 
appears in the report. The “most important” element of the Task Force on the Victims of 
Crime’s methodology was talking to victims.151 According to the Report, “crucial to our 
approach, however, was the concept that it was necessary to hear directly from those whose 
lives have been touched by crime. Therefore, we spoke at length and in great numbers with 
innocent people who have been victimized.”152 To accomplish this task, the Task Force on 
Victims of Crime convened hearings in six cities, during which they received testimony from 
dozens of victims.  
The Task Force’s process of hearing testimony and translating it into findings and 
recommendations is entirely unclear. Quotations from victims are absent from the main 
section of the report detailing the Task Force’s findings and recommendations. However, 
quotations presumably obtained from transcripts of these hearings appear throughout the 
report in the literal margins of the main text. The victims quoted in the margins are primarily 
unidentified, as are the hearings in which they testified. The quotations themselves typically, 
though not always, bear a thematic relationship with the passage they appear alongside, 
offered as evidence to substantiate whatever claim the Task Force is making at that point in 
the report. For example, next to the report’s recommendation that judges limit continuances 
at the victim’s request is a quotation from an unnamed victim, “People have to realize that 
emotional scabs are constantly scraped off as you appear time after time in court” because of 
delays at the defendant’s request.153 
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The cumulative effect of these quotations is to evoke a world in which people are 
perpetually at risk of becoming victims of amoral criminals, after which they will enter an 
inhumane and bizarre criminal justice system devoid of common sense principles of truth and 
justice.  These quotations operate in multiple rhetorical modes. Some describe the crime and 
the mortal danger it presented: “‘He said, ‘Move or yell and I’ll kill you.’ I didn’t doubt his 
word.’—a victim.”154 Others lament allegedly senseless procedural elements: “‘I just 
couldn’t believe that the judge could actually suppress evidence. It’s like it really didn’t 
happen…it just seems very unfair that something so crucial could just be eliminated.’—a 
victim.”155 Others recount horror stories from the investigation or trial: “‘It took me a long 
time to get my 8-year old daughter to sleep that night, but finally I did. Later I got a call that 
the molester had been arrested, and that my daughter and I had to go down to a police line-up 
at 1:00 a.m. We did go, but it was very traumatic for her.’—a victim’s mother.”156   
Other quotations were maxims about the nature of justice for victims: “‘Justice does 
not bring one’s son back, but it is the closest thing to what is right.’—a victim’s father.”157 
Finally, these quotations include normative claims about the criminal justice changes 
necessary to achieve justice for victims: “Shouldn’t we be notified if the killer was out on 
bond, or if he is about to come up for a parole hearing? Had my son lived through the assault 
on him, would he not be entitled to this information? He didn’t live through this, and I think 
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that I am entitled to ask it for him and for all the victims who don’t survive.’—a victim’s 
mother.”158  
This mosaic of quotes articulates crime victims and their families as street-smart 
survivors, whose lay understanding of the law is offended by bizarre procedural 
technicalities, who are injured by the crime yet resiliently participating in the criminal justice 
system, sober-minded ethicists, and selfless crusaders sublimating their rage into advocacy 
for the dead victims unable to advocate for themselves. These are formidable figures, whose 
qualities merit great deference in criminal justice policy. Arranging these quotes in the 
margins of the main text lend the victims’ prestige and supposed infallibility to the policy 
recommendations alongside of which they appear.  
 The victim authority encapsulated in these quotations serves as the Task Force 
report’s main source of evidence. The report makes further claims about victim authority: in 
addition to their status as authorities working on criminal justice policy, they are authoritative 
participants in the criminal justice process itself. Many of the report’ recommendations 
would maximize victims’ decision-making influence in the criminal process, such as 
including victims’ statements at sentencing hearings and requiring prosecutors to consult 
with them on both bail and plea decisions. The report argues that a victim’s superior sense of 
fairness warrants increased victim participation. For example, the report recommends that 
parole be abolished, because specific parole outcomes may violate victims’ ideas about 
appropriate sentences. According to the report, it is “important that the victim and the 
community know what the sentence actually means—how long the defendant will be 
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incarcerated.”159 Parole prevents this certainty by enabling the release of the offender long 
before the end of his sentence. The actual time-served of the sentence indicates the ‘fairness’ 
of the sentence, and a shorter sentence, according to the report, is an unfair sentence for 
victims. Why? Because “their own sense of justice dictates that the person who directly 
caused them so much agony receive a fair punishment.”160 Whatever the source of this sense 
of justice, the benefits of unleashing its infallible acuity merits the destruction of the 
American parole system, long the bedrock of American penological theory, predicated on 
decades of psychological, educational, and medical discourses.  
 In addition to the victim’s superior ‘sense of justice,’ the report also ascribes to 
victims the power to predict the offender’s future behavior. According to one 
recommendation, victim impact statements should be mandatory at sentencing hearings 
because “a judge cannot reach an informed determination of the danger posed by a defendant 
without hearing from the person he has victimized…Others may speculate about the 
defendant’s potential for violence; it is the victim who looked down the barrel of the gun, or 
felt his blows, or knew how serious were the threats of death that the defendant conveyed.”161 
Accordingly, the victim’s encounter with a defendant enables him or her to predict what the 
defendant will do at the conclusion of his sentence, whether that is in 10 days, 10 months, or 
10 years. Victims can apparently penetrate the overdetermined circumstances—
psychological, economic, and social—structuring the offenders’ current and future life, to 
perceive and predict the offender’s capacity for violence. 
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 The report avers that the victim’s “sense of justice” and predictive power demand 
longer prison sentences for offenders. Her sense of justice violated, a victim’s mother 
laments, “[f]or killing my son he only does one and a half years!”162 Prohibited from 
participating in the parole hearing where he could deploy his predictive power to oppose a 
parole board’s predictable malfeasance, a victim contends “[t]he Parole Board that let him 
out did an awful, ignorant, foolish thing. They just turned their back on society, they just 
didn’t care about the public.”163 This demand for longer sentences ran contrary to that of 
contemporary rehabilitation advocates—such as those on Nixon’s Rehabilitation Task 
Force—who continued to promote indeterminate sentencing structures, in which an inmate 
can be released whenever a parole board deems him or her rehabilitated, rather than only 
after completing a determinate sentence.  
This opposition is consistent with the general opposition articulated in the report 
between victims and knowledge-based authorities. In her “Statement of the Chairman” 
preceding the report, Lois Harrington describes victims who expect that the criminal justice 
system will “do what a good government should—protect the innocent”164 It turns out, 
according to Herrington, that “somewhere along the way, the system began to serve lawyers 
and judges and defendants, treating the victim with institutionalized disinterest.”165 In other 
words, the interests of lawyers, defendants, and judges run counter to those of victims, and 
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accounting for the rights and interests of these parties necessarily injures victims. This shift is 
the perversion of justice its recommendations aim to rectify.  
 According to the report, this perversion manifests in the disproportionate focus on the 
defendant during the sentencing process, at the expense of proper attention to victims, who 
wish for but are denied the opportunity to give a statement to the judge. The introduction of 
the report is a purportedly representative composite of victim experiences, based on 
testimony gathered at hearings. According to the report, “this victim is every victim; she 
could be you or related to you.”166 The report includes a hypothetical scenario, told from the 
victim’s point of view; in it, the defendant has been convicted of the rape of a 50-year old 
woman, and is awaiting sentencing. A pre-sentencing report prepared for the defendant 
“delves into his upbringing, family relationships, education, physical and mental health.”167 
Also, judges will send the “defendant to a facility where a complete psychiatric and 
sociological work-up is prepared.”168 By contrast, the victim (referred to as you in the report) 
is “amazed that no one will ever ask you about the crime, or the effect it has had on you and 
your family. You ask permission to address the judge and are told that you are not allowed to 
do so.”169  
This hypothetical scenario aligns psychological, educational, and sociological 
resources with defendants, who presumably utilize them to advocate for lighter sentences. 
And, this is exactly what happened in this narrative, as the defendant received a three-year 
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sentence for rape, “less than one year for every hour he kept you in pain and terror.”170 
According to the report, the participation of knowledge-based authorities in the criminal 
justice process obstructs victims’ participation and violates their interests, and accordingly 
harms the criminal justice process overall.  
The arguments for increasing victim participation found in the report typically 
denigrate the validity of the participation of such figures as psychologists and social workers. 
The Task Force calls for victim impact statements to counter those who advocate for 
defendants. The Task Force describes these participants, such as the psychologists and 
sociologists who developed the pre-sentencing report, the defendant’s lawyer, and the 
defendant himself, as “Others [who] may speculate about the defendant’s potential for 
violence.” Describing these contributions as ‘speculation’ suggests that they are little more 
than guesswork of questionable legitimacy. By contrast, victims experienced their 
victimization, and their expertise derives from those experiences. They “looked down the 
barrel of the gun, or felt his blows, or knew how serious were the threats of death that the 
defendant conveyed; it is the victim who can tell of the defendant’s response to his pleas to 
be spared, to be hurt no further. It is the victim who knows how the defendant said he would 
avoid capture or dupe the judge if he were caught”171 This section, and the report overall, 
articulates a clear opposition between experience-based authority and knowledge-based 
authority.    
 This is the precise opposition Nixon articulated in his 1968 campaign. In the Reagan 
Task Force report, victims are the forgotten majority, while the social workers, judges, 
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psychologists, and defense lawyers in the criminal justice system represent the naïve and 
ineffectual elite. However, though the articulation is identical, the conditions of the 
articulation are dramatically different. The Task Force was a product of a governing 
president, not a presidential candidate. It was not Reagan the presidential candidate that 
assembled a Task Force that embraced authority as experience, but Reagan the president. 
Under Reagan experience-based authority assumed policy making dominance.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This shift from campaign strategy to governing principles indicates the increased 
power of authority as experience. This ascent signaled the successful attack on knowledge 
and expertise. An important part of the liberal consensus was faith in both of these concepts. 
As John W. Murphy argued, the liberal consensus assumes a “difficult, complex, and gray 
world that requires careful thought, extensive research, and prudent acts. It therefore puts a 
premium on rational argument [and] scientific evidence.”172 The ascent of authority as 
experience enables a range of discourses impossible when authority as knowledge was 
hegemonic as it was in the liberal consensus. People can reject climate change when they 
find themselves stuck in the snow. Macroeconomic policy can dissolve into microeconomic 
policy, as critics of government spending allege that families and small businesses know how 
to spend money more wisely than government bureaucrats. Other can reject the need for 
welfare because they themselves have worked hard in their lives, which proves that 
individual effort ensures self-sufficiency, no matter what the statistics say.  
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On a more general level, conservatives impugn the wisdom of liberal policies simply 
because they are grounded in research findings. Any government efforts to help poor people 
that are predicated on research are cancerous. They do not emerge from life and experience 
itself, but from research that is alien to life, and, when implemented, feed on what is good 
and vital about Americans and the American experience.    
Finally, this assault on authority and knowledge also represents an attack on the 
institutions that serve as the sources and guarantors of both. If knowledge lacks authority, so 
do the institutions that produce it. Indeed, Lawrence Grossberg argues in Caught in the 
Crossfire that “the prestige of universities, schools, and the media as the ‘guardians’ of 
legitimate knowledge and knowledge production has significantly declined.”173 The guiding 
frameworks of welfare programs, efforts to provide medical care to underserved 
communities, and educational policy have emerged from university departments such as 
public health, sociology, and social work. It seems that any effort to achieve progressive 
political goals, environmental, economic, public health, and others, requires knowledge 
produced by institutions, which requires knowledge to have authority. After the successful 
assault on knowledge-based authority described in this chapter, such goals appear evermore 
remote.  
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Chapter Two: Victims’ Rights Neutralization of the Threat of Domestic Violence 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 Like all political developments, the political struggle over victimization has not 
arrived at victims' rights according to an uncontested linear path. Instead, there have been the 
moments of struggle over the meaning of victimization, in which alternative models of 
responding to victimization were proposed, which were consistent with the liberal consensus. 
The struggle over the proper responses to domestic violence is one such moment, and it is the 
focus of this chapter. Understanding the dynamics of the struggle over the meaning of 
domestic violence sheds light on the responses to victimization that were bypassed in favor 
of victims' rights, and examining alternative conceptions of victims’ needs and the causes of 
victimization provides a more precise delineation of victims' rights itself. This chapter 
discusses the ways that anti-domestic violence activism configured the family, a central front 
in the struggle over the liberal consensus. This discussion sets the stage for chapter three, in 
which I examine the ways victims’ rights configures the family, and how that configuration 
is connected to the struggle over the liberal consensus.   
Victims’ rights focuses primarily on crimes committed by strangers. The crimes that 
catalyze major victims’ rights legislation were all committed by strangers. Famous victims’ 
rights advocates were victimized by strangers or had family members victimized by 
strangers. By contrast, non-stronger crime, domestic violence, receives little attention from 
the victims’ rights movement. Victims’ rights advocates are not victims of or family 
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members of victims of domestic violence. Legislation produced by the victims’ rights 
movement is not named for domestic violence victims. Prominent pieces of domestic 
violence legislation, such as the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), are not named after 
victims or considered victims’ rights legislation. In news accounts of VAWA and related 
domestic violence initiatives, no victims' rights advocates are quoted. Altogether, anti-
domestic violence activism and victims’ rights activism are treated as distinct and essentially 
unrelated.   
 Victims’ rights and strains of anti-domestic violence activism diverge over the status 
of the family bond. In focusing on strangers, the victims’ rights movement does not implicate 
the family in the commission of violent acts. In fact, as we shall see in chapter three, victims’ 
rights works to valorize the goodness and self-sufficiency of the family. Anti-domestic 
violence activism, by contrast, deeply implicates the family in the commission of violence. 
The family itself is either the source of violence, or it is incapable of protecting its members 
from violence, and preventing violence requires external intervention.   
 Conservatives deny both aspects of this characterization of the family. According to 
conservatives, the family is a nurturing and safe space. Also, the family is self-sustaining, 
enabling its members to manage life’s challenges without external intervention. This vision 
of the family has been used to challenge government programs that support the poor. These 
programs, conservatives charge, harm families, which provide the only spaces in which 
people grow to be successful socioeconomic actors. According to conservatives, government 
support programs, such as welfare and Medicaid, must be reduced or eliminated in order to 
protect families and, in turn, strengthen individuals.  
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 The struggle over domestic violence policy turned on these conceptions of the 
goodness and self-sufficiency of the family. In holding that the traditional family was 
inherently violent and material deprivation increased victimization, early anti-domestic 
violence activists promoted material support for victims that the family itself could not 
provide. They also advocated for reconfiguring family dynamics by rejecting the conception 
that men were the natural authority figures in families. In response, conservatives fashioned 
responses to domestic violence which articulated the family as both safe and self-sufficient. 
This struggle over the familial bond in domestic violence reflects the larger struggle between 
the liberal consensus and its detractors. The liberal consensus held that there were forces 
beyond the individual’s control that shaped his or her socioeconomic chances. Similarly, 
anti-domestic violence discourse holds that the family is subject to material forces that 
prevent it from being able to prevent and eliminate domestic violence on its own. These 
forces create the need for government intervention to prevent further domestic violence 
incidents. However, as the victims’ rights movement gained strength and power, politicians 
came to focus on punishing offenders rather than providing government support for victims. 
In focusing on punishment rather than addressing familial material dynamics, politicians, 
both Democratic and Republican, produced a conception of the safe, self-sufficient family 
amenable to conservative attacks on the liberal consensus.  
The chapter begins by tracking changes in the federal government’s domestic 
violence discourse between 1978 and 1984. In 1978, domestic violence was attributed to 
traditional gender norms and male socioeconomic domination, and solving domestic violence 
required material change and altered familial relations. By 1984, domestic violence was 
articulated as a matter of aberrant acts disconnected from gender roles and any 
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socioeconomic context. Accordingly, an act of domestic violence was presented as being no 
different than an act of stranger violence, and material and familial change was unnecessary. 
This position became dominant in mainstream politics, and what was potentially a bad issue 
for conservatives, one that challenged the goodness and self-sufficiency of the familial bond, 
was neutralized.   
After tracing the evolution of domestic violence discourse between 1978 and 1984, 
the chapter’s second part look at ways in which the traditional family is positioned as the 
central element of conservative welfare discourse, and how domestic violence troubles that 
positioning. Conservatives argue that the absence of traditional families leads to welfare, and, 
in turn, welfare destroys traditional families. However, contrary to these articulations, 
domestic violence in the traditional family impairs the victim’s ability to participate in the 
economy, and responding to domestic violence requires the types of welfare programs 
conservatives allege weaken the traditional family. These understandings of domestic 
violence challenge conservative attacks on welfare and affirm the liberal consensus. The 
most important factor in preventing revictimization is material autonomy, precisely what the 
liberal consensus held as requiring government assistance. I end section two by examining 
the ways the Reagan Administration’s 1984 Task Force on Family Violence managed that 
challenge in its “Final Report.” 
The chapter’s third and final part examines responses to domestic violence crafted by 
American liberals in the 1990s and in force today. They rely on the criminal justice system 
instead of material support for victims to address domestic violence, thereby mirroring 
conservative domestic violence discourse developed in the 1980s. Robust empirical evidence 
indicates that relying on the criminal justice system is an inadequate way to reduce domestic 
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violence. I assert that absent any conceptual or empirical basis for relying on the criminal 
justice system at the expense of material support for victims, it is the ascent of the victims’ 
rights movement that disabled efforts to respond to domestic violence with material support. 
Victims’ rights has set the terms for how government responds to victimization, privileging 
punishment and marginalizing material responses to both stranger crime and domestic 
violence. In so doing, victims’ rights has preserved the family as the location of the primary 
and favored social bond. This valorization is considered at greater length in chapter three, as 
are the ways that valorization is articulated to broader conservative discourses.  
 The vision of the family active in anti-domestic violence discourse largely cohered 
with the liberal consensus. That vision was negated when material responses to victimization 
were bypassed in favor of punishment. Chapter three describes the victims’ rights vision of 
the family that came to dominate responses to victimization, one that complements attacks on 
the liberal consensus.  
   
 
The Evolution of Domestic Violence Policy between 1978 and 1984 
 
In the following section, I examine four texts to demonstrate the evolution of federal 
domestic violence discourse between 1978 and 1984. The first is the transcript of a 1978 
conference put on by the United States Civil Rights Commission entitled “Battered Women: 
Issues of Public Policy Consultation,” which featured representatives of the battered 
women’s movement, a forerunner of subsequent progressive anti-domestic violence activism. 
While some called for strengthened law enforcement responses to domestic violence, many 
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of the Consultation’s participants emphasized the need for reoriented attitudes about gender 
roles and the need for material support and equality for women in order to reduce domestic 
victimization. The second text is a 1982 report released by the Civil Rights Commission 
entitled “Under the Rule of Thumb,” which departed from the views of the Consultation’s 
participants by ignoring questions of material equality and gender norms and focused instead 
on changing the criminal justice system and providing emergency aid to victims. The third 
“text” is a series of statements critical of federal anti-domestic violence efforts made by 
prominent conservatives. By 1980, conservatives had managed to derail federal efforts to 
provide funding for domestic violence programs, alleging that such programs were anti-
family. Finally, I examine the 1984 “Final Report” of the Reagan Administration’s Task 
Force on Family Violence, which purportedly offered comprehensive methods to respond to 
domestic violence, but rejected critiques of traditional gender roles and the material 
inequality between genders while insisting on the prestige of the traditional family, thereby 
accommodating conservative criticisms of federal anti-domestic violence efforts.  
 
1978’s “Battered Women: Issues of Public Policy” Consultation 
According to activist and scholar Susan Schechter, the term ‘battered women’ 
reached public consciousness by 1977.174 In her 1982 history of the battered women’s 
movement, Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles of the Battered Women’s 
Movement, Schechter argues that the movement operated from a feminist, grassroots 
orientation, critical of common gender roles in which males perceived their dominant 
position in family life as a license to abuse, and women, because of their material 
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subordination, had difficulty escaping such abuse. It raised awareness about domestic 
violence through forming consciousness raising groups to publicize the pervasiveness of and 
condemn domestic violence, which was otherwise tolerated as a private family matter in 
which violence was the male’s prerogative. Also, activists contested the lax enforcement of 
criminal law when it came to domestic violence, advocated for the creation of civil protection 
orders, established shelters for battered women to go to escape abuse and receive long-term 
material assistance, and created mechanisms through which victims could receive emotional 
support and counseling, often from other victims of domestic violence.  
The 1978, the United States Civil Rights Commission sponsored the “Battered 
Women: Issues of Public Policy” Consultation which was the first federally-sponsored 
examination of domestic violence. Why it was named a “Consultation” instead of a 
conference is, upon reading its transcript, odd, as it resembled a standard conference, 
composed of presentations and question and answer sessions.  
The event included over 30 presenters and occurred over two days. Its purposes were  
to identify sound, existing research data, as well as research gaps, and 
consequently to consider research strategies; to identify necessary State 
legal and law enforcement reform; to identify needed short- and long-
term support services for battered women; to identify, in all of the 
above, the appropriate Federal role; to facilitate communication among 
researchers, activists, policymakers, and others; and to inform the 
public.175  
 
As this summary makes clear, law enforcement was only one of many issues addressed in the 
Consultation. Participants included grassroots activists, academics, and representatives from 
a wide range of institutions, including doctors, lawyers, social workers, and representatives 
of members of the United States Congress. Many participants offered feminist, class-based 
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critiques of domestic violence, rooting its causes in economic inequality and traditional 
family roles in which men have authority over women and exercise it through violence.  
Though only one event, the Consultation is representative of and important to the 
battered women’s movement for four reasons: first, because of the large number of 
participants; second, because of the wide array of disciplines, professions, and institutions 
present; third, the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, which continues to be a 
central anti-domestic violence organization, was formed as a result of the conference; and 
finally, and most importantly, many of the leading activists in the battered women’s 
movement participated, including Del Martin, Lisa Leghorn, and Lisa Richette, and leading 
scholars of the time, including Morton Bard, Murray Strauss, and Lenore Walker. 
Throughout the Consultation, participants referred to major efforts to change the treatment of 
and outcomes for battered women. For these reasons, the 730-page transcript of the 
Consultation serves as an important document of the 1970s battered women’s movement, a 
movement that proved anathema to conservatives and was ultimately abandoned by the 
Democratic Party in its efforts to address domestic violence.  
Many of the Consultation’s participants attributed domestic violence to traditional 
gender roles. In its opening session, Martin, a leading anti-domestic and sexual violence 
activist, argued that patriarchal family relations are the cause of women battering. She 
averred “marriage is the institutional source and setting in which the violence is carried out. 
Although many try to avoid its implications, to me, domestic violence cannot be fully 
understood without examining the institution of marriage itself as the context in which the 
violence takes place.”176 She described American gender relations as a “patriarchal structure” 
in which the “dominant group [men] define acceptable roles of subordinates [women],” 
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whose survival “depends on the subjugation and control of women and uses marriage as a 
routine means of enforcement.”177 This arrangement defines masculinity as “strong, active, 
rational, aggressive and authoritarian” and femininity as “submissive, passive, dependent, 
weak and masochistic.”178 Marriage, according to Martin, is the arena in which “women and 
men are socialized to act out dominant-submissive roles that in and of themselves invite 
abuse. Husbands/assailants and wife/victims are merely the actors in the script that society 
has written for them.”179 
 In her presentation, Judge Richette agreed with Martin and proposed eliminating the 
husband as “head of the family” from its “continuing presence in the law, in religion, in 
administrative procedure, and a taken for granted aspect of family life…Full sexual equality 
is essential for the prevention of wife-beating.”180 Leghorn stressed the need for replacing 
male domination with female solidarity, hailing support services provided to abused women 
by previously abused women. Doing this weakens male domination, fosters “new ways of 
living,” the kinds “of transformation in their lives [that] is not only possible, but also 
necessary,” a transformation that often ends the family unit the woman was a member of 
before she entered the shelter.181 
 Some participants rejected policies specifically focused on battered women, and 
instead advocated for comprehensive material redistribution for all. Monica Erler argued, 
“Abused women don’t need treatment programs. They, like other women, need fair income 
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for their labor, decent housing at an affordable price, competent legal advice, dependable 
child care and other assistance with child rearing. Government policy and funding should 
take these needs seriously.”182 Solving domestic violence, then, requires, not only contesting 
the traditional family, but challenging capitalism itself. As Leghorn argued, ending domestic 
violence demands “[a] massive restructuring of our priorities. We would be forced to address 
the tremendous question of human needs and human rights, rather than the violation of those 
needs by a merciless and irresponsible system based on private profit.”183 Altogether, it is 
easy to see why conservatives would be alarmed by the Consultation’s critique of the family 
and calls for thorough economic redistribution.  
While it goes far beyond the liberal consensus in its critiques of capitalism and 
traditional gender norms, the Consultation affirms the its contention that forces beyond a 
person’s control trap people in socioeconomically vulnerable situations, which in this 
instance contributes to domestic violence victimization. As we shall see, the conservative 
response to the Consultations’ critiques erased the importance of these material forces in 
domestic violence victimization.  
 
1982’s Under the Rule of Thumb 
Such solutions proved to be far too progressive and comprehensive to be a tenable 
framework for federal action, especially once Reagan assumed the presidency in 1981, and 
lost their centrality in federal anti-domestic violence discourse, as represented by their 
important role in the Consultation. Accordingly, in 1982, the United States Civil Rights 
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Commission issued the report “Under the Rule of Thumb: Battered Women and the 
Administration of Justice,”184 which, though issued by the same institution that released the 
Consultation, moves away from the Consultation’s critiques of capitalism and the traditional 
family and focuses almost exclusively on the criminal justice system. In addition to using 
materials from the Consultation, “Under the Rule of Thumb” held hearings in Pennsylvania 
and Arizona in which members of the Civil Rights Commission met with legal and law 
enforcement personnel.  
The report’s preface states that its findings were “partially built upon” the 
Consultation.185 However, the report’s arguments and policy proposals differs substantially 
from those found in the Consultation by granting the criminal justice system the central role 
in addressing domestic violence and displacing the Consultation’s insistence on the need for 
economic redistribution and the reformulation of the traditional family. “Under the Rule of 
Thumb” was “designed to elicit further information on the nature and extent of law 
enforcement practices that treat battered women differently from other assault victims,”186 
and rejects the need for social and economic change. The gender and structural analysis 
permeating the Consultation is absent from the report. The contributions of the 
Consultation’s anti-battered women’s movement’s participants, including Martin, who 
provided the Consultation’s keynote address, are nowhere reflected in “Under the Rule of 
Thumb,” nor did members of the battered women’s movement participate in the 1981 public 
hearings upon which the report’s findings, along with the Consultation, are based.  Instead, 
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the public hearings’ participants were prosecutors, law enforcement personnel, and members 
of the judiciary.  
“Under the Rule of Thumb’s” preface refers to the Consultation and claims, 
“Although speaking from a wide variety of backgrounds and perspectives on the problems of 
battered women, these experts [in the Consultation] were united by their conclusion that the 
legal system’s response to women victims of domestic violence and their abusers differs 
markedly from its typical response to other assault victims and perpetrators.”187 This 
statement implies that all of the Consultation’s participants suggested that the legal treatment 
of DV victims should resemble that of other assault victims, and that these arguments 
constituted the thrust of the Consultation.  
This is untrue, as all of the Consultation’s participants, including prosecutors and law 
enforcement personnel, agreed that domestic violence victims need resources beyond those 
that the criminal justice system can provide, and in so doing rejected the idea that domestic 
violence and non-domestic violence should be treated identically by the legal system. For 
example, in the 1978 Consultation, Milwaukee District Attorney Charles Schudson stated 
that the “battered women’s problem is one that is helped by a coordination of many 
components, only one of which is the criminal justice system.”188 Contrary to this statement 
by District Attorney Schudson, the chapter on prosecutorial conduct in “Under the Rule of 
Thumb” contains no discussion of coordinating with social service providers and finding 
ways to provide material support to victims. Instead, the chapter focuses on how to increase 
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the conviction rates of domestic violence offenders. The chapters on the judiciary and the 
police similarly omit discussion of coordinating with domestic violence service providers.   
 Altogether, most of “Under the Rule of Thumb” criticizes the criminal justice 
system’s failure to effectively arrest and prosecute domestic violence offenders. Its chapters 
include: “The Law”, which gives an overview of civil and criminal responses to battered 
women; “The Police,” “The Prosecutors,” “The Courts,” and “Diversion Programs.” In 
emphasizing the criminal justice system, the report focuses primarily on offenders rather than 
victims. Its discussion of material support for domestic violence victims is wholly confined 
to one chapter, “Shelters and Social Services.” This chapter prescribes far most modest 
material remedies than those offered in the Consultation, including changing welfare rules to 
expedite applications from battered women, engaging shelter personnel in sensitizing police 
officers on the unique dimensions of domestic violence, and coordinating, but not increasing, 
shelter and victims’ services funding sources. It focuses on providing services to victims 
made destitute by leaving abusive situations, rather than changing power and economic 
relations between men and women to avoid destitution in the first place.  
In attending to material support and social services while ultimately emphasizing law 
enforcement, “Under the Rule of Thumb” functions as a halfway point between the structural 
focus of the Consultation and the heavy emphasis on law enforcement of Reagan’s Task 
Force on Family Violence. These changes likely reflected Reagan’s 1980 election, and his 
decision as president to close the Office of Domestic Violence, opened by Jimmy Carter in 
1977. Notably, because of Reagan’s stated opposition, legislative efforts to establish federal 
funding for domestic violence services had been defeated and ultimately abandoned by the 
time “Under the Rule of Thumb” was released.  
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1980 Conservative Opposition to Federal Domestic Violence Assistance 
Significant conservative opposition to the battered women’s movement emerged 
during the time period between the Consultation and the publication “Under the Rule of 
Thumb’s” According to historian Elizabeth Pleck, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, “The 
New Right identified domestic violence legislation with feminism, which in turn they 
associated with an attack on ‘motherhood, the family, and Christian Values.’”189 These views 
were presented during Senate and Congressional debates about federal domestic violence 
legislation in 1980, efforts made while Carter, who said he would sign federal domestic 
violence legislation, was still president. In 1980, the Moral Majority worked with Republican 
Senators to defeat legislation that would have provided $65 million in grants to domestic 
violence shelters and programs over three years. The Moral Majority and its conservative 
supporters argued that the legislation attacked the sanctity of the traditional family and they 
rejected any government role in addressing domestic violence or even the use of material 
resources overall to reduce it.  
In Senate floor debate, Senator Gordon Humphrey asserted that the domestic violence 
shelters which would receive federal money under this legislation were “opposed to 
traditional families.”190 Jesse Helms complained that domestic violence shelters will 
“encourage the disintegration of thousands of American families.”191 Referring to calls in the 
Consultation for the removal of the husband as “head of household,” Helms argues, “This 
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type of social engineering does not command the support of the majority of the American 
people and I suspect this is the primary reason why these centers have not been able to 
generate sufficient financial support within their local communities and now seek federal tax 
dollars.”192 He concludes by stating “I cannot support legislation which gives every 
indication of supporting activities which can only further undermine the ability of many 
families to resolve their problems while preserving their unity.”193 
 Senator Strom Thurmond asked, “Who can seriously argue that the Federal 
Government is better suited than family and friends, churches and community groups to cure 
this social ill?”194 He feared that the legislation “would result in dividing the family rather 
than uniting the family and curing domestic violence.”195 If passed, The Moral Majority 
lobbyist argued, “Radical feminists” will “be coming to the federal trough for a $65 million 
feed.”196 Howard Phillips, head of the Conservative Caucus, argued that the “federal 
government has no business regulating the relationship between a man and his wife.”197 In 
addition to his philosophical objections, Phillips rejected the federal government’s 
involvement on practical grounds, suggesting that domestic violence was adequately 
addressed by civil society. He asked, “How do you suppose the matter has been taken care of 
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the last 200 years? It’s been largely taken care of by private organizations, religious groups, 
by families.”198 
 
The 1984 Family Violence Task Force Final Report 
Despite this conservative opposition to federal anti-domestic violence efforts, in 1983 
Reagan created the Task Force on Family Violence, whose “Final Report” contained dozens 
of recommendations for federal, state and local governments. In contrast to the composition 
of the 1978 Consultation, members of the Family Violence Task Force were primarily 
associated with law enforcement or the nascent victims’ rights movement. Members of the 
Family Violence Task Force included William Hart, chief of the Detroit Police Department, 
Missouri Attorney General John Ashcroft, Ursula Meese, wife of law and order conservative 
United States Attorney General Ed Meese, Ruben Ortega, chief of the Phoenix Police 
Department, Newman Flanagan, Suffolk County, Massachusetts District Attorney, Clyde 
Narramore, founder of the Narramore Christian Foundation, a Christian mental health 
organization, and Frances Seward, Mareese Duff and Catherine Milton, all victims’ rights 
activists.  
Like the Victims’ Rights Task Force discussed in chapter one, the report is a product 
of hearings held around the country featuring law enforcement, academics, advocates, and 
victims. A small number of the listed witnesses appeared in both hearings held before the 
Task Force and the Consultation. As a whole, however, these hearings included far fewer 
grassroots activists than the Consultation, and far more law enforcement personnel and 
people associated with religious organizations. Also, while numerous Consultation 
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participants were victims of abuse, each had assumed some sort of advocacy position after 
their victimization, and therefore testified as both victims and domestic violence advocates 
and/or service providers. By contrast, in the Task Force hearings, no victims were identified 
as having engaged in any anti-domestic violence work. Therefore, the Task Force hearing’s 
victims testified only in their capacity as victims. In fact, the Final Report lists the witnesses 
who testified in front of the Task Force, including, if they had one, their institutional 
affiliation. Many witnesses were simply identified as “victim” without any institutional 
affiliation. 
Parts of the report are consistent with portions of the 1978 Consultation and the 
“Under the Rule of Thumb” report. The Task Force takes positions domestic violence 
activists had held since the mid-1970s: the widespread prevalence of domestic violence; the 
unique challenges it presents in comparison to violence committed by strangers; and the need 
for adequate criminal justice responses. Addressing the issue federally at all, and adopting 
positions held by feminist activists, seems, on its face, a dramatic departure from existing 
conservative thought on the federal government’s role in addressing domestic violence. 
However, this apparent change did not ultimately represent a political orientation different 
from conservative celebrations of the traditional family on display during the 1980 Senate 
debates. Instead, consistent with conservative opposition, the Task Force excised critiques of 
the traditional family and the material subordination of women found in the 1978 
Consultation. 
Accordingly, gender relations do not frame the report’s analysis, which lacks any 
feminist critiques of domestic violence. The report omits discussion of the need for 
comprehensive socioeconomic change to reduce domestic violence. There is no discussion of 
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women’s economic subordination and its impact on women’s ability to leave abusive 
relationships, or of the need to provide substantial material support for victims to enable 
them to leave abusive relationships.   
Far from condemning the traditional family, the report repeatedly proclaims its 
virtues and the necessity of its promotion and preservation. The Report’s introduction argues 
that “the family is the cornerstone of the American community. Preserving valuable 
traditions and nurturing the country’s children, families are the nation’s greatest strength and 
hope for the future.”199  And, the Report’s conclusion proclaims, “America derives its 
strength, purpose and productivity from its commitment to family values.”200 Thus, according 
to the report, “As important as our families are to us individually and to the health of the 
nation, it is crucial that public policy support and strengthen family values and family well-
being.”201 
The report privileges criminal justice responses to domestic violence, arguing that the 
lax punishment of offenders causes domestic violence, not gender inequality or the dominant 
male role in traditional families. It contains over 20 recommendations for the criminal justice 
system, all of which aim to increase prosecution and conviction rates and intensify criminal 
sanctions. For example, the report recommends requiring law enforcement agencies to 
establish arrest as the preferred response to family violence incidents (instead of mediation or 
the separation of parties in the incident), abolishing the requirement for victims to testify at 
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preliminary hearings, and promoting prison terms as the only appropriate sanction for 
perpetrators of family violence. The report claims that  
 
Penalties imposed by the court [in domestic violence cases] do not 
reflect the severity of the injury or the number of prior conviction for 
the same offense. This under-enforcement of the law tells victims and 
assailants alike that family violence is not really a serious crime, if a 
crime at all. It is this widespread perception that has contributed to the 
perpetuation of violence within the family.202 
 
 
It suggests that judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement agencies increase their cooperation 
with one another, because “a consistent coordinated approach will more effectively deter 
recurring family violence and allow for more successful prosecutions.”203 Even those 
sections of the report not expressly dedicated to criminal justice are dominated by criminal 
justice concerns. Many of the recommendations in sections titled “Data Collection,” 
“Research,” and “Prevention” aim to increase prosecutions and convictions. For example, the 
report recommends compelling drug and alcohol treatment providers to report any time a 
patient admits to child abuse, a practice which was at that time prevented by federal law.  
 Between 1978 and 1984, the progressive politics of federal anti-domestic violence 
discourse disappeared and were replaced by tough-on-crime ideas, which attributed domestic 
violence to insufficiently harsh criminal sanctions. As we shall see, those progressive politics 
have never reappeared. The next section argues that their suppression was necessary for the 
viability of conservative criticisms of welfare, and describes the ways that the Task Force on 
Violence’s Final Report provided the template for that suppression.  
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The Danger of Domestic Violence to Conservative Discursive Formations 
 
As described above, anti-domestic violence activists asserted that without the 
provision of comprehensive material resources, domestic violence victims may not escape 
abusive situations. Activists also asserted that domestic violence reveals that the traditional 
family can be a source of misery and physical danger that is irremediable by the family itself. 
According to these activists, domestic violence indicates that the family alone does not have 
the resources to ensure security for domestic violence victims, and may be the source of the 
danger to their security in the first place. Consequently, activists called for the reformulation 
of the traditional family, and the robust provision of welfare resources for domestic violence 
victims and their families.   
The idea that the traditional family needed reformulation and that it alone cannot 
ameliorate and prevent misery compromises core conservative principles and the policy 
positions they buttress. Conservative support for the traditional family is articulated as 
existing in a zero-sum game with government programs that provide material support to non-
traditional families. In other words, when conservatives argue that the traditional family is 
good they are also saying that government programs such as welfare are bad. According to 
former Education Secretary and current conservative activist William Bennett, “We believe 
our families to be the first, the best and the original department of health, education, and 
welfare.”204 With their ability to promote the traditional family at the expense of social 
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welfare programs on the line, it is crucial that the dangers of domestic violence to 
conservative discourse be silence, and it has, by domestic violence discourse itself.   
In the following section I first review the antithetical relationship between welfare 
and the traditional family articulated by conservatives, who argue that society’s fundamental 
security and prosperity depend on the widespread prevalence of two-parent households.. 
Second, I demonstrate the ways that the Final Report of the Family Violence Task Force 
provides a template for dismantling domestic violence’s dangers to conservative articulations 
of the traditional family. In section three, I describe the ways Democrats have adopted this 
template as their own.  
 
 
 
Conservative Articulations of Welfare and the Traditional Family 
A number of feminist legal scholars have identified the traditional family as a central 
element of conservative politics, noting how American poverty is attributed to the decline of 
married, two-parent households in the United States. Martha Fineman argues that “images of 
the traditional family pervade contemporary discourse” attacking welfare and other social 
spending programs, and “it is the intimate unit in policy and legal discussions that is 
exclusively designated as what is normatively desirable.”205 Melissa Murray suggests that 
commentators argue that the function that the “family serves is that privatization of care for 
dependent members, usually children. The family—and parents, particularly—takes on this 
task, so that it is not primarily the public responsibility of the state.”206 Ariela Dubler argues, 
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“To many lawmakers, female poverty resoundingly signals the failure of marriage.”207 Tonya 
Brito notes that “the mother-child family is perceived as inherently suspicious and, unless, a 
man is brought into the family, it is undeserving of public support.”208 Vivian Hamilton notes 
that “government [has] explicitly embraced marriage as a facet of antipoverty policy.”209 
Judith Koons asserts that justifications for welfare reform and welfare reauthorization “are 
anchored in moral discourse that is rife with family imagery.”210  
The following section elaborates upon these scholarly assertions. Since the 1960s, 
conservatives valorized the traditional family and denigrated families headed by unwed 
mothers. According to conservatives, such families cripple the socioeconomic viability of 
their members, who, consequently, do not become educated, get and hold jobs, and 
frequently commit crimes. The traditional family, for these observers, is a sort of training 
ground for family members, especially children, inculcating them with the values necessary 
for success in the free market economy. Without such training, members of non-traditional 
families are doomed to socioeconomic failure.   
The section begins with the 1965 “The Negro Family: The Case for National Action,” 
popularly known as the Moynihan Report (named for its author, Daniel Patrick Moynihan). It 
then describes two texts published during the Reagan administration: Charles Murray’s 
Losing Ground, and a report produced by the Reagan administration’s White House Working 
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Group on the Family entitled “The Family: Preserving America’s Future.” It continues by 
examining Francis Fukuyama’s work on the relationship between social capital and 
traditional families. The section then details past Republican claims about the destructive 
effects welfare has on the traditional family, discusses the ways religious groups connect 
welfare to the destruction of the traditional family, and concludes by describing how 
contemporary conservatives portray the negative relationship between government programs 
and the traditional family.  
An early connection between the non-traditional family and socioeconomic failure 
was made by the 1965 Moynihan Report, completed while Moynihan served in the Johnson 
administration’s Department of Labor. Its introduction declared that the prevalence of 
mother-led family structure meant that “the Negro family in the urban ghettos is crumbling,” 
and, as long as that is the case, “the cycle of poverty and disadvantage will continue to repeat 
itself.”211 The family, the report argues, “is the basic social unit of American life; it is the 
basic socializing unit. By and large, adult conduct in society is learned as a child.”212 The 
report proceeds to offer many dismal statistics attributable to mother-led families, including 
high crime rates and low test scores. It alleges that the mother-led families affect 
temperament, reporting that blacks “are not able to absorb setbacks. Minor irritants are 
rebuffed and magnified out of all proportion to reality.”213 Altogether, moving out of poverty 
and into a free market economy is difficult if one is raised in a mother-led family.  
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Despite being produced by a Democratic administration supportive of civil rights, the 
report was criticized by many civil rights leaders, including Bayard Rustin, Martin Luther 
King, and the leadership of the NAACP. Critics alleged that it blamed black culture instead 
of America’s history of racism and its relationship with black economic deprivation, and 
ignored the importance of economic conditions generally. King worried that as a result of the 
report, “problems will be attributed to innate Negro weaknesses and used to justify neglect 
and rationalize oppression.”214 Rustin argued against focusing just on blacks, saying “we 
must talk about the poor family, not simply the Negro family.”215 By contrast, conservatives 
supported its findings. William F. Buckley said that the report is “imperative reading for 
liberals and conservatives alike, to say nothing of those who seek to advance the cause of 
Negro equality free of the shackles of ideological dogma.”216 Moynihan said, “My god, I was 
not a racist, [while] here was this fellow [William] Buckley saying these thoughtful things. 
[Nathan] Glazer and I began to notice that we were getting treated in National Review with a 
much higher level of intellectual honesty [than in liberal publications].”217 Criticized by 
liberals and hailed by conservatives, the report is one of the founding lamentations of the 
destructive effects of mother-led families.    
Two texts released during Reagan’s presidency echo Moynihan’s concerns about non-
traditional families. Political scientist Charles Noble describes the publication of Charles 
Murray’s 1984 book Losing Ground as a “watershed in the debate on the welfare state. 
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Murray succeeded in recasting what had been easily dismissed as an ideological fantasy into 
a social scientific critique.”218 In Losing Ground Murray links changes in federal social 
welfare programs to changes in black poverty and family structure. Murray claims that 
various developments in social welfare programs have de-incentivized men and women from 
working and marrying. For example, because welfare provides women with additional 
money for each child they have, it provides incentives for increased out-of-wedlock 
childbirths. Murray attributes the fact that there were more female-headed households in 
1980 than in 1950 to federal social welfare programs. To counteract this trend, Murray 
proposes the elimination of all forms of federal assistance for working-age adults.  
What, for Murray, is so destructive about female-headed households that call for the 
radical step of eliminating all federal social welfare programs? First, female-headed 
households offend middle class American standards. Having children within marriage was 
“the only system that the white American middle class and working class accepted as 
valid.”219 More concretely, such families are destructive for children, as “poor, uneducated, 
single teenage mothers are in a bad position to raise children.”220 He speculates that such 
families are prone to poverty because a “single-female head of household is untrained to 
work at a well-paying job, because of her need to stay home and care for the children, or 
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because of chronic unemployment for other reasons.”221 According to Murray, without a 
husband, women and children are doomed to inescapable poverty.  
Such ideas also emerged from within the administration itself. In 1986, the Reagan 
Administration formed the ‘White House Working Group on the Family,’ which released its 
report, “The Family: Preserving America’s Future,” in December of that year. It was chaired 
by Gary Bauer, who later headed the Family Research Council, a major conservative 
Christian organization allied with James Dobson’s Focus on the Family, and described as a 
“political arm to spearhead a fight for the restoration of traditional ‘family values’ in the 
United States.”222  
“The Family: Preserving America’s Future” argues that “the family can generate and 
nurture what no government can ever produce—Americans who will responsibly exercise 
their freedom and, if necessary, defend it.”223 According to the report, the family is “the 
central unit for launching the education of children, for character formation, and as the moral 
agent of society.”224 Families ensure socioeconomic mobility by serving as a training ground, 
preparing their members for “individual responsibility, for self-sacrifice, for seeking a 
common goal rather than self-interest,” all of which are necessary for socioeconomic 
mobility.225 Conversely, the free enterprise system allows for the existence of the traditional 
family, as its “devotion to human freedom, its creation of wealth, and its demand for personal 
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responsibility—made the modern family possible.”226 Therefore, free enterprise and the 
family are mutually constitutive. Under a different economic system, the traditional family 
would not exist, and, without the traditional family, there would be no free enterprise.  
The report argues that welfare disrupts the mutually constitutive relationship between 
the family and free enterprise. According to the report, “[w]elfare contributes to the failure 
to form the family in the first place,” by preventing men from living in the home of women 
receiving welfare payments and providing additional welfare funds for each child, which 
ultimately leads to mother-led families and absent fathers.227 Without fathers, children are not 
trained to develop the traits necessary for the robust economic existence identified above, 
increasing the chances of being trapped in poverty and dependent on welfare. Those on 
welfare do not labor in the free market, and the report suggests that this lack of labor would 
harm the traditional family structure, as the free market is the source of the traditional family. 
Altogether, the report describes welfare and the end of the traditional family as mutually 
constitutive.  
Despite the professed grandeur of the free enterprise system, millions of Americans 
are on welfare. Therefore, the incentives of going on welfare are for many greater than 
participating in the free enterprise system. However, the report suggests that welfare’s 
incentives are in fact less powerful than those of the free enterprise system, as it denies that 
poor economic conditions and subordinate socioeconomic location make welfare and its 
attendant destruction of the traditional family more attractive than the free market.  
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It offers the following vignette to illustrate this argument: a “father who works two 
low-paying jobs so that a son can go to college, the penniless immigrant who teaches himself 
English and ultimately begins his own business—these success stories are not an elaborate 
myth. They are possible because the people who are the main actors in them believe that 
personal effort, sacrifice, perseverance and hard work will result—if not today, then 
tomorrow; if not for them, then for their children—in a better life. It is the embracing of this 
belief that makes success possible.”228 Those who receive welfare lack this belief, but the 
report does not identify what is the source of this belief or its lack; judging by the 
pervasiveness of welfare, it cannot be the American free enterprise system itself that provides 
the belief in a better life achieved through participation in the free market, as many people 
simply lack the belief and go one welfare. The document both highlights the family’s 
vulnerability to welfare while simultaneously glorifying the family and free enterprise. The 
family is both fallible and infallible, flimsy and all-powerful.   
In the late 1990s, influential intellectual Francis Fukuyama argued that families are 
essential for the development of what he calls social capital, which he defines “simply as a 
set of informal norms shared among members of a group that permits cooperation among 
them.”229 Fukuyama reports that the “decline of nuclear families in the West had strongly 
negative effects on social capital and was related to an increase in poverty for people at the 
bottom of the social hierarchy, to increasing levels of crime, and finally to declining trust.”230 
According to Fukuyama, “There is a strong relationship between families and social 
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capital.”231 Families “create, socialize, and educate children.” 232 In other words, they are 
where social capital is acquired. Social capital such as “honesty, reciprocity, and keeping 
commitments…help the groups that practice them achieve shared ends,” such as the 
economic activity necessary for socioeconomic viability.233 
Illegitimate birth rates result in the failure of the development of social capital, 
opening the door to criminal activity and other anti-social behavior. He reasons that “the 
central problem that any society faces is controlling the aggression, ambition, and potential 
violence on the part of its young men, directing it into safe and productive channels.”234 He 
contends that this process requires the acquisition of social capital, which is best 
accomplished within the family, imparted by fathers who “can encourage, discipline, serve as 
role models, and otherwise socialize sons.”235 
This concern about the absence of fathers in the nuclear family appears in attacks on 
welfare. The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWOA) of 
1996 was accompanied by continuous articulations of welfare to the decline of traditional 
families. One of the welfare system’s primary sins, it was argued, was its supposed 
catastrophic effect on the traditional family. Accordingly, proponents of the act, primarily 
Republican, used the language of “Family-driven welfare reform,”236 which was necessary 
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because welfare has “destroy[ed] traditional families.” 237 PRWOA itself provided money to 
states to encourage marriage and two-parent families and its text explicitly stated that one of 
its goals was to encourage marriage. 
In 1994, during debates about welfare reform, Congressman and future United States 
Senator Jim Talent argued, “By subsidizing out of wedlock births, the system rewards young 
men for being irresponsible and lures young women into a course of action that is destructive 
for them, their children, and society.”238 He glorified the traditional family in language 
reminiscent of Reagan’s Family Violence Task Force: “the traditional family has always 
been the primary institution in America which transmits the values necessary for people to 
live together.”239  He lamented “it has now for the most part disappeared in our low- income 
communities” because of welfare.240 An editorial in the Utah newspaper the Deseret News 
(Utah’s oldest newspaper with the second largest circulation in the state) articulates families 
to economic prosperity: “Strong, traditional families remain the most reliable bulwarks 
against poverty and despair. The only way to design a successful welfare system is to make 
work and family the centerpiece. Families instill self-esteem.”241  
During welfare debates, Republicans were particularly anxious that welfare “trapped” 
people by harming families. In an editorial published in 1995, Speaker of the House of 
Representatives Newt Gingrich used the word trapped five times to describe those on 
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welfare, as the “welfare state…breaks up families.”242 In 1996, Michigan Governor John 
Engler argued that welfare recipients are “trapped in poverty, caught in a failed welfare 
system that discourages work, penalizes marriage and rewards irresponsible behavior” such 
as having children out of wedlock.243  
In 1997, California Assemblyman Bill Campbell argued that welfare recipients are 
kept “trapped in poverty” because the welfare system tells “young men: You can father 
children and walk away—the government will take care of them. We have told young 
women: You don’t need a husband—the government will take care of you. The result: One in 
seven children in the United States is living on AFDC.”244 Also in 1997, California governor 
Pete Wilson asserted that politicians “must end a welfare system that undermines the work 
ethic, that has trapped generations in dependency that drives fathers out of homes and 
encourages out-of-wedlock births.”245 Finally, in 1994 Virginia governor George Allen 
alleged that welfare has “trapped many Virginians and their families in a saga of 
dependency,” and his solutions squarely addressed the absence of two-parent families, 
including forcing mothers to identify the fathers of their children before receiving benefits.246  
Contemporary conservative figures also criticize the non-traditional family’s 
deterioration under welfare. Explicitly religious groups such as Focus on the Family and the 
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Family Research Council make similar connections between the need for minimalist 
government and traditional families. Both organizations contend that traditional marriage is 
under attack by welfare, as is the spiritual and economic health of the United States. Both 
incorporate concerns about welfare’s relationship to poverty into their opposition to gay 
marriage, gay adoption, cohabitation, single-parent families, and divorce. According to the 
article “Why Marriage Should be Privileged in Public Policy” by Bridget Maher on the 
Family Research Council website, “Marriage is the best antidote to poverty and welfare 
dependency.”247 According to Maher, “Welfare reform should aim to strengthen marriage, 
because the breakdown of marriage is a root cause of poverty, as most welfare recipients are 
never-married or divorced mothers.”248 The Focus on the Family website’s section on 
marriage argues that “families are the building blocks essential to a formation of a 
community, and strong social structure arises from the foundation many families provide.” It 
claims that “divorced and unwed childbearing cost U.S. taxpayers more than $112 billion a 
year.”249 The page links to an report completed by the American Values Institute, which 
argues that family-fragmentation leads to increased poverty, resulting in increased criminal 
justice costs, welfare payments, housing assistance, Medicaid, and other costs.250  
According to contemporary conservative leaders, the traditional family ensures 
socioeconomic viability. It is the space where individuals develop the personal responsibility 
necessary to successfully function in the free market economy. Former Arkansas governor 
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and presidential candidate Mike Huckabee argues that children of absentee fathers “are not 
raised to be ethical and productive citizens.”251  Furthermore, conservatives believe that the 
ultimate viability of a free-market economy itself depends on the formation of traditional 
families. According to former Ohio lieutenant governor and current senior fellow at the 
Family Research Council Ken Blackwell, “If we balance the budget and rein in government 
but do not rebuild and protect families, then the popular will for government intervention will 
irresistibly grow over time.”252 Huckabee argues “no government program can do what 
parents must do in teaching the kind of personal responsibility that is essential to creating a 
good economy.”253 
The family could only fill this organizing function if it was outside of economic 
relations. Accordingly, in conservative discourse, the quality of family life is articulated as 
having no relation to a family’s socioeconomic location. Love, support, guidance—the 
elements of the family valorized in conservative politics for enabling socioeconomic 
mobility—are independent variables that are not socioeconomically-specific.  
Texas governor Rick Perry celebrates the irrelevance of wealth to the quality of his 
family life as a child: “we didn’t have much in the way of material goods, but we were sure 
rich. We were rich in spirit. We were abundant in faith. And we were devoted to family.”254 
For parents of all socioeconomic locations, achieving these elements within one’s family is 
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mandatory, and is not contingent on socioeconomic variables. Also, the traditional family is a 
precondition for and guarantor of children’s economic success. Huckabee argues, “two thirds 
of children who live in poverty wouldn’t be in such a plight if their parents were married.”255 
That is, marriage prevents poverty, overpowering socioeconomic conditions. Thus, the 
importance of socioeconomic location is erased twice: first, it does not affect parenting and 
the formation of a nourishing family unit; second, traditional families negate the 
disadvantages of subordinate class locations.  
Contrary to these contentions, a parent’s ability to be dedicated and supportive is 
directly connected to socioeconomic location. For example, time with one’s children is a 
luxury for many parents. Parents working evenings and weekends may not be able to eat 
dinner with their children or attend extra-curricular activities. Also, engaged parenting cannot 
erase disadvantages of material deprivation. No matter the extent of parental support and 
dedication, a poor child in Flint, Michigan still lives somewhere without jobs or institutional 
resources to enable them to succeed socioeconomically. Class is significant in family life and 
family is of limited relevance in class relations. 
Nonetheless, conservatives criticize government efforts that attempt to address the 
deleterious consequences of class subordination. Government support and families exist in a 
zero-sum game, in which government support necessarily comes at the expense of family 
life. Congressman and 2012 Republican Vice Presidential nominee Paul Ryan complains that 
“Americans have been lured into viewing government—more than themselves, their families, 
their communities, their faith—as their main source of support.”   
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Government programs have destructive consequences for the traditional family’s 
ability to develop the autonomy necessary to compete in capitalism, and must be reduced to 
improve family life. Ryan’s budgetary plans reflect this position, proposing comprehensive 
reductions in federal welfare programs in favor of free-market economic policies, including 
the end of Medicare as an entitlement, reduction in Medicaid funding, food stamps, and 
housing aid, and dramatically lowered income tax rates. These measures aim to reduce 
dependence on the government and to increase dependence on the family, a shift that will 
strengthen individuals. Without minimizing government material support through reducing or 
eliminating programs, they will perpetuate and proliferate, as, by weakening families, 
government programs increase the need for government programs. Ryan argues that 
“government’s expansive reach too often undermines non-governmental institutions better 
suited to assist individuals in need, because it substitutes federal power in their place.”256 
Government power grows as family power recedes, which cements the need for government 
power.  
According to this way of thinking, the traditional, two-parent family is the 
fundamental and consequential network of relations, rather than legal, economic, educational 
or other socioeconomic relations. Indeed, as Perry argues, “the fabric of our society…is the 
family.”257 Perry and other conservatives privilege the interests of the traditional family, as 
they define them, over other relational networks: “the most basic unit of government is the 
family. And as a conservative, I believe with all my heart that the government closest to the 
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people is the best for the people.”258 Government, according to Perry, should cede space to 
familial decision-making, by, for example, reducing the social services that supposedly 
interfere with familial decision-making.  This contention runs counter to the liberal 
consensus, which held that government and not just family, is necessary for socioeconomic 
sufficiency and autonomy.  
 
Family Violence Task Force’s Management of Domestic Violence’s Challenge to the 
Family 
Domestic violence turns the argument that traditional families obviate the need for 
government programs inside-out. Traditional families in which abuse occurs create the need 
for government programs, precisely the types of comprehensive programs Ryan accuses of 
cultivating indolent helplessness: long-term housing; economic support; healthcare; and 
others. In addition, a traumatized, physically injured wife or child is intellectually and 
emotionally compromised, compromising their ability to thrive educationally and 
professionally, making them problematic economic subjects. If the traditional family has 
functioned as the guarantor of individual preparedness and the inclination to participate in the 
economy, as Huckabee, Ryan, and Blackwell argue, how do conservatives respond when the 
traditional family itself creates the need for the government programs that destroy, in their 
way of thinking, individual economic ability and inclination? This situation seems to demand 
the solution the liberal consensus proffered of broader material assistance.  
 Reagan’s Family Violence Task Force Final Report protects the prestige of the 
family and denies the need for comprehensive resources for victims by omitting any analysis 
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of domestic violence’s causes. The report does not discuss economic inequality or critique 
traditional ideas of men holding positions of authority in households and exercising that 
authority through violence, both central arguments of the battered women’s movement. In 
addition, the report fails to discuss material causes of domestic violence, such as 
unemployment, drug and alcohol abuse, or homelessness, an omission that preserves the 
fantasy of the family as a self-sufficient haven that shields its members from outside threats 
such as the multiple deleterious physical and psychological consequences of poverty, a 
fantasy crucial to a discourse glorifying the traditional family and critical of social welfare 
programs.  
The Task Force Report de-contextualizes domestic violence by relying on a criminal 
justice response that does not treat domestic violence differently than non-domestic violence, 
thereby omitting any discussion of the dynamics of the traditional family that give rise to 
domestic violence. It argues, “The legal response to family violence must be guided 
primarily by the nature of the abusive act, not the relationship between the victim and the 
abuser.”259 That is, a crime is a crime, a stance that ignores the context in which many acts of 
domestic violence occur, the traditional family. The criminal justice system treats family 
violence as aberrant acts, rather than, as the battered women’s movement would have it, as 
characteristic of problems with the configuration of the traditional family itself. Also, it 
presumes that prosecution and punishment will reduce further victimization better than 
providing resources to victims to enable them to live independently of their abusers.  
The Final Report is consistently vague in its descriptions of what victims’ services 
programs do. For example, while its “Victim Assistance” chapter names various forms of 
victims’ assistance, such as “family violence prevention and intervention,” “victim assistance 
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programs,” and “victim assistance services,” it rarely specifies the purpose of such programs, 
or even what victims’ needs they fulfill, thereby avoiding discussing what needs domestic 
violence victims have.260 Also, the report identifies the need for a complex coordination of 
resources between the criminal justice system and service providers, explaining that “[l]aw 
enforcement officers must know where victims can be referred for emergency aid… [j]udges 
must be familiar with the services that can be employed as alternatives to traditional 
dispositions… [s]ervice agencies must know who to call at the police station.”261 However, it 
fails to define any of the previous passage’s key terms, such as service agencies, emergency 
aid (presuming that means more than medical attention), and alternatives to traditional 
dispositions (that may involve counseling for offenders rather than punishment). This 
vagueness, again, obscures what service agencies do and the problems to which they respond. 
Altogether, a careful reading of the report reveals little about who any one of these figures 
would call to accomplish the stated tasks of finding emergency aid and coordinating social 
services, and one is left with little idea about what problems of victims’ needs demand these 
types of resources.  
The report’s “Education and Training” chapter is similarly vague. It recommends that 
a wide range of institutions provide training in family violence intervention. Such institutions 
include professional schools (medical, law, divinity, education, etc.), federal, state, and local 
government agencies, and national professional organizations. However, besides alerting law 
enforcement, the report fails to identify the specific dimensions of this proposed training, or 
how exactly someone in one of these institutions seeking to intervene could or should 
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respond when encountering domestic abuse. Overall, the report offers no direction as to how 
institutions outside of the criminal justice system can improve their responses to domestic 
violence.  
In contrast to its vagueness about victims’ services and civil society’s response to 
domestic violence, the Final Report offers many specific recommendations for the judiciary, 
police, and prosecutor’s offices. For example, the report recommends barring law 
enforcement agencies from interviewing children more than once. In being specific about 
criminal justice responses but remaining vague on social service resources, the report works 
to constrict the problem’s scope to bad men who will hopefully learn their lesson through 
being punished. By delimiting and obscuring solutions, the report delimits and obscures the 
problems those solutions presuppose. The Final Report’s emphasis on prosecuting and 
punishing offenders enables it to treat domestic violence as isolated acts outside of any 
socioeconomic and gender relationality, thereby preserving the family’s autonomy and 
prestige, enabling its continuing utilization as the basis of attacks on the welfare state.  
Conservative victims’ rights criminology advocates focusing on and punishing acts 
rather than on the socioeconomic conditions that enable criminal acts, decontextualizing 
violence just as the Task Force does. For conservatives, crime has nothing to do with where 
either the victim or criminal lived, how they got around, their mental health, what drugs they 
were on, or what school they went to, only the defective moral character of perpetrators. By 
contrast, mainstream criminological scholarship does not merely focus on the criminal justice 
system and criminal justice institutions, but on a wide array of institutions and dynamics, 
including schools, drug addiction, medical resources, prison rehabilitation programs, and city 
planning. Conservative criminology ignores such analysis, emphasizing the offender’s 
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punishment after they have committed the crime rather than any conditions that preceded it. 
262 Accordingly, the paradigmatic crimes for ‘tough-on-crime’ victims’ rights advocates are 
rapes, murders, or robberies committed by strangers, in which no relationship existed 
between the offender and victim before the incident, and no relationship will exist after.263  
Domestic violence complicates this conservative picture. In contrast to stranger 
violence, domestic violence occurs in a relationship with a future. Like stranger crime, 
conditions at the time of the incident (such as homelessness, unemployment, or previous 
abuse, among many others) provide insight into why the incident occurred. Unlike stranger 
crime, the alteration or continued existence of these conditions affect whether the violence 
will reoccur. That is, a robbery victim is no more likely to be robbed than someone who had 
never been robbed at all, while a domestic violence victim is far more likely to be reassaulted 
than someone who had never been a domestic violence victim, unless there is a change of 
family dynamics. Of course, the criminal justice system alone is ill-equipped to examine and 
respond to those conditions on its own; hence, there is a need for vigorous cooperation with 
support for social service resource to provide housing, money, and employment for battered 
women, which the 1978 Consultation’s participants demanded and the Reagan Task Force 
‘Final Report’ remained silent about. Ignoring the victim’s context may not engender further 
victimization for those previously victimized by strangers, but it will for victims of domestic 
violence. The Task Force on Family Violence erased the difference between stranger crime 
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and domestic violence, thereby suppressing the notion that treating them identically leaves 
domestic violence victims vulnerable in ways stranger victims are not.  
Conservative criminology holds that focusing on domestic violence as isolated 
criminals acts and ignoring socioeconomic complexity will be beneficial for victims, as 
incarcerating offenders incapacitates their ability to further victimize, enhancing domestic 
violence victims’ security. However, if a domestic violence policy’s success is measured by 
the connected goals of reducing future victimization and enhancing victims’ life chances, it is 
counterproductive to ignore the offenders’ and victims’ socioeconomic conditions. For 
domestic violence policy to be effective, it must respond to the specific socioeconomic 
conditions of victims and offenders. Consider that couples exist in economic relationships 
with shared parenting responsibilities. Removing an abusive husband from the home for a 
year-long prison term—in the event of the type of prosecution and incarceration the Task 
Force promotes—profoundly changes the victim’s economic situation and her ability to care 
for her children. If the assaultive husband was the household’s sole source of income, the 
battered wife will not have money to pay the household’s bills, leading directly to hunger, 
homelessness, and lack of healthcare. Also, the possibility of the victim’s re-victimization is 
related to their socioeconomic situation. If the victim remains destitute at the end of the 
offender’s incarceration, she will be more likely to return to the offender, thereby making 
herself subject to further abuse. In such a situation, the criminal justice system alone is 
incapable of solving problems arising from domestic violence, and, in light of the female’s 
imminent poverty without the husband’s income, it may be a destructive response to 
domestic violence. The liberal consensus would hold that this situation demands government 
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assistance to liberate the female from the forces that contributed to her economic dependency 
on her husband or male partner that enabled future victimization.  
Domestic violence policy that provides housing, employment, and financial 
assistance presume that victims are situated in economic, geographic, professional, social, 
and familial relations, and thereby point to the manifold webs of relationality that exceed the 
family relations conservatives treat as autonomous and determinative. Such solutions look 
beyond the family to a semblance of a welfare state that provides material resources, as other 
elements of civil society popular among conservatives—neighborhoods, churches, families—
have demonstrated their inadequacy at meeting victims’ basic needs.  
 
The Democratic Party’s Neglect of Material Support for Domestic Violence Victims 
 
 
Of course, Reagan’s was a conservative administration, and the Family Violence 
Task Force Final Report reflects that conservatism in glorifying the traditional family and 
emphasizing criminal justice responses to domestic violence at the expense of social welfare 
responses. One may think that domestic violence policy crafted by liberals would include 
solutions addressing the victim’s socioeconomic context by providing material resources to 
enable a victim to survive independently of his or her abuser, thereby mirroring liberal views 
on the need for government support generally. However, the Democratic Party’s primary 
federal policy response to domestic violence, the 1994 Violence Against Women Act, 
mirrored the Task Force on Family Violence’s vigorous reliance on criminal justice solutions 
and meager provision of material resources.   
VAWA created two new federal crimes: crossing state lines to commit acts of 
domestic violence and crossing state lines to violate protection orders. It also mandated that 
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any civil protection order receive full faith and credit in every state. While the 1994 Act and 
the most recent version of VAWA both contain money for social services, the vast majority 
of VAWA money is dedicated to the criminal justice system. VAWA funding supports state 
and local law enforcement agencies’ mandatory arrest policies, changes in domestic violence 
investigation procedures, the development of prosecution and police units dedicated solely to 
crimes against women, and the creation of more comprehensive databases for crimes against 
women. For example, the 2005 version of the act contained $75 million per year for 
encouraging mandatory domestic violence arrest practices, $55 million per year for rural 
domestic violence and child abuse enforcement grants, and $225 million per year for 
Services and Training for Officers and Prosecutors (STOP) grants. By contrast, VAWA 
contained no money for temporary shelters, only $40 million per year for transitional 
housing, and $10 million for grants to coordinate development of long-term housing for 
victims.264 In the fiscal year 2012, the amount available for transitional housing declined to 
$25 million. Considering that in 2000 there were 1,887 domestic violence shelters and many 
more transitional housing programs, federal funding makes up only a tiny portion of shelter 
and transitional housing program budgets.265  
Perhaps these law and order elements of VAWA were included to satisfy tough-on-
crime Republicans, and they ensured VAWA’s passage and its continued authorization. In 
other words, through the course of the legislative process, Democrats sacrificed their liberal 
emphasis on domestic violence victims’ material conditions to compromise with Republicans 
and get the bill passed. However, the evidence shows that providing material resources was 
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never VAWA’s emphasis from the beginning of its legislative history. From its 1990 
introduction by Senator Joseph Biden, VAWA shared the Task Force on Family Violence’s 
emphasis on criminal justice solutions to domestic violence. The strong majority of VAWA 
money in the 1990 legislation went towards increasing the number of police and prosecutors 
focused on domestic and sexual violence, encouraging mandatory arrest policies, and training 
police and prosecutors to improve conviction rates, all elements of the final 1994 VAWA 
bill.  Comparatively few resources were devoted to ameliorating the material conditions of 
battered women, primarily funding for temporary shelters. Absent from VAWA are long-
term housing, employment, medical care, mental health care, transportation, substance abuse 
treatment, financial, or child care resources for victims, all necessary for a victim to live 
independently of her batterer.   
The rhetoric of prominent Democrats during Congressional hearings about VAWA 
demonstrates a commitment to the Task Force on Family Violence’s emphasis on criminal 
justice responses to domestic violence. For example, in the 1990 Senate Judiciary Committee 
hearing concerning VAWA entitled “Legislation to Reduce the Growing Problem of Violent 
Crime Against Women,” Biden argues that his bill “uses federal grant money to encourage 
States to treat domestic violence as a crime and not as a quarrel.”266 In a 1991 Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary hearing “Violence Against Women: Victims of the System,” 
Biden offered the following statistic to suggest that arrest, prosecution, and conviction were 
central to reducing domestic violence “Last year, according to one study, an abusive spouse 
was arrested in less than 15 percent of the cases where his victim was bleeding from an open 
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wound.”267 In 1994 statement provided to the House Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal 
Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary hearing “Domestic Violence: Not Just a Family 
Matter,” Biden argued, “For too long, violence in the home has not been treated as seriously 
as violence in the street…while a stranger might serve a lengthy jail term for an assault, a 
spouse of boyfriend will all too often be neither arrested nor prosecuted for the very same 
conduct.”268 Similarly, in his speech opening the 1994 “Domestic Violence: Not Just a 
Family Matter” hearing, Representative Charles Schumer hailed the criminal justice 
orientation of the pending VAWA legislation, declaring, “if there is one message I would like 
everyone to hear today it is that batterers must be treated like the criminals they are.”269  
By insisting on the commensurability of domestic and stranger violence, Biden and 
Schumer bracket out socioeconomic context from domestic violence analysis. Accordingly, 
entirely absent from Schumer’s and Biden’s speeches is any discussion of the material 
deprivation that contributes to the inability of women to live on their own because of a lack 
of material resources, which, in turn, increased their vulnerability to further victimization. 
Instead, they, like the Task Force on Family Violence, focused on the criminal justice 
system’s treatment of the batterer, presumably because they determined that convicting and 
imprisoning offenders is the proper focus of anti-domestic violence efforts, and that 
incarcerating offenders alone will sufficiently reduce future victimization and improve 
battered women’s lives.  
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The equation between domestic violence and stranger violence in VAWA was not 
total. In funding domestic violence advocates employed by prosecutors’ offices, the 
legislation recognized the unique difficulties domestic violence victims have in participating 
in the criminal justice system. However, these measures still worked to increase prosecutions 
and punishments, demonstrating the same reliance on and faith in criminal justice responses 
to domestic violence. In VAWA, helping women meant helping them prosecute and punish 
their batterers and little else.  
Their statements not only mirror the Task Force on Family Violence’s reduction of 
domestic violence to stranger violence, but also the language of Republicans participating in 
the same hearings in which they were presented. Republicans participating in VAWA 
hearings offered the same solutions to domestic violence as those they advocated for in 
addressing stranger violence: prosecution and harsh penalties. VAWA was part of a larger 
crime bill, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, which was emphatically 
tough-on-crime, including, among other measures, billions of dollars for states to build 
prisons if they promised that offenders would serve at least 85% of their sentences.  
Republican Senators and Representatives made no distinction between domestic 
violence and bank robberies and drug-related murders addressed in other parts of the larger 
crime bill. For example, in the 1991 “Violence Against Women: Victims of the System” 
hearing, Republican Senator Chuck Grassley said, “We must impose swift, sure, and strict 
punishment for criminals at least as tough as the crime itself,” and “getting tough on the 
crime means getting tough on the criminal.”270 In the same hearing, Strom Thurmond 
demanded that “vicious acts against women be dealt with by enacting tough crime penalties 
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which harshly punish perpetrators and deter these violent crimes.”271 In the 1994 “Domestic 
Violence: Not Just a Family Matter,” Representative Steven Schiff echoed the ‘crime is a 
crime’ ethos by referring to his previous experience as a district attorney: “one of the first 
actions I took was to issue instructions to our office and law enforcement agencies in our 
district that domestic relations violence was violence. In other words, a charge of assault and 
battery should be treated like a charge of assault and battery and the relationship between the 
accused and the victim were (sic) not relevant.”272 
 It is mysterious why Democrats would adopt wholesale conservative domestic 
violence discourses. The absence of comprehensive funding for victims’ services cannot be 
attributed to an absence of research demonstrating the central role socioeconomic status plays 
in determining the frequency of domestic violence victimization and the ability of victims to 
leave abusive situations, or an absence of research demonstrating a need for and the benefits 
of comprehensive domestic violence victims’ services. Law professor and social worker 
Donna Coker argues that inadequate resources are a primary reason women do not leave 
abusive situations, and battering itself can have a catastrophic effect on women’s economic 
well-being, compromising educational opportunities, employment, and housing status. 273 
Suzanne Wenzel, Barbara Leake, and Lillian Gelberg demonstrate that the severity of 
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homelessness is a major predictor of domestic violence.274 Chiquita Rollins reports that “the 
perceived and actual availability of safe, affordable housing and programs in the community 
to assist survivors of IPV [intimate partner violence] in accessing housing is also linked to 
women’s decision and ability to safely leave an abusive relationship.”275 Jody Raphael argues 
that “women with no financial resources are more vulnerable, easier to dominate, and unable 
to leave their abusers.”276 
Responding to the evidence of a relationship between a lack of material resources and 
domestic abuse, Coker proposes submitting every anti-domestic violence law and policy to a 
“material resources test,” which will ascertain whether a specific policy “improves women’s 
access to material resources.”277 She reasons that “inadequate material resources render 
women’s choices more coerced than would otherwise be the case.”278 Ultimately, “the 
obvious impact of applying the material resources test is to shift significant monies to direct 
aid for victims and to target more significant aid to poor women and especially poor women 
of color” from law enforcement and incarceration expenditures.279 Instead of costly 
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mandatory arrest policies, she recommends transportation, housing, childcare, and food 
assistance.280 
Despite the emphasis on criminal justice responses in VAWA and the Family 
Violence Task Force Final Report, Coker’s material resources test reveals that criminal 
justice responses may offer fewer resources than social service responses for women of color 
and immigrants. Also, mandatory arrests policies carry two risks for these women. First, 
forcing police to choose someone in arrest in chaotic and contested circumstances because of 
mandatory arrest policies may result in the battered woman’s arrest, which could catalyze 
severe financial and parental consequences. Second, if the victim or offender is 
undocumented, initiating contact with law enforcement may cause either the batterer or the 
battered to become enmeshed in the immigration system, ultimately leading to one or the 
other of them being deported. Both scenarios carry significant adverse material 
consequences, which, according to Coker, outweigh the material benefits of having the 
batterer arrested.281  
Affirming Coker’s arguments, studies have demonstrated that access to material 
resources effectively reduces the chances for violent revictimization. Domestic violence 
programs that explicitly address a victim’s socioeconomic condition have succeeded in 
reducing the recurrence of violent victimization. Studies indicate that employed victims with 
stable housing are considerably less likely to suffer future victimization by their batterers, for 
the simple reason that they are materially capable of staying away from them. For example, 
Neil Websdale documents a Kentucky project in which women in domestic violence shelters 
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received employment training, housing support, and other forms of services. He found that 
only 2.4% of women who participated in the project and subsequently secured housing 
separate from their abuser suffer further victimization, compared to 86.4% of those who do 
not.282 Christina Gibson-Davis et al. examined two programs to discern the relationship 
between employment and victimization. The first program, the Minnesota Family Investment 
Program, offered wage supports and job-training to single mothers. The second, the federal 
National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies, required welfare-recipients to work or 
receive job training. They found that each program increased the employment of their 
participants. According to their study, increased employment brought a 6-8% decline in 
domestic abuse.283 Also, Gibson-Davis, et al found that both programs “reduced reports of 
domestic violence, even though these programs did not include services to directly address 
domestic abuse.”284   
Tellingly, Melissa Richter and Karen Rhodes found that domestic violence victims 
endorsed economic support and mental and medical health care rather than law enforcement 
responses. According to their study, 88% of victims expressed interest in health care, 72% in 
mental health treatment, and 77% in economic assistance (including cash payments, housing 
assistance, and employment assistance), while 56% wanted law enforcement assistance.285 
The disparity between law enforcement and services was greater concerning what victims 
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said they needed. While 76% said they needed financial support, only 47% said they needed 
law enforcement.286 Richter and Rhodes posited that preference for services may be due to 
law enforcement being perceived as acting “as a temporary ‘Band-Aid’ for acute 
circumstances but are not viewed as useful for long-term protection. Without means for 
gaining independence from the partner, some women will not be able to safely escape the 
violence.”287 Deborah Bybee and Cris Sullivan studied whether assistance from advocates 
trained to help domestic violence victims would reduce future victimization for those 
victims. She found that 25% of domestic violence victims who received assistance with 
housing, employment, and other services experienced no further abuse after two years, while 
that was true for only 10% of those who had not.288  
Altogether, considering these studies, no good policy reasons exist for a lack of 
victims’ services. Unsurprisingly, a lack of financial resources impairs the ability of service 
providers to enable victims to avoid future victimization. The primary complaint of North 
Carolina domestic violence shelters and services providers is the perpetual lack of funding.289 
In a study completed by Rebecca Macy, the directors of domestic violence agencies 
repeatedly said that transitional housing and transportation were crucial for victims. 
However, they “reported that their agencies were unable to offer long-term transitional 
housing for survivors or to help survivors with transportation needs. In addition, few 
affordable housing resources and low-cost transportation systems existed in their agencies’ 
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respective communities.”290 In 2011, the National Network to End Domestic Violence 
completed a census of 1,726 domestic violence programs across the nation. The census 
recorded the requests for services each program reported within a 24-hour period. It found 
that within that 24-hour period there were 10,581 requests for services that the domestic 
violence programs could not meet, including over 6,714 requests for housing. The report 
notes that programs could not meet these requests because “programs did not have the 
resources to offer these services.”291 The report further indicated that only 35% of the 
programs offered transitional housing, 22% offered employment assistance, and 18% offered 
medical care and advocacy, among many other services important for women to avoid further 
victimization only a minority of shelter programs offered.  
Considering the research indicating that there is need for and manifold benefits to 
victims’ services funding, the constraints limiting domestic violence services are not 
immanent to domestic violence discourse and policy itself. Therefore, the constraints come 
from outside of domestic violence discourse, from other normative discourses concerning 
ways of responding to victimization.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The struggle over domestic violence was an important moment in the development of 
the politics of victimization. Domestic violence policy could have developed in a different 
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way, such as focusing on services instead of punishment. In so doing, it would have offered a 
clear alternative to the victims’ rights model of responding to victimization. However, the 
victims’ rights model has prevailed. Domestic violence service providers have not been able 
to obtain the resources to offer the comprehensive services necessary to prevent victimization 
and revictimization. By contrast, the victims’ rights movement is extraordinarily successful 
in its efforts to dramatically increase sentences for numerous crimes, such as the three-strikes 
law in California. Such campaigns that are conducted in victims’ names have resulted in 
billions of dollars of annual government spending to incarcerate prisoners, dwarfing what 
government expends on domestic violence services.  
In the victims’ rights model, victims need nothing more than prosecution and 
punishment. In the anti-domestic violence model, victims need services as much or more 
than punishment. Victims in stranger crimes do not have the same needs as domestic 
violence victims. However, contrary to the victims’ rights model, they do have needs beyond 
punishment for criminals. For example, a victim injured during a robbery may need 
counseling, medical care, time off of work, and financial assistance in order to cope with and 
recover from their victimization. Adopting the anti-domestic violence paradigm would not 
just be a matter of adding to services government provides victims, but in complexifying the 
concept of victims’ needs, displacing punishment and prosecution from its centrality in 
American responses to victimization.  
It is impossible to separate stranger violence and domestic violence so completely 
that responses to victimization in one would not affect the other. It is difficult to imagine one 
system of governmental responses to victimization that can include such antithetical 
approaches as victims’ rights and domestic violence services, and America’s responses to 
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victimization have almost exclusively privileged the victims’ rights approach. Perhaps the 
absence of domestic violence funding can be attributed to the victims’ rights movement’s 
preeminence. In the 1990s, Democrats chose to model domestic violence responses 
according to the victims’ rights paradigm.  
Domestic violence provided a test case of the ability of American political and 
criminal justice system to fashion responses to victimization that consider socioeconomic 
context and presume a broad sociality of an interconnected whole rather than responses that 
treated crime as committed by atomized individuals. If any type of crime was going to impel 
material responses, it would be domestic violence, because of the undeniable importance 
socioeconomic context in the commission of the offense (the family) and the social service 
responses it demands to avoid further victimization (housing, food, money). But, victims’ 
rights criminal justice responses that deny the importance of socioeconomic relations have 
carried the day.  
Domestic violence policy focuses of perpetrators and not victims in a manner 
identical to the victims’ rights movement. As a result, a conservative vision of the family has 
prevailed, spared the comprehensive critique levied by the battered women’s movement. It 
remains intact as the nurturing and self-sustaining entity conservatives require for their 
attacks on welfare and government support generally. As chapter three shows, victims’ rights 
affirms the conception of the nurturing and self-sustaining family promoted by conservatives. 
It is obvious why conservatives advocate for victims’ rights approaches to domestic 
violence: it protects their articulation of the family as the fundamental force shaping 
socioeconomic relations, which has undergirded conservative Republican attacks on the 
welfare state. The victims’ rights family represents a unification of conservatism’s cultural 
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politics and neoliberalism’s economic agenda. For conservatives, the health of the family 
depends on the health of capitalism, and vice versa. By contrast, insisting on the importance 
of socioeconomic forces in the commission and prevention of domestic violence necessarily 
asserts the importance of social forces beyond the family, dislodging the family from its 
fundamental position. This affirms the liberal consensus’s contention that forces beyond the 
family’s control call for assistance from government to ensure socioeconomic viability.  
The failure of Democrats to support comprehensive domestic violence victim services 
seems to contradict the liberal consensus’s assertion of the importance of broader social 
forces affecting families. Advocating for comprehensive victims’ services would call into 
question the self-sustaining traditional family, thereby contesting the foundation of 
conservative attacks on welfare. By contrast to their tepid support for comprehensive 
domestic violence victims’ support, Democrats supported and continue to support victims’ 
rights measures, at times enthusiastically. When it comes to responding to victimization, 
then, Democrats are not progressive, or even liberal, but conservative.  
The success of victims' rights relative to the failure of domestic violence service 
acquisition mirrors the ascendance of conservative attacks on government’s responsibility to 
care for the poor. Conversely, the failure to achieve plentiful resources for domestic violence 
mirrors the demise of the liberal consensus’s commitment to helping poor people affected by 
socioeconomic forces beyond their control. The failure to legislate comprehensive victim 
support coincided with the success of attacks on social welfare programs predicated on 
glorification of the traditional family. For example, VAWA was passed in 1994, while the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act ended welfare as an entitlement in 1996. 
Both measures were led by Democrats.  
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As conservatives increasingly attack the liberal consensus and demand budget cuts 
targeting welfare and other social spending instead of tax increases to balance the federal 
budget in the name of the traditional family, we will see on what basis those inclined to 
protect the poor mount their defense of such spending. Such efforts may be impossible 
without an assertion of broad social forces and the fallibility of the traditional family 
comprehensive domestic violence services advocates asserted. They abandoned such an 
assertion by choosing victims’ rights, leaving liberals defenseless in their fight, if they 
choose to wage it, to protect government support for the poor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter Three: The Power of the Common Man 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 “We’ve got the power to do whatever we want. All we have to do is just do it.”292 
Mark Lunsford 
 
Previous chapters about the American victims' rights movement have examined the 
victims’ rights work of the Reagan Administration and the victims’ rights orientation of 
domestic violence policy in the 1990s. This chapter focuses on more recent victims’ rights 
activism, providing an overview of the work of current victims' rights organizations 
generally, and a case history of the work of one leading victims' rights activist, Mark 
Lunsford, who between 2005 and 2011 successfully advocated for the passage of harsher 
sexual offender sentencing laws across the United States, named Jessica’s Law for his 
murdered daughter.   
 This chapter will explore the appeal of victims' rights, using the work of Stuart Hall 
to argue that its appeal derives from the current socioeconomic conditions of its supporters. It 
also examines the victims’ rights movement’s disarticulation of two discourses that have 
cemented the post-World War Two liberal consensus. First, that government must ameliorate 
poverty’s psychological damages and devote resources to enable socioeconomically 
subordinate populations to function economically and professionally in American capitalism. 
The second assumption is that unregulated private economic enterprise corrodes the 
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possibilities of socioeconomic mobility for all. Together, these two assumptions suggest the 
impossibility of social mobility for Americans without government intervention. I cite these 
discourses in the political work of Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson, two great 
champions of the liberal consensus. Both of these assumptions are undercut by the victims' 
rights movement’s articulation of the family, one very different than the family articulated by 
the anti-domestic violence activism described in chapter two.  
 
The Victims’ Rights Movement after the 1990s 
 
As discussed in chapter one, the Reagan Administration released a report on crime 
victims in 1982. The report continues to be cited by victims’ rights activists and the few 
academics sympathetic to victims’ rights as the template for victims’ rights philosophy. The 
report primarily calls for increased victims’ participation in the prosecution of defendants and 
the determination of offenders’ sentences; it devotes little attention to the provision of 
medical, financial, and psychological resources to victims. For a short period after the release 
of the report, legislation addressing crime victims focused on establishing government 
administered financial compensation schemes for victims, rather than on inserting victims 
into the criminal justice process.293 Victims' rights took the qualitative shift to offender-
oriented policy found in the Task Force Report in the early 1990s, when states across the 
country passed laws guaranteeing victims’ rights to participate in and receive information 
about criminal justice cases. By 1997, 44 states had laws guaranteeing victims access to 
criminal trials, and 33 had passed constitutional amendments guaranteeing such access.  
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These and other victims’ rights efforts have been led by an array of non-governmental 
organizations who work with local, state, and federal governments, many of which are 
described in the introduction. As the movement has evolved, groups focusing on punishment 
and the treatment of offenders have come to dominate the victims’ rights movement. Some 
are dedicated to increasing victims’ ability to participate in the prosecution and punishment 
of offenders, and also work to lengthen prison sentences for offenders. In addition, these 
groups, such as Justice For All, Crime Victims United, and Crime Victims Action Alliance, 
support increasing the number of crimes eligible for the death penalty, call for an expanded 
use of mandatory minimum sentences, and oppose any legislation or court-orders reducing 
prison populations. These groups also seek to reduce the quality of life of prisoners, 
reasoning that victims’ and offenders’ well-being exist in an inverse relationship to each 
other. For example, in 1994, Justice for All’s Pam Lychner, a crime victim, sued to overturn 
a federal settlement between Texas prisoners and the Texas Department of Corrections which 
granted inmates certain living standards, limited the use of tents to house prisoners, and 
mandated certain staff to prisoner ratios. Lychner protested, we “are demanding respect. We 
won’t tolerate inmates laughing at us anymore.”294 Altogether, they are tough-on-crime and 
tough on criminals, purportedly for the sake of crime victims.  
Other groups are dedicated to specific offender populations and sentencing issues. For 
example, the National Organization of Victims of Juvenile Lifers works to defeat any efforts 
to repeal life sentences without parole for people convicted of a murder committed when they 
were minors, arguing that allowing those convicted as juveniles to leave prison after 25 years 
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instead of requiring them to die in prison harms victims or their families, and is thus 
unacceptable.295   
In the 1990s, amidst a wave of legislative changes that dramatically increased the 
United States’ prison population—such as the passage of three-strikes laws—legislators 
developed the practice of naming many ‘tough-on-crime’ legislative measures after specific 
victims. In other words, such legislation is passed ‘for’ and in honor of these victims. 
Legislation named after crime victims typically bore some relation to the type of crime the 
victim had endured. For example, New Jersey’s Megan’s Law is named after Megan Kanka, 
who was murdered by a man with two previous convictions for sexually assaulting young 
girls. The law requires sex offenders to register with local police departments and for their 
registration to be publicly available. A pattern was established for the development and 
passage of these bills. First, the victim him/herself or the victim’s family (most bills were 
named after deceased victims) lobbied for the bills, testifying in state legislatures or in the 
United States Congress, and expressing their support in the media. After bills were passed by 
legislators, governors and presidents typically held signing ceremonies with the victim and/or 
the victim’s family in attendance. The governor or president frequently embraced the victim 
or victims’ family members, congratulating them for the bill’s passage. Politicians and family 
members assert that these legislative efforts provide justice for the named victims, ensuring 
that they did not suffer in vain.  
This practice of naming legislation after people not involved in writing it is unique in 
criminal justice. Laws have long been named after people, but they are typically named for 
the lawmakers who wrote the act, not non-politicians associated with the legislation. To 
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follow the victims’ rights’ example, the Wagner act, named for Senator Robert Wagner, 
would be named after a striking worker exploited by his employer.  
There are dozens of laws named after victims, including Caylee’s Law (passed in 
multiple states; first passed in Florida in 2012), Jessica’s Law (passed in multiple states; first 
passed in Florida in 2005), Amber’s Law (passed multiple states and federally; first passed 
federally in 1996), Megan’s Law (passed in multiple states; first passed in New Jersey in 
1994), Jacob’s Law (passed federally in 1994), Ashley’s Law (passed in Virginia in 2011), 
and Chelsea’s Law (passed in California in 2010), among others. All make life harder for 
those convicted of the types of crimes addressed by the laws by lengthening sentences, 
making post-release conditions stricter, increasing surveillance of ex-offenders, or increasing 
the information about offenders available to the public. There are demographic similarities 
among the victims for which the bills are named. All of the victims are white; most are 
children. Of these children, most are girls. Most of them were victims of crimes committed 
by a stranger.  
For many, the particular horror of the crimes that catalyzes vigorous legislative 
responses is due to the victim’s socioeconomic location. Most of these victims belonged to 
socioeconomic classes typically insulated from everyday criminal victimization.  They were 
not homeless or addicted to drugs, did not live in high crime areas, were not a member of a 
racial minority (crime rates for racial minorities are much higher than for whites), were not 
involved in criminal activity themselves, and did not possess any other socioeconomic or 
behavioral factors that predict one’s vulnerability to victimization. The absence of 
socioeconomic risk factors enhanced the unique innocence of the victims these bills were 
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named for. It was not their socioeconomic location that placed these victims at risk, but the 
evil of the offenders. In that sense, these were classless crimes.  
The absence of risk factors, many socioeconomic, mirrors the absence of the 
provision of socioeconomic resources to address these risk factors in the legislation named 
for crime victims. Such legislative measures are primarily dedicated to extending prison 
sentences and making post-release surveillance stricter. However, while the victims may not 
have had any socioeconomic risk factors, there were often such risk factors for the offenders. 
Many were mentally ill, homeless, or drug addicts, all factors than increase the likelihood of 
their reoffending. Legislation named for crime victims does not direct material resources to 
address these issues for these offenders.  
Similarly, while the victims the bills are named for were not at socioeconomic risk for 
victimization, many victims are. Nothing in the legislation named for victims addresses the 
socioeconomic factors that contribute to criminal victimization. A female homeless drug-
addict is much more likely to be sexually assaulted than someone with safe, stable housing. 
Providing safe, stable housing would prevent victimization, a professed goal of the victims’ 
rights movement. However, emphasizing the socioeconomic contributors to the commission 
of crime and criminal victimization would, perhaps, function as a critique of the legitimacy 
of America’s class structure, and such a critique would be anathema to the conservatives who 
vigorously advocate for victims’ rights. In fact, as we shall see, victims' rights works to 
cement the legitimacy of the class structure.  
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Mark Lunsford’s Crusade 
  
The following section will focus on Jessica’s Law, named for eight year old Jessica 
Lunsford, who was murdered by a sex offender in Florida in 2005. Following her death, her 
father, Mark, crusaded across the country advocating for the passage of versions of Jessica’s 
Law, a crusade that garnered him great power and prestige.  
Jessica Lunsford disappeared from the home she shared with her father and paternal 
grandparents in Homosassa, Florida, a rural community 75 miles north of Tampa, early 
Thursday morning, February 23, 2005. By Friday, her disappearance had become a national 
story. Starting that day, Mark Lunsford met frequently with the press, describing his efforts 
to his find Jessica and his family’s emotional state. His comments were covered in national 
newspapers such as USA Today and The New York Times and he appeared on CNN, NBC 
News, ABC, and CBS. Though hundreds of law enforcement personnel and volunteers 
searched for Jessica Lunsford, the search was unsuccessful, and its scope was reduced over 
the next three weeks, while the police investigation into her disappearance continued. On 
March 18, Citrus County police traveled to Augusta, Georgia to interview John Couey, a 
convicted sex offender who lived near the Lunsford house and left the state following 
Jessica’s disappearance. During the interview, Couey confessed to murdering Jessica, and 
subsequently directed the police to her body, which was buried behind his house. In 2007, 
Couey was convicted of murdering Jessica, and sentenced to death. Lunsford had said that he 
would like to administer Couey's lethal injection himself, but, to his dismay, Couey died of 
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natural causes in 2009. Lunsford complained, “My daughter’s murderer died today. And it 
wasn’t by our hands. John Couey got off easy.”296  
 On March 20, two days after Couey confessed to killing Jessica Lunsford, Lunsford 
began work to pass legislation making laws for sexual violence harsher, passing out petitions 
to lengthen sentences for sexual violence and make ankle monitoring systems for sex 
offenders mandatory. He declared, “She’s home now. Now we have a new struggle. I need 
people to support me to help change things.”297 Elected officials immediately went to work 
drafting legislation matching Lunsford’s proposals. On March 23, Florida State 
Representative Charles Dean said he would introduce legislation that would extend sentences 
and mandate lifetime electronic monitoring for offenders, which was ultimately written by 
State Senator Nancy Argenziano and Jeff Dawsy, the Citrus County sheriff who investigated 
the Lunsford case. Lunsford dictated that any version of Jessica’s Law “needs to mirror the 
Senate Bill that Nancy Argenziano and Jeff Dawsy put together.”298 Lunsford spent March 
and April lobbying state senators and representatives and giving interviews in support of the 
bill. On April 20, the Florida Senate passed the Jessica Lunsford Act. Political activity 
concerning Jessica’s Law was not confined to the state level. On April 9, United States 
Congressional Representative Ginny Brown-Waite introduced a federal version of Jessica’s 
Law, unveiling it at a press conference attended by Lunsford. 
 The Jessica Lunsford Act was signed by Florida Governor Jeb Bush on May 2, 2005, 
just six weeks after Couey confessed to murdering Jessica Lunsford and one month after the 
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legislation was introduced. It increased penalties for sex crimes to 25 years for a first offense, 
required lifetime electronic monitoring for sex offenders, expanded death penalty eligibility, 
and made failing to register a third degree felony. This was the first of many legislative 
accomplishments credited to Lunsford. According to CNN’s Susan Candiotti, the bill was 
passed “at the request of the victims in this case, the surviving victims in this case, to get a 
push to do something to toughen up the law in the state of Florida. And clearly, that is what 
has taken place.”299  
Mark Lunsford was a novel political advocate. At the time of his daughter’s death, he 
was a 41-year old part-time truck driver, divorced, father of four, with a ninth grade 
education, who lived with his parents. He was skinny, with a gaunt face typically fixed in a 
morose, dead-eyed expression. He had tattoos, long hair, and a wispy goatee. When 
interviewed and testifying during his crusade, he usually dressed-down, wearing a baseball 
hat, motorcycle t-shirts, mirrored, wrap-around sunglasses, blue jeans, and work boots.  
He referred to himself as a redneck. His grammar was decidedly nonstandard. 
Interviewed standing outside his home, from which he could see where Couey was living 
when Jessica Lunsford was murdered, Lunsford told Larry King, “I’m trying not to look at 
these people’s house, and I mean, this ain’t right. This ain’t right at all.”300 He swore during 
televised interviews. He was a proud motorcyclist, and branded his motorcycle colleagues 
‘Jessie’s Riders,’ organizing memorial rides, and received the gift of a custom built Harley-
Davidson with his daughter’s face framed by angel wings painted on its body. Lunsford 
celebrated the loyalty and street-smarts of his fellow truckers and bikers. When his daughter 
first disappeared, Lunsford “did what he thought was best, calling on bikers and truckers to 
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lead the search…Sometimes they see things nobody should see. Tattooed guys with beer 
bellies hit the road in droves.”301 Despite being praised by politicians and media figures for 
his dignity, composure and tolerance, Lunsford continually expressed hatred and bloodlust 
for Couey and his hopes that he will “rot in hell.”302 Lunsford declared, “I just want to see 
him die. I want to watch him. I want him to look me right in the eye when he dies.”303 
Lunsford also espoused vigilante justice, complaining “It’s a shame we have to defend 
people who commit murder. We ought to take them out and just hang them.”304 At a Jessica 
Lunsford Memorial Motorcycle Ride, Lunsford read a poem he composed entitled “Predators 
Forewarned”: “Your time is short, your shelters few/ Jessie’s Riders are coming for you.”305  
Lunsford utilized his lack of education and unskilled employment to maximum 
political effect. He began speeches by declaring his lack of education and political 
accomplishment. Urging a group of Floridians to pressure lawmakers to pass additional 
sexual offender legislation in 2006, Lunsford said, “Let them know this is important. I don’t 
know much. I’m just a truck driver. But I know I want this legislation.”306 Newspapers 
described how “he has somehow found an everyman’s eloquence that resonates with the 
public,”307 and praised his “down-home manner.”308  
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Lunsford acknowledged the unlikeliness of his newfound access to power and the 
elite approbation he received. But he took it in stride, stressing that his political effectiveness 
and vernacular sensibilities rightfully brought social approbation from wealthy, powerful 
elites: 
[Jeb] Bush joked with Mark that day, asking where his famous baseball 
cap was. Mark took a liking to the governor. He says he’s the kind of 
guy who would watch your back. Sometimes, Mark thinks about taking 
up golf; he knows Jeb likes to play. Maybe they could hang sometime, 
wouldn’t that be funny. A white collar guy hanging with a guy who isn’t 
even a blue collar. Hell, I’m a no collar, he says, tugging on his T-
shirt.309 
 
 Despite being a political ingénue, his often-bombastic proclamations covered a 
dizzying array of topics, and were treated by the media and politicians alike as worthwhile 
contributions to discussions about sexual violence. Such topics included abnormal 
psychology (claiming “never in the history of mankind has anyone been reformed”310 who 
was convicted of a sex offense), ethics (the justness of capital punishment for a wide range of 
crimes), public policy (bemoaning funding cuts to prosecutors’ offices), even the pros and 
cons of different GPS technologies. In a letter to the Florida Corrections Secretary 
concerning the state’s GPS technology choice, Lunsford expressed “shock and 
disappointment” that the state opted for one company’s technology over Lunsford’s preferred 
choice, writing “(We) endorse what we believe to be the latest and best technology in the 
one-piece BluTag device.”311 
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 Lunsford’s political crusading regularly brought him into contact with powerful 
political figures. He routinely met with governors and state legislators in states where he was 
lobbying for the passage of versions of the Jessica Lunsford Act. For example, Lunsford met 
President George W. Bush on July 26, 2006 at a White House bill signing ceremony of the 
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. Also, Lunsford was joined by Arnold 
Schwarzenegger and Rudy Giuliani when campaigning in California for its version of the 
Jessica Lunsford Act.  
These political figures lauded Lunsford. Jeb Bush praised Lunsford’s efforts at the 
Florida Jessica Lunsford Act’s signing ceremony. At the ceremony, Bush said, “I appreciate 
the fact that Mark Lunsford is here, and as well as Kelly May [the mother of another murder 
victim active in victims’ rights]. Their daughters did not deserve the incredible treatment they 
received. Their deaths, however, weren’t in vain. And I just appreciate it so much; I 
appreciate it so much that you’ve come to participate in this bill signing.”312 Afterwards, 
Bush hugged Lunsford. Also, after meeting Lunsford, former United States Attorney General 
Alberto Gonzalez praised him as uniquely heroic and a personal example and inspiration for 
him. He proclaimed,  
 
Listening to Mark Lunsford last night, I realized that had his story been 
about one of my sons, I doubt I could stand up and tell that story. And 
of course telling the story is nothing, compared to actually living 
through the loss of a child at the hands of evil…So I am humbled when 
I see people who have suffered so much able to stand up and take 
action. It makes me even more determined to do whatever I can, too. 
When people like Mark dedicate themselves to preventing other 
Listening families from experiencing the pain his family has 
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experienced, it would be shameful for the Department of Justice not to 
be truly dedicated to the same goal.313 
 
At the beginning of a 2009 Congressional hearing in which Lunsford, along with other 
witnesses, including a police officer and a Department of Justice attorney, testified, 
Congressman Ted Poe singled him out, saying “I appreciate all of you being here, especially 
Mark Lunsford.”314  In the 2006 Texas gubernatorial race, candidate Lieutenant Governor 
David Dewhurst included Lunsford in his campaign advertisements.315 Attorney General 
Charlie Crist filmed a campaign commercial containing a testimonial from Lunsford urging 
people to vote for Crist because he is responsive to Lunsford, saying “if I need Charlie, he’ll 
pick up his phone.”316 
In addition to his access to and approbation from powerful politicians, Lunsford was a 
central participant in legislative processes across the country. As mentioned above, he 
testified in front of the House Judiciary Committee, offering his views on federal funding for 
sex offender monitoring programs. He testified frequently in front of state legislatures, 
including those of Florida, Washington, Maryland, Kansas, Wyoming, and Rhode Island. 
When he travelled to a state to lobby for the passage of Jessica’s Law and did not testify, he 
frequently met with legislators, gave speeches, and conducted press conferences to pressure 
politicians to pass the legislation.  
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His manner during his state and federal testimony was, to put it lightly, forthright. He 
chastised legislators whom he deemed insufficiently faithful to his legislative demands. 
Decrying a proposed version of Jessica’s Law in Washington State that waived mandatory 
minimum sentences in certain situations, Lunsford inveighed, “I get very angry sometimes 
when I hear the things we think are protecting our children… This is absurd, and it’s an insult 
to my daughter’s name, and with all due respect sir, please do not name this bill after my 
daughter.”317 His testimony was also theatrical. He spoke in soft, somber tones and routinely 
broke down into tears. He wore jackets with pins signifying his daughter’s life and ties with 
her picture on them. In his testimony before the Washington State Legislature, Lunsford held 
up a watch with his daughter’s picture on its face and said, “This is my watch, this is my 
daughter. This is the only time I have with my daughter.”318  
His legislative advocacy was immensely successful. As of March, 2011, 44 states 
have passed versions of Jessica’s law. His advocacy is often credited for the bill’s passage. 
According to a Utah legislator, “If Jessica’s Law is to make it through the Utah Legislature, 
her father might be one of the reasons.”319 In New York State, the Republican-led State 
Senate deployed Lunsford to persuade Democrats to pass Jessica’s Law. According to 
Republican Charles Nesbitt, “To have Mark here articulating on behalf of people’s children 
is very powerful.”320 In 2008, North Carolina passed its version of the Jessica Lunsford Act. 
North Carolina Governor Mike Easley “applauded Mark Lunsford’s effort, calling him a 
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‘great negotiator’ with a common sense proposal.”321 United States Congressman Lamar 
Smith said that the passage of versions of the Jessica Lunsford Act in states across the 
country was a “credit to him.”322 Legislators around the country found themselves 
negotiating directly with Lunsford and seeking his approval. During efforts to pass the 
Jessica Lunsford Act in Massachusetts, Lunsford became, in effect, an unelected chief 
executive, vetting potential sexual violence legislation. According to Therese Murray, 
President of the Massachusetts State Senate, “Lunsford urged Massachusetts to follow the 
Florida example…But in the end he agreed to the modified version.”323 
In addition to his political power and prestige, Lunsford received extensive and 
positive media coverage. Lunsford appeared on national news shows dozens of times 
between 2005 and 2011. Invariably, interviewers adopted an adulatory stance towards him. 
Paula Zahn told Lunsford “we have all been heartened to see how you have taken your own 
pain and loss and turned it into action, actually helping other families who are going through 
similar losses,” and lauded Lunsford for “so valiantly looking for your daughter and now 
taking on this issue.”324 CNN’s Rita Cosby gushed about Lunsford and another victims’ 
rights crusader, “Everyone is so proud of you. You all really are incredible people, and I 
applaud all the efforts that you’re doing for the all the kids and parents out there.”325 
MSNBC’s Dan Abrams commended “you’re a smart guy, you’re a committed guy, and you 
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know I think people around this country respect and look up to you for what you are 
doing.”326 In an interview the evening that Florida’s Jessica Lunsford Act was passed, Bill 
O’Reilly congratulated Lunsford, telling him “I don’t know how you compose yourself, sir. I 
really respect you,” and “I want you to maintain the dignity that you have and the fairness 
that you have.”327 CNN correspondent Fredericka Whitfield described Lunsford’s “amazing 
composure” through Couey’s trial: “this man has showed remarkable resolve and tolerance 
through this entire procedure.”328 Court TV’s Lisa Bloom said, “He is an astonishing person 
to me.”329  Larry King succinctly told him, “You’re a great man, Mark.”330 
His crusading earned him the 2006 Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis award, a national 
award for outstanding public service benefiting local communities. By 2007, his media and 
political success grew to where he enlisted the William Morris agency to represent him on 
potential book and film deals. He was urged to run, and considered running, for the Florida 
House of Representatives. Citrus County GOP Secretary Richard Windle suggested, “An 
awful lot of people are tired of professional politicians…He doesn’t have any political 
background, but that could be a plus.”331 Lunsford had contemplated politics much earlier. In 
2005, Lunsford said he was “thinking about finding a way off the dump truck, and that way 
might be politics.” As Tampa Tribune journalist Donna Koehn put it, “Yeah, he’s only got a 
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ninth-grade education, but he’s smart, with a sly wit and self-deprecating humor. Important 
people are listening to him.”332 
Despite his apparent unanimous and immediate political support, his crusade was 
represented as one in which he took on established, powerful interests and the characteristic 
gridlock of the legislative process. Explaining Democratic resistance to implementing every 
one of Lunsford’s legislative demands, Massachusetts State Senator Scott Brown (until 2012, 
a United States Senator) argued, “The trial lawyers' lobby is pretty strong, but we're going to 
try to crack it.”333 Bill O’Reilly described a menagerie of villains opposed to Lunsford’s 
crusade: “Many trial lawyers object because they want the ability to plea bargain. Some 
judges dissent because their egos are bruised. They are taken out of the equation after a child 
predator is convicted. And many in the left-wing media object to Jessica’s Law on the 
grounds that it is cruel and unusual punishment; these people want rehabilitation for violent 
sexual offenders who brutalize children.”334 This, for many, was a struggle not only between 
Lunsford and sex offenders, but also between Lunsford and the self-serving legal 
establishment and soft-hearted liberals.  
 
Lunsford’s Appeal and Conservative Politics 
 
It seems strange to treat an unemployed truck-driver as an authority on criminal 
justice policy and to articulate his bloodlust as noble and heroic. However, this valorization 
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derives from the direct connection between his narrative and the material conditions of his 
supporters, making their support perfectly rational. His quick transformation from being a 
quintessential nobody to a political power indicates the possibility of socioeconomic mobility 
and the existence of the American Dream, a potent narrative for the tens of millions of 
Americans who, as I argue below, lack such mobility, and, consequently, are unable to live 
the American dream.   
This section begins by describing Stuart Hall’s assertion of the rational and material 
core of political decision-making, even decision-making which appears irrational or contrary 
to the decision-maker’s interests. This framework helps to explain the rational core of 
Lunsford’s support. It continues by considering the rational and material basis of Lunsford’s 
appeal—his apparent socioeconomic mobility—while explaining the ways that his program 
does nothing to enhance it for those without it. It concludes by looking at the ways 
Lunsford’s narrative buttresses conservative discourses concerning the ability of the family 
and the free market—if only unburdened from government taxation and regulation—to 
ensure socioeconomic mobility.  
 
The Lived Experience Underpinning Lunsford’s Support 
Stuart Hall’s 1979 essay “The Great Moving Right Show” provides a conceptual 
framework with which to understand the existence of the political and material conditions 
that grounded Lunsford’s popular appeal. Written after Margaret Thatcher’s election as prime 
minister of Great Britain, Hall rejects notions promulgated by the British left that the 
Conservative Party’s success was due only to their deployment of “rhetorical device[s] or 
trick[s]” which “duped unsuspecting folk” and had nothing to do with voter’s lives and 
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problems.335 Instead, Hall argues that the Conservative Party articulated their positions to 
existing material and political conditions—including Labour’s political practices and 
Britain’s crime problems—in ways that directly connected their discourse to the lives of 
ordinary Britons. These conditions provided a “material and rational core” for conservative 
support.336 Hall argues that the Conservative Party’s success was due to their ability to 
“address real problems, real and lived experiences, real contradictions.”337  
 For example, Hall notes that when in it was in power during the 1960’s and 1970’s, 
the Labour government worked closely with capital to manage the British economy by 
setting wages and prices, and influencing investment decisions, and directly subsidizing 
them. In so doing, it aligned itself with capital and the power bloc. Hall argues that there is 
always a “contradiction between popular interests and the power bloc,” between “popular 
needs, feelings, and aspirations” and “the state of monopoly capitalism.”338 According to 
Hall, because Labour failed to fully mobilize popular interests to participate in democratic 
processes, it appeared to be with big capital, who, again, are in a contradictory relationship 
with the people. The Labour-led government, therefore, was aligned with capital against the 
people. Hall argued that the alliance between Labour and capital in opposition to popular 
interests enabled Thatcher and Conservative Party to be “undividedly, out there ‘with the 
people’” in ways that were impossible for Labour.339  
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Such contradictions are not the only things that drive political support; articulations 
undoubtedly matter. In “The Great Moving Right Show,” Hall spends significant time 
explaining the power of the Conservative Party’s articulations. For example, Hall describes 
their articulation of the crisis of law and order, their use of “the great syntax of ‘good’ versus 
‘evil,’ of civilized and uncivilized standards.”340 In articulating the crime problem as such, 
the Conservative Party gained a “grasp on popular morality and common sense 
conscience.”341 However, Hall points out that however they articulated it, the Conservative 
Party did not create this problem out of thin air; their articulations touched “concretely the 
experiences of crime and theft, of loss of scarce property and fears of unexpected attacks in 
working class areas and neighborhoods.”342 The experience of crime and the fear of crime 
provided a rational basis of support for the Conservative Party’s articulation of crime, no 
matter how perverse and inane the British left found these articulations.  
 Overall, according to Hall, Labour was in an open and comprehensive relationship 
with capital because it set prices and wages, influenced investment decisions, and subsidized 
businesses, a relationship which set it opposition to the people, and crime was a problem in 
working class areas. Under these conditions, it was rational for voters to support the 
Conservative Party, who promised to protect them and their property and work against rather 
than with capital by withdrawing state support for corporations. Hall stresses in “The Great 
Moving Right Show” the ways real, material contradictions in British life existed no matter 
                                                 
 
340 Hall, “The Great Moving Right Show,” 19.  
 
341 Hall, “The Great Moving Right Show,” 19.  
 
342 Hall, “The Great Moving Right Show,” 19.  
 165 
 
how they were articulated. The Conservative Party “operat[ed] on genuine contradictions” in 
Britons’ experiences.343 
Similarly, Lunsford’s appeal and success is not due merely to the rhetorical power of 
victims’ rights. Instead, like Thatcher’s Conservative Party, Lunsford and his crusade 
connected to the real and lived experiences and material conditions of his supporters.  When 
Lunsford proclaims, as he did early in his crusade, that “we’ve got the power to do whatever 
we want. All we have to do is just do it,”344 it speaks to those who do not have the power to 
do whatever they want, whose real and lived experiences include socioeconomic immobility. 
While feelings of powerlessness have long existed, victims’ rights provides people with a 
new vocabulary to express them while retaining a commitment to American socioeconomic 
relations as they exist today.  
News coverage of Lunsford articulated an investment in him that was rooted in 
feelings of powerlessness. As mentioned above, Lunsford worked as a truck driver at the 
time of his daughter’s murder. Articles about the initial search for his daughter noted this 
working class identity. As his advocacy for harsher sex offender sentencing laws continued 
over the next six years, this socioeconomic location remained integral to his political identity. 
For example, he was identified as a truck driver in 36 articles about his advocacy. This 
articles identified him as a truck driver long after he ceased being a truck driver in order to 
work on his crusade full-time. Lunsford never became simply an activist; he always a truck 
driver/activist.  
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Over and over his lack of socioeconomic status was emphasized. In addition to being 
referenced as a truck driver, Lunsford was referred to as blue collar.345 Attorney General 
Alberto Gonzales described him in an editorial in USA Today as being as “typical as any 
American I’ve ever met,”346 while another article described him as “an ordinary man.”347 
Articles mentioned his only having a high school diploma, and his failed ambitions of being a 
mechanic.348 Another article offered conflicting information concerning his level of 
education, though to identical effect, noting that Lunsford described himself as “a single 
parent and a truck driver with a 10th grade education.”349 Lunsford himself said he would 
“rather drive a truck” than be a tough-on-crime advocate.350 America’s Most Wanted host 
John Walsh described Lunsford saying to him “‘John, I’m just a simple truck driver.’”351 An 
article described the ways that he was “thrust out of his quiet life as a divorced single parent” 
when his daughter was murdered.352 In a public event Lunsford said “I don’t know much. I’m 
just a truck driver.”353 His manual labor background was emphasized through references to 
his lack of technological knowledge: “He had to buy a BlackBerry to keep up with his e-
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mails. He says he gets several hundred a month. His cell and his parents' phone ring 
constantly. He's not tech-savvy, though. He keeps a handwritten list of phone numbers folded 
in his pocket. ‘It's awful because I don't know nothing about computers.’”354 
Lunsford traversed political and socioeconomic boundaries, but remained rooted in 
his original location. Far from diminishing his political stature, these descriptions served to 
enhance it. The regularity of his identification as truck driver-activist indicates an investment 
in and an affirmation of his working class location. This pattern implies a class 
consciousness, as Lunsford was celebrated not just for his political success, but for being 
successful while being a member of the working class, triumphing over the socioeconomic 
barriers to political power. This discourse celebrating this triumph indicated a cognizance of 
the otherwise existing socioeconomic barriers. In making his ascent a cause for celebration, 
the discourse implicitly lamented the norm: the perpetual failure of the working class to 
achieve political power.  
 Lunsford himself was an exponent of these feelings of powerlessness. In 2007, 
contemplating a run for the Florida House of Representatives, Lunsford asked, “What about 
the average person, the middle class or below-middle class? They have a voice, too, and 
nobody's hearing them.”355 In endorsing Charlie Crist as the 2006 Republican nominee for 
Florida governor, Lunsford said, “How many blue collar workers can pick up the phone and 
call the attorney general? And Charlie Crist answered for me.”356 As quoted earlier in the 
chapter, Lunsford noted the rarity of social interaction between the rich and working class, 
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when, as told by Tampa Tribune journalist Donna Koehn, he mused about his relationship 
with former governor Jeb Bush: “Maybe they could hang sometime, wouldn't that be funny? 
A white collar hanging out with a guy who isn't even a blue collar. Hell, I'm a no collar, he 
says, tugging on his T-shirt.”357 His apparent glee at the prospect of such a social occasion 
implied despair about its typical impossibility.  
 The socioeconomic powerlessness that provides the rational and material core of 
Lunsford’s appeal is intensifying. The institutions necessary for socioeconomic mobility and 
an equitable distribution of political power are increasingly weakened. The percentage of 
Americans without healthcare increases annually.358 Education is increasingly unattainable, 
as public school funding is cut and university tuition and fees increase.359 Finally, political 
campaigns have become increasingly expensive, while limits on campaign contributions have 
been virtually eliminated, making politicians increasingly dependent on corporate and 
wealthy donors while reducing the power of small contributors. Contrary to the notion that 
socioeconomic mobility is a uniquely American phenomenon, according to five recent 
studies examined by The New York Times, “Americans enjoy less economic mobility than 
their peers in Canada and much of Western Europe.”360   
Does, contrary to my claims, the Lunsford narrative prove the existence of 
socioeconomic mobility available for all Americans? Does he demonstrate that despite the 
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dismal list in the previous paragraph, socioeconomic mobility is available for all? No. 
Lunsford’s crusade would have been impossible without help from powerful groups who saw 
his crusade benefitting their interests. It was not a grassroots campaign that succeeded 
because of the power of the people. Political and business interests offered immediate and 
substantial support. Across the country, legislators enthusiastically wrote and passed 
legislation matching his specifications. Legislators and police chiefs lauded his work and 
appeared with him in support of the legislation. Lunsford also received financial support 
from a business that would potentially benefit from his crusade. He received more than 
$100,000 per year from a computer database company, Technology Investors, which 
develops tracking software for use by criminal justice agencies.361 Tellingly, information 
about these payments did not surface publicly until 2008, long after most of his political 
work had been completed.  
Lunsford’s appeal derives from his story of a powerless man seizing power and 
socioeconomic mobility. Did Lunsford advance his supporters’ political project by 
advocating a program that addressed socioeconomic immobility, thereby fulfilling his 
oppositional appeal? Did he champion their cause? Again, no. Lunsford worked to 
accomplish the opposite: the consolidation of power for those who already possessed it, 
without increasing it for those who did not. Surely, the ability of the criminal justice system 
to wield political and create political change increased. However, the longer sentences, 
stricter post-prison surveillance, and expanded use of the death penalty mandated by the 
Jessica’s Law do nothing to reduce socioeconomic immobilization and political 
disenfranchisement. As criminal victimization is directly connected with a lack of 
                                                 
 
361 See Susan Taylor Martin, “Lunsford’s Finance Raise Questions,” The St. Petersburg Times. 
November 6, 2009.  
 170 
 
socioeconomic power, ameliorating socioeconomic deprivation would be a logical place to 
address victimization. Or, many offenders struggle with drug and alcohol additions, and 
offend when intoxicated, as Couey did. Accordingly, mandatory, fully-funded drug treatment 
may reduce sexual victimizations.  
Instead of such measures, Jessica’s Law’s provisions only enhance the state’s 
repressive capacities, increasing the power of law enforcement, prison and probation 
institutions, and prosecuting attorneys, doing nothing for those who victimize or are 
victimized as a result of socioeconomic immobility. In addition, the criminal justice system 
consumes huge amounts of government resources. As of August, 2012, the state of Florida 
incarcerated 100,272 inmates, at an annual cost of over 2 billion dollars.362 Jessica’s Law will 
lead to the incarceration of more people for longer periods of time, taking money away from 
institutions that promote mobility, such as schools and public health organizations.  
Lunsford’s appeal demonstrates a yearning for socioeconomic mobility, one with 
potentially political effects. For Lunsford supporters without socioeconomic mobility, seeing 
their negative image in him may catalyze the recognition of the lack of socioeconomic 
mobility they and millions of Americans experience. This recognition functions as a register 
of discontent with their immobility and the corresponding desire for mobility, or, as Dana 
Cloud puts it, an “acknowledgment of the limits of what exists and gesture toward what 
could be different.”363  This may foster—though this is the challenge facing all groups 
opposing powerful interests—first, a critical consciousness concerning their immobilization, 
and, second, political activity addressing the conditions of their immobilization. Successfully 
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working to change the socioeconomic conditions of that immobilization would inevitably 
require sacrifices by those with socioeconomic power. Lunsford’s political work actually 
helps to neutralize such possibilities by advancing a project that reduces socioeconomic 
mobility as the response to a desire for mobility. In so doing, he satisfied the latent critical 
stance found in the yearning for socioeconomic mobility, without actually increasing it. 
Altogether, the oppositional elements of Lunsford’s narrative were canceled out by the 
politically-dominant elements of his political program, rendering his overall narrative 
amenable to the interests of those with socioeconomic power. Lunsford’s narrative engages 
this critical consciousness of socioeconomic immobility, but satisfies it by increasing exactly 
what fuels it.  
 
Lunsford Disarticulating Lyndon Johnson and Franklin Roosevelt 
In addition to offering a general defense of socioeconomic hierarchy, Lunsford’s 
narrative also complements specific conservative endorsements of capitalism’s and the 
family’s role in enabling socioeconomic mobility, articulations directly contrary to those of 
the liberal consensus as articulated by Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson. Roosevelt 
argued that without government intervention and regulation, capitalism constricts 
socioeconomic mobility. Johnson held that the family and capitalism are not enough to 
ensure socioeconomic mobility, and government support was necessary for those who would 
otherwise be immobile. For both, government functions as the guarantor of socioeconomic 
mobility, not capitalism or the family. By contrast, conservatives argue that capitalism, 
together with the family, ensures socioeconomic mobility.  
 172 
 
Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson presided over two robust liberal legislative 
periods in American history. Roosevelt’s New Deal vastly expanded government 
intervention into the economy. Legislation was passed regulating agricultural prices, labor 
relations, banking, the stock market, utility companies, and industrial production. The New 
Deal also provided resources directly to Americans, including Social Security, Aid for 
Dependent Mothers and Children, and unemployment insurance. Johnson’s Great Society 
programs expanded the federal government’s provision of resources to poor people and 
communities, including healthcare for seniors and the poor, pre-kindergarten enrichment 
programs, and legal aid.  
Throughout their New Deal and Great Society efforts, Roosevelt and Johnson, with 
different emphases, suggested that economic relations derived from unregulated capitalism 
lead to conflict, political corruption, and human suffering.  Their policies sought to mitigate 
what they saw as the negative effects of capitalist economic relations on socioeconomic 
mobility. Despite these concerns, both were pro-capitalist and repeatedly professed faith in 
the beneficence of free enterprise in speeches about policies that were designed to regulate it, 
and deferred to business sensibilities even when instituting precedent-breaking policies. 
Their critiques, however mild, of capitalist economic relations stand in stark contrast to 
political discourse in the 2010s, which emphatically denies the debilitating consequences of 
capitalist economic relations in the United States on socioeconomic mobility and quality of 
life.  
During the first five years of Roosevelt’s presidency, in the midst of the Great 
Depression, when his efforts to pass New Deal legislation were at their most successful, 
Roosevelt and members of his administration portrayed America as embroiled in economic 
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and political warfare, waged between big business and the American people. In these 
portrayals, Roosevelt and his administration decried the consequences of the accumulation of 
wealth during under-regulated capitalism. In 1936 Roosevelt argued that the “concentration 
of wealth and power has been built upon other people’s money, other people’s business, 
other people’s labor. Under this concentration independent business was allowed to exist 
only by sufferance. It has been a menace to the social system as well as to the economic 
system which we call American democracy.”364 The events of the late 1920s and early 1930s 
demonstrated that “government by organized money is just as dangerous as government by 
organized mob.”365  
Roosevelt saw this struggle in stark terms, as one between big business and humanity 
itself. In responses to speeches made by members of the United States Chamber of 
Commerce critical of his economic policy, Roosevelt argued, “I don’t think there was a 
single speech which took the human side.”366 In 1937, Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Interior 
Harold Ickes, according to the New York Times, suggested that the conflict was between the 
rich and democracy itself, and constituted a “struggle for power, for control of lives, labor 
and possessions of whole peoples.”367 According to Ickes, “economic power in this country 
does not rest in the mass of the people as it must in a democracy,” and “the new America 
must be a land of free business, not of ruthless  business—a land of free men, not of 
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economic slaves.”368 To dismantle these slave relations, Roosevelt signed a raft of 
regulations, on utility companies, banks, and others, and passed protections for labor unions.  
In speeches advocating for Great Society programs, Johnson did not blame capitalism 
or class relations for poverty. According to Johnson, “For so long as man has lived on this 
earth poverty has been his curse. On every continent in every age men have sought escape 
from poverty’s oppression.”369 In fact, according to Johnson, the bountifulness of post-World 
War Two American capitalism dramatically reduced poverty, and Johnson argued that his 
proposed tax-cut would spur greater growth and poverty reduction. Also, instead of class 
conflict, Johnson saw unanimous dedication to ameliorating poverty among all sectors of the 
American economy: “Today, more than at any other time in our history, labor and business, 
city and farm, rich and poor share a common interest in the progress of all of our people.”370 
Accordingly, Great Society programs aimed to train the poor to participate in American 
capitalism, rather than to alter its operation by using government to create jobs or directly 
redistribute wealth.  
Despite this commitment to American capitalism, Johnson stressed the disabling 
consequences of poverty amidst capitalism:   
It means a daily struggle to secure the necessities for even a meager 
existence. It means that the abundance, the comforts, the opportunities 
they see all around them are beyond their grasp. Worst of all, it means 
hopelessness for the young. The young man or woman who grows up 
without a decent education, in a broken home, in a hostile and squalid 
environment, in ill health or in the face of racial injustice—that young 
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man or woman is often trapped in a life of poverty. He does not have the 
skills demanded by a complex society. He does not know how to 
acquire those skills. He faces a mounting sense of despair which drains 
initiative and ambition and energy.371 
 
In this passage, Johnson laments the inadequate availability of institutional resources, and, 
delicately and compassionately, attributes poverty to the poor’s ignorance and laziness 
resulting from material deprivation. Johnson argues that socioeconomic location conditions 
the possibilities of economic autonomy. Government’s role was to counteract the 
deprivations of poverty by providing institutional resources, thereby interrupting the cycle of 
inadequate institutional resources causing dysfunctional personalities. Without government 
action, this cycle would continue unabated.  
For both Johnson and Roosevelt, unregulated capitalism and passive government 
created misery and exploitation. Both were concerned about the distribution of economic and 
political power under capitalism and its effect on socioeconomic mobility. Johnson thought it 
difficult for the poor to obtain mobility without government assistance. Roosevelt held that 
without economic regulations, big business would accumulate excessive power, and wield it 
to immobilize small businesses, workers, and consumers, who cannot improve their quality 
of life when big business controlled their livelihoods. For both, having economic power was 
a prerequisite for mobility, and, conversely, a lack of economic power ensured a future 
without it. Power was not only unequally distributed, but that unequal distribution ensured 
the exacerbation of immobility. This represented a departure from the rhetoric of presidents 
from Washington to McKinley, which held that men were the masters of their own fates. 
                                                 
 
371 Lyndon Johnson, “Special Message to the Congress Proposing a Nationwide War on the Sources of 
Poverty,” March, 16, 1964. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26109.  
 176 
 
Interestingly, it is 18th and 19th century figures like Washington and McKinley that current 
conservative turn to when justifying their austerity policies.372   
These critiques of unregulated capitalism that supported intervention formed two of 
the primary components of the liberal consensus, and conservatives have endeavored to 
disarticulate these positions. Lunsford’s narrative buttresses conservative efforts to 
disarticulate LBJ’s and FDR’s rhetoric in three ways: first, the glorification of Lunsford’s 
fatherhood; second, the rejection of the notion that poverty impedes socioeconomic mobility; 
third, the articulation of the possibilities of obtaining socioeconomic mobility within current 
American political and economic relations, which are egalitarian in the Lunsford narrative.  
First, the glorification of Lunsford’s fatherhood defines family relations and not class 
relations as the determinative force in social and economic life, rendering arguments of the 
need for government to intervene into the economy untenable. This limitation of the scope of 
government is antithetical to the liberal consensus, as reflected in Lyndon Johnson’s 
contention that government spending was necessary to lift people out of poverty. Liberalism 
articulates family relations as often inadequate in providing socioeconomic mobility, hence 
the need for government support. Nevertheless, arguments of the need for social spending 
demand that government encompasses units bigger than family relations. This position 
requires that there are other important social relations besides the family that make up the 
bonds that justify government. The family’s privileged status in political discourse must be 
dislodged to justify social spending that presumes other forms of relationality. The Lunsford 
narrative firmly privileges the family over other social relations.  
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As a divorced father, Lunsford and his daughter did not live in a traditional family, at 
first blush failing to embody the familial ideal conservatives promote in their attacks on 
social spending. However, in other ways, Lunsford fulfilled that ideal. First, he and Jessica’s 
mother were originally married. It is the unmarried and not divorced family that is the 
primary source of conservative consternation. Second, Lunsford was the dominant familial 
figure in her life; conservatives are most anxious about the absence of fathers, not mothers. A 
single father with sole custody of his child is novel, heroic even, assuming enhanced 
responsibility that other men willingly cede to mothers. Third, a father seeking vengeance for 
his daughter fueled by his tender love for her affirms many traditional gender roles. Fourth 
and most importantly, Lunsford lived with his parents in order to capitalize on their ability to 
help care for Jessica, enabling him to avoid government support, which is the ultimate 
familial sin for conservatives.  
Emphasizing the force and grandeur of Lunsford’s fatherhood complements 
conservative efforts to privilege family over other forms of relationality, and glorifies the 
conceptual framework in which family precedes and organizes class relations described in 
chapter two, a framework which negates class analysis itself.  The incessant appeal to Mark 
Lunsford’s fatherhood in the Lunsford narrative emphasizes the centrality of family relations 
rather than other forms of relationality, including residential, social, political, economic, and 
racial relations. While the crusade’s success would not have been possible without Jessica, a 
sympathetic and unusual victim, the central figure around which the narrative was organized 
was Mark Lunsford. Lunsford cultivated this emphasis on his fatherhood in his interviews 
and statements to the press. He rarely discussed her, but instead focused on his relationship 
with her and the loss’s effect on him. After Couey was arrested, Lunsford said, “I’ve raised 
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kids all my life and someone has taken that from me.”373 He took the opportunity at his 
daughter’s memorial service three days later to repeat this introduction and reiterate his 
fatherhood: “Who am I? My name is Mark. I’ve led a simple life…I’ve worked, and I’ve 
raised kids, and someone has taken that from me.”374 Standing with members of the United 
States Congress, Lunsford lamented, “I will never get to see Jessie go on her first date. I will 
never be a grandfather to her children. Eight weeks ago a convicted sex offender stole this 
life away from me.”375  
Lunsford’s was treated as a trusted source of fatherly wisdom. In a statement given 
the day Couey confessed, he declared “Jessie is home now, and she is right here with 
me…And all the parents out there, I know everybody does, but do it more often, make sure 
you get that hug and kiss every day before you leave that house. I did. I got mine. You just 
make sure you get yours. And remember, love your children this much, and no one or 
nothing will come between you and them.”376 There were continual efforts to establish ways 
for viewers qua parents to identify with Lunsford qua parent. In response to the above 
statement, CNN anchor Tony Harris said, “And I think the sound bite there, the quote that’ll 
break a lot of fathers’ hearts, mothers’ hearts, parents’ hearts, ‘Jessie’s home now.’”377 
Another CNN anchor, John Zarrella, described his difficulty in reporting on this case: “As a 
father myself with two little girls, it really does hit home, and it makes it very difficult.”378 
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Lunsford characterized his political and legal crusade as stemming from the 
emotional bond he continued to have with his daughter after her death. Imploring the New 
Jersey Legislature to pass harsh sentencing laws, Lunsford, with tears in his eyes, brandished 
a picture of his daughter and said “This is not a way to remember your daughter. This is not 
how it’s meant to be.”379 He explained his decision to attend Couey’s trial by saying “I’m not 
going to leave my daughter to go through this alone. I mean, she already had to be alone 
when she was with him.”380 In 2007, questioned by CBS how he will compose statements he 
was scheduled to give during Couey’s trial, Lunsford answered, “Well, I don’t plan on doing 
anything different than what I’ve been doing for the last two years when I testify. You know, 
I ask God and Jessie for the things to say, and I say it.”381 Asked by CBS News what Jessica 
Lunsford would think of his activism Lunsford said, “She’d be proud of me, I know that.”382  
Headlines of news articles about Lunsford’s crusade emphasized Lunsford’s identity 
as a father. For example, “Father Pleads for Action on Bill to Track Sex Offenders,”383  “Dad 
seeks tougher Sex Offender Laws,”384 “Victim’s dad pushes boost in sex-offender 
penalties,”385 “Father Pushes ‘Jessica’s Law,”386 “Daughter’s Rape, Murder, Haunt Dad,”387 
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“Jessica’s Dad: Get Tougher on Freed Pervs,”388 and “Murder Victim’s Father Begs for 
Sexual  Predator Legislation,” all from 2005.389 Altogether, Lunsford’s emphatic fatherhood 
complements conservative efforts to privilege the two-parent family over other 
socioeconomic forces in their efforts to delegitimize welfare.  
The victims’ rights movement generally uses family members as it primary 
exponents. Mothers, father, sisters, and brothers are the primary victims’ rights advocates. 
Like Lunsford’s advocacy, this approach valorizes familial relations, deemphasizing other 
forms of relations. When a mother successfully utilizes her relationship with her son to push 
for radical pieces of criminal justice legislation, that relationship is granted significant power, 
elevating family relations over other socioeconomic relations. In the current political context 
in which familial relations are used as the foundations of attacks on welfare and other forms 
of socioeconomic support, victims’ rights buttresses that foundation and functions as a 
critique of such socioeconomic support. Lunsford’s family relations and the victims’ rights 
family generally stands in stark contrast to the anti-domestic violence family, which 
demanded that familial relations be subordinated to broader socioeconomic relations. 
Without this subordination, anti-domestic violence activism holds, revictimization is 
possible.  
A second front of the conservative assault on the post-war liberal consensus abetted 
by the Lunsford narrative is the denial of LBJ’s contention that poverty immobilizes the 
poor. On August 23, 2011, United States Senator Marco Rubio delivered a speech at the 
Ronald Reagan Library, in Simi Valley, California. At the time of the speech, Rubio was a 
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rising star of the Republican Party, and rumored to be a vice-presidential pick in the 2012 
election. In it, he offered a grim assessment of the damage the federal government had done 
to the American people. He began his analysis by affirming the American commitment to 
individual responsibility and personal fortitude, which, he argued, ensures socioeconomic 
mobility:  
 
[Americans] want our nation to be…a place where your economic hopes 
and dreams can be accomplished and brought up to fruition. That 
through hard work and sacrifice you can be who God meant you to be. 
No matter who your parents were, no matter where you were born, no 
matter how much misfortune you may have met in your life, if you have 
a good idea, you can be anything if you work hard and play by the 
rules.390  
 
Rubio reports that this vision has been thwarted by presidential administrations of the 
previous 80 years, which, with the exception of the Reagan administration, promoted policies 
that presumed “yes, we’ll have a free economy, but we will also have a strong government, 
who through regulations and taxes will control the free economy and through a series of 
government programs, will take care of those in our society who are falling behind.”  
 Unfortunately, the programs established to take care of those falling behind—
including Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid—were doomed to fail from the start. 
Government programs replaced the “institutions and society” that previously provided care 
for the needy: “We took things upon ourselves and our communities and our families and our 
churches and our synagogues…. If someone was sick in your family, you took care of them. 
If a neighbor met misfortune, you took care of them. You saved for your retirement and your 
future because you had to.”  Policy-makers have wrongly cast their lot with the non-human, 
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forgetting “that the strength of our nation begins with its people, and that these programs 
actually weakened us as a people,”391 who, he suggests, toughen up when struggling with 
poverty.  
 Rubio’s conception of the role of government and the strength of the poor is the 
opposite of Lyndon Johnson’s. Johnson argued that being poor in a capitalist economy is 
immobilizing, as it “drains initiative and ambition and energy.”392 Accordingly, Johnson 
tasked government with providing that energy through job programs and community 
development. By contrast, Rubio sees poverty as invigorating, as people have to pull 
themselves up by their bootstraps and organize efforts to help each other out. By contrast, 
governmental attempts to assist the poor cultivate indolence, as they allow people to sit back, 
relax, and wait for government to solve their problems. The GOP uses conceptions like 
Rubio’s to orient their budget and policy proposals. Paul Ryan structured his Roadmap for 
America's Future around life-enhancing austerity, an “approach draws from, and reinforces, 
the most real source of America’s strength: its people, acting through family, community, 
vocation, and faith—with a limited government supporting the growth of these most 
important institutions.”393 
 Democrats, to varying degrees, defend the social safety net, relying on the type of 
analysis LBJ presented to demonstrate its necessity. The struggle between Rubio, Ryan and 
other critics of the social safety net and those who wish to protect the idea that government 
must intervene into poverty will not be decided solely by who has the more persuasive policy 
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documents and speeches. Instead, the struggle also depends on the outcomes of struggles in 
other parts of society. The valorization of the Lunsford narrative bolsters Rubio’s contention 
that government institutions are unnecessary for economic viability and self-sufficiency. 
Lunsford did not require unions, universities, food or residential subsidies, or social justice 
groups—or any other institutions which demand tax dollars or limits on private enterprise to 
function—to ascend to political power. His previous socioeconomic subordination had no 
apparent detrimental effect on his socioeconomic mobility. Nor did he utilize such 
institutions during his life before Jessica’s death, when, despite his poverty, he lived a 
dignified life as a father, laborer, and motorcycle rider. Also, he moved to Florida to live with 
his parents who assisted him in caring for Jessica, performing Rubio’s ideal of informal or 
familial networks providing for those with material needs, not government. In this sense, his 
socioeconomic subordination and immobility did not preclude familial, professional, and 
sentimental mobility.  
The legislative activity since the GOP assumed control of the House of 
Representatives in 2010 demonstrates this conviction that government support is not 
necessary for ameliorating poverty and ensuring socioeconomic mobility. The Fiscal Year 
2012 Republican budget reduces government spending that promotes a basic standard of 
living and enhances poor peoples’ ability to participate in the economy.394 It calls for cutting 
Pell Grants and capping the total Federal funding for food stamps and housing aid, even if 
the number of people eligible for it increases. It also imposes time limits and work 
requirements for Federal housing and food assistance, to “encourage recipients of federal 
housing aid to lead lives of increased self-sufficiency.” 395  In other words, Republicans call 
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for reducing the protections of government and increasing the role of the market and familial, 
neighborhood, and religious relations in poor people’s lives. In April, 2011, in response to 
Republican threats to shut down the Federal government unless budget cuts were enacted, 
Democrats agreed to cut over one billion dollars to public and low income housing, and the 
Women, Infant and Children nutrition program for low-income mothers was cut by $500 
million, an action that presumably will “toughen up” the women, infants, and children who 
lost access to the program as a result of the cut. 396  
The third way in which Lunsford abets Republican disarticulations of the liberal 
consensus is by articulating the existence of socioeconomic mobility within American 
political and economic relations. This strain of the disarticulation is best captured in current 
Republican “job creator” discourse, which stands in contrast to FDR’s criticisms of 
unfettered capitalism. Lunsford is an example of extreme socioeconomic mobility, having 
transformed himself from a quintessential nobody into a political icon, indicating that 
mobility is possible within the current American political and economic systems.  
Today’s GOP hopes to expand the freedom of capitalism by dismantling the types of 
regulations Roosevelt introduced. According to House Speaker John Boehner, “We need to 
liberate our economy from the shackles of Washington. Let our economy grow!”397 Boehner 
conflates private business with “the people,” contrasting both with the government. Instead 
of relying on federal agencies to regulate economic activity, “We need to trust in the good 
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judgment of the American People.”398 In this sense, socioeconomic mobility is unnecessary, 
because all Americans—corporations, the unemployed, the middle class, etc.—are in the 
same place: part of “the people.”  
Far from being made up of fearsome corporate machines, the free market is composed 
of upstanding and reasonable people, whose decisions are beneficial to us all and guarantee 
socioeconomic mobility. Accordingly, government regulations are unnecessary because of 
this beneficence.  Mitt Romney argues that far from suspiciously scrutinizing and vigilantly 
policing businesses, “government and regulators have to be allies of business, not foes.”399 In 
addition, workers, in this way of thinking, do not require labor unions to protect them from 
rapacious corporations. In his jobs plan “Believe in America,” Romney suggests that as 
businesses are composed of people, labor unions are outmoded because people prefer the 
natural conviviality of personal relationships rather than the impersonal, adversarial union-
employer dynamic. He attributes the decline in union participation to “the fact that American 
workers are more inclined toward a cooperative one-on-one relationship with their employer 
than the distant, combative relationship all-too-often encouraged by organized labor.”400 
Conservatives modulate their rhetorical enthusiasm for unregulated economic activity 
by generally avoiding naming corporations as objects of concern and beneficiaries of their 
economic programs in debates and economic proposals. Instead, they use the term “job 
creators.” For example, the 2011 Republican House job creation proposal was titled, “The 
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House Republican Plan for America’s Job Creators.”401 Contesting the wisdom of Barack 
Obama’s calls for raising taxes on and eliminating tax breaks for the wealthy, Republicans 
argue that such measures would harm “job creators,” thereby harming those with or looking 
for jobs. The “job creator” solutions proposed by Republicans follow a simple pattern: give 
businesses more money and deregulate them (allowing them to pollute more, for example) 
and people, both job creators and job receivers, will prosper.  
In general, the “job creator” discourse offers a simple vision of economic relations. 
The prime factors affecting job creation, according to Republican policy statements, are 
government regulations and taxation. This “job creator” discourse institutes two equations. 
First, all jobs are identical, and, second, so are all employers (except government, which, 
though it employs millions of people, is not included in the term “job creator”). A minimum 
wage job at Wal-Mart is, in this way of thinking, equivalent to a highly-skilled craftsman 
position. Republicans do not put pressure on job creators to be “good-job creators.” In 
addition to these equations, it obscures the adversarial relationship between labor and 
business (business will always pay labor as little as possible), suggesting they have common 
cause in seeking tax cuts and government deregulation.  
Altogether, the multitude of variables that shape which businesses offer employment, 
what types of employment is offered, and the conditions of that employment, are suppressed. 
Instead, an image of a felicitous situation emerges, in which, given capital and freedom, 
businesses will create jobs, and their functional allies, the unemployed, will take them. 
Employers, while not selfless, are nevertheless munificent, and depend on the steadfast 
industriousness of the American worker. Romney highlighted the united interests of all 
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elements of the American economy, when, in response to the nascent Occupy Wall Street 
movement, he argued in October, 2011, “The best way to create greater income and greater 
jobs for all of America is not to attack one part of America or another, but instead to pull 
together and find how we can do a better job of competing globally.”402 
All of this, of course, is a highly contestable description of economic relations. 
Corporations, a type of “job creator” Republican economic legislation benefits, are, by law, 
not job creators but profit maximizers. Corporate executives have a fiduciary duty to 
maximize returns for shareholders, even if it means cutting jobs or reducing wages and 
benefits. As a result, time and again, the drive to maximize profits directly leads to job 
elimination. Furthermore, accepting the contention that tax cuts and deregulation empowers 
job creators to create jobs for the good of all obscures the adverse consequences of 
deregulation and tax cuts; as a result, environmental damage, the loss of government funds 
for socioeconomic programs, and other adverse consequences are bracketed out of the 
conversation. To the extent that the Republican “job creator” discourse suppresses the 
consequences of deregulation, the antagonistic character of labor relations, and the poor 
quality of many of the jobs created, the more successful Republican economic policy will be.  
Hence, there is a struggle to maintain the simplicity and legitimacy of the “job 
creator” discourse.  The Lunsford narrative is well-suited for providing sustenance to this 
simplicity and legitimacy. Lunsford’s socioeconomic mobility is evidence of the truth of the 
“job creator” discourse. Just as it was possible for a truck-driver to become a powerful 
advocate in American politics, it is possible for members of the lower and middle classes to 
advance in a capitalist economy, if it is unburdened by high taxes and regulations.  
                                                 
402 David Eldridge, “Romney: Divisiveness ‘dangerous’; ‘Have’ vs. ‘have not’ strategy ‘misguided’” 
The Washington Times, October 4, 2011.  
 188 
 
Furthermore, Lunsford obscures the complexity of the political process, just as the 
“job creator” discourse obscures the complex reasons for when, where, and which jobs are 
created. Time and again, Lunsford stormed into a state and left days or weeks later with the 
Jessica Lunsford Act passed. By contrast, most substantive legislative changes take years to 
achieve. If the economic system is as simple as the political system was in the Lunsford 
narrative, it would be a much more comprehensible system, exactly the type of simplistic 
thinking on which the “job creator” discourse depends, which reduces economic analysis to 
deregulation and tax cuts.  
In these ways, Lunsford’s political articulations mirror “job creator” articulations. 
Like “job creator” discourse, Lunsford helps the powerful at the cost of the decreased 
mobility of those who already lack it. Republican “job creator” economic proposals give 
corporations more money and reduce regulations at the expense of social services and labor 
and environmental protections. Likewise, Lunsford’s efforts increased the power of the 
police, prosecutors, and department of corrections to arrest, prosecute, and imprison people, 
also at the expense of social services for the broader public and for victims themselves (if 
being tough-on-crime is conceived of as the best response to victimization instead of victims’ 
services).  
The two discourses have one important difference between them. Lunsford’s political 
success was predicated, as argued above, on a class consciousness, i.e., the novelty of a truck 
driver becoming a powerful political actor. His supporters’ experience of socioeconomic 
immobility and powerlessness provided the ground for his appeal. By contrast, while the “job 
creator” discourse offers visions of plenitude attractive to those without mobility, one of its 
primary objectives is to erase the notion of class altogether from its analysis. The “job 
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creator” discourse intentionally speaks to everyone as if they were situated identically, while 
Lunsford’s narrative speaks directly to those without power qua people without power.  
However, while the Lunsford narrative was grounded in class consciousness, his 
political agenda effaced it by promoting a program that did not attend to unequal class 
relations; instead, it gave power to the powerful as if class was not a concern. He capitalized 
on class consciousness while simultaneously liquidating it. While the “job creator” discourse 
ignores class consciousness, Lunsford’s narrative invokes then destroys it, a more 
comprehensive approach to dismantling class consciousness than simply ignoring it 
altogether. Perversely, Lunsford satisfied class consciousness by exacerbating the conditions 
that give rise to it.   
In addition to concealing the complexity of the political process, the Lunsford 
narrative obscures the difficulty and rarity of those without power achieving political 
success, which is equivalent to a denial of socioeconomic immobility. He, a person without 
power, got things done as he wanted them done. In addition to asking people to trust the 
police, Lunsford articulated a picture of American politics in which the people without power 
can trust the political system, just as the GOP asks voters to trust unfettered capitalism.  
The Lunsford narrative made the political process seem non-adversarial. In so doing, 
it obscured the notion that the reason that people without socioeconomic power rarely 
achieve political success is that they often, though he certainly did not, advocate for 
socioeconomic policies that serve their economic and political interests, which are contrary 
to the interests of those with socioeconomic power. Policies that increase socioeconomic 
mobility for those who do not have it only are instituted when such an increase does not 
compromise the mobility of those who do. 
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Contrary to what emerges from the Lunsford narrative, the political process is 
fundamentally adversarial, with the interests of the rich opposed to those of the middle class 
and poor. In the 2012 political context, the opposition between the poor’s interests and the 
rich’s are stark. Mitt Romney’s economic plans assails efforts to raise taxes on the rich (in 
fact, proposing massive tax cuts disproportionately benefitting the wealthy), while 
demanding cuts to services for the poor. Many argue that the rich have more power in the 
political process than the poor, and thereby their interests are advanced at the expense of the 
poor’s. Naftali Bendavid, a correspondent for the pro-business Wall Street Journal, admitted 
as much on the PBS News Hour. In response to a question asking how a program as 
seemingly unobjectionable and crucial to a vulnerable population’s well-being as the 
Women, Infant, and Children nutrition program could be cut, as it was in April 2011, 
Bendavid answered that welfare is perpetually vulnerable to cuts, because it is “a program 
that helps the poor. Those often do have less of a powerful constituency than other 
programs.”403 The Wall Street Journal is a pro-capitalist publication, whose editorial board 
would reject the notion that economic inequality would impair the poor’s political mobility. 
The Lunsford narrative counters the implications of immobility implicit in Bendavid’s 
answer, as Lunsford’s economic subordination did not impair his political program. 
Accordingly, the poor, in Lunsford’s world, have the same power as the wealthy to make 
political change, enjoying socioeconomic mobility.    
More importantly, in addition to indicating the poor are at a disadvantage in the 
American political process, Bendavid’s answer also admits that poor people and rich people 
have different political and economic interests; this statement is evidence of the fact that as 
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political interests conflict and diverge, so do economic interests. This is a notion the “job 
creator” discourse must suppress, so that the rich and the poor appear to have the same 
interest in expanding the marketplace through tax cuts and deregulation. The Lunsford 
narrative buttresses the “job creator” idea of unified interests by suggesting that everyone has 
the same interest in prosecuting and harshly punishing sex offenders. In this instance, poor 
interests and rich interests coincided; the more poor and rich interests are articulated as 
coincident, the stronger the “job creator” discourse becomes.  
The words written above, “everyone has the same interest in prosecuting and harshly 
punishing sex offenders,” even strikes me as reasonable, whether it is or not. This is the 
beauty of tough-on-crime policies generally for conservatives: they give the appearance of 
unified interests, and a government working on behalf of everyone’s interests. Roosevelt 
strenuously denied that anything resembling unified interests exist. Conservatives have 
promoted tough-on-crime policies not just to capitalize on American racism and fear of 
crime, but to promote visions of unified interests, i.e., the erasure of class consciousness.  
In summary, Lunsford’s political crusade buttresses the purported felicity of labor, 
economic, and political relations under pro-capitalism governance. Because his crusade 
seems to have nothing to do with economic and political policy as such, its amenability goes 
undetected, and Democrats who may support the social safety net and economic regulations 
embrace him and his legislation, even if the implications of Lunsford’s crusade undermine 
the political possibilities of the economic regulation and welfare spending of the liberal 
consensus. 
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Conclusion 
  
While I am arguing that Lunsford’s ascent from powerless to powerful served 
conservative interests, I am not claiming there is anything intrinsically conservative about 
this narrative of the economically subordinate pursuing and achieving such political power 
and mobility. Indeed, socioeconomic reorganization depends on those without power 
obtaining and exercising it. But Lunsford’s goals had nothing to do with socioeconomic 
change. The appeal deriving from his socioeconomic location did not match his political 
agenda, which did not seek to redistribute power in order to end socioeconomic immobility 
and inequality. This demonstrates the simple point that there is no guaranteed 
correspondence between specific populations and any one political agenda.  A 
socioeconomically disadvantaged political advocate may not necessarily work to redistribute 
wealth, just as the poor do not necessarily support programs that endeavor to redistribute 
wealth. Nevertheless, having a enthusiastically subordinate and immobile person advocate 
for policies that materially and ideologically benefit the powerful seems an effective political 
strategy for the powerful to deploy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four: Victims’ Rights and the Denial of Society 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In a speech televised live hours after the United States military killed Osama Bin 
Laden, Barack Obama declared, “And on nights like this one, we can say to the families who 
have lost loved ones to al Qaeda’s terror: Justice has been done.”404 While elsewhere in the 
speech Obama asserts that Bin Laden’s death advances the interests of the nation as a whole, 
he identifies victims’ families, not the nation generally, as the entity in whose name justice 
had been done. That justice is a matter concerning individual victims and victims’ families 
rather than society as a whole is the language of victims’ rights.  
This chapter considers the impact of articulating justice as a matter for victims rather 
than society. What if a victim’s or victims' family members’ conception of justice differs 
from that of society? Whose view of justice, on both a macro- and micro-level, is privileged? 
Could it be that society today does not determine justice, but that, instead, victims make 
those determinations on a case-by-case basis?  
If victims’ views have gained ascendance, what salience and agency does the 
articulation of society have? If society does not establish justice’s dimensions, how has the 
articulation of society been compromised? In what diminished form does society exist? If the 
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lack of agency demonstrated by its diminished role in shaping justice was extended into other 
economic, political, and cultural contexts, what would be the consequences? What would the 
consequences of the disarticulation of society be for the liberal consensus forged between the 
1930s and 1960s, specifically its advocacy for a welfare state?  
This chapter examines these questions. In it, I describe Harry Truman’s conceptions 
of a robust sociality, which underlay his national health insurance proposals. This sociality 
has been a conservative target, and I demonstrate how victims' rights provides a template for 
the conservative disarticulation of Truman’s articulation of American interconnectedness. I 
examine the central role of society in John Locke’s conception of punishment. The chapter 
details the omission of societal considerations in two prominent victims’ rights practices: 
inviting victims’ and their family members to view executions and allowing them to 
participate in prosecutorial and judicial decisions. I describe the ways that this absence of 
societal considerations in victims’ rights departs from historical understandings of 
punishment, which saw such considerations as paramount. Finally, I attempt to demonstrate 
that victims’ rights undermines the elements of John Locke’s political society found in the 
United States Constitution. In so doing, it brackets political society out of the Constitution, 
reducing it to an economic document of minimalist government as articulated by the Tea 
Party.  
 
Society in the Fair Deal, John Locke, and the Victims’ Rights Movement 
 
This section compares the articulation of society in the victims’ rights movement to 
the articulation of society found in the work of Harry Truman and John Locke. It begins by 
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examining the articulation of society in Harry Truman’s advocacy for his Fair Deal policies 
and John Locke’s conception of political society, one taken up by early-American political 
figures. I then look at the articulation of society operative in two different victims’ rights 
practices: inviting victims’ family members to view executions and allowing victims to guide 
prosecutorial, police, and judicial decisions. In these practices, societal concerns are deemed 
unimportant. I trace theories of punishment and their role in American criminal justice 
history, arguing that society has been an ever-present consideration until the advent of 
victims’ rights.  
 
The Fair Deal’s Articulation of Sociality  
While Lyndon Johnson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt are often treated as American 
Liberalism’s great champions, Truman represented the high-water mark of the liberal 
consensus.  Truman attempted to institute measures Franklin Roosevelt supported but never 
saw realized, such as full-employment policies and more robust social security programs. 
The entirety of Truman’s political activity lay in promoting the “leftist” elements of the 
liberal consensus, while much of Roosevelt’s presidential activity was dedicated to 
establishing the rudiments of the liberal consensus before abandoning efforts such as the 
Economic Bill of Rights, which would have guaranteed, among other things, employment 
with a living wage, housing, and medical care, because of congressional opposition and 
World War Two.  
Truman advocated for the liberal consensus in the absence of the economic crisis in 
which Roosevelt’s New Deal was forged. Without the crisis of the Great Depression, 
Roosevelt may not have had the justification for reshaping the federal government’s role in 
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the economy.  Roosevelt’s liberal achievements and advocacy may reflect less about the 
hegemony of liberal ideas in the 1930s, but more about the unique political conditions 
wrought by the Depression. Truman, on the other hand, advocated for a strong version of the 
liberal consensus in the absence of any economic crisis, pushing a version of the Economic 
Bill of Rights even as the post-war economy improved. His advocacy indicated that no 
matter the economic conditions, the Democratic Party stood for a robust liberal consensus, 
demonstrating the strength of the liberal consensus by the late-1940s. 
Though Lyndon Johnson’s legislative efforts were more successful than Truman’s, 
Truman’s policy proposals were much more progressive than Johnson’s. For example, 
Truman advocated for health insurance for all Americans. Johnson advocated for health 
insurance only for senior citizens. Also, Johnson’s advocacy for his version of the liberal 
consensus was not rooted in a robust conception of an interconnected society with 
heterogeneous, conflicting interests. Instead, Johnson framed his Great Society programs as 
helping out those in need who were unable to escape poverty without government assistance, 
who were decidedly “other” to the middle- and upper-class Americans who were to pay for 
those programs. The poor, in the Great Society, resembled charity recipients. By contrast, 
Truman consistently articulated his agenda as deriving from the interconnectedness of all 
Americans, who all had claim on the nation’s wealth. It was not charitable impulses that 
animated the Fair Deal, but rather the notion that the poor are poor because of the rich’s 
appropriation of resources, and government properly assists the poor through disciplining the 
wealthy.  
In his first State of the Union address after winning re-election in 1948, Truman 
introduced a group of policy proposals he termed “the Fair Deal,” declaring that “[e]very 
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segment of our population and every individual has a right to a fair deal.”405 This set of 
policies included  
 
Anti-inflation measures, a more progressive tax structure, repeal of the 
Taft-Hartley Act, a higher minimum wage, a farm program based on the 
concepts of abundant production and parity income, resource 
development and public power programs, expansion of social security, 
national medical insurance, federal aid to education, extensive housing 
legislation, and civil rights bills.406 
 
In addition, Truman advocated a Full Employment Act, which would have required the 
federal government to enact spending measures and tax cuts to counteract economic signals 
that employment was going to drop in the future, in order to achieve the full employment the 
bill mandated. These measures were not only progressive for the time, but appear even more 
radical according to today’s standards. The utter implausibility of the implementation of a 
Full Employment Act today indicates the success of conservative attacks on the liberal 
consensus.  
In advocating for these Fair Deal policies in his State of the Union, Harry Truman 
made five assertions relevant to my discussion of the relationship between victims’ rights and 
sociality. First, he asserted the existence of a national whole, with its own set of interests, 
which can be counterposed to any specific economic or political interest, and which is 
represented by the government: “The people of this great country have a right to expect that 
the Congress and the President will work in closest cooperation with one objective—the 
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welfare of the people of this nation as a whole.”407 The second assertion, also contained in 
this quote, is that the interests of the national collective trump any specific economic or 
political interest in governmental decision making. In directing government to work for the 
whole, Truman implicitly identified the danger that government may work for only part of 
that whole. Third, he argued that “the economic system should rest on a democratic 
foundation and that wealth should be created for the benefit of all.”408 In other words, the 
organization of the economic system affects the entire American population, no matter where 
they are located within that system.  
His fourth claim is that the nation’s wealth is collectively held by the American 
population, Americans have claim to that wealth, and government must work to allocate that 
wealth to achieve egalitarian results. For example, consider his use of the word ‘our’ in the 
following statement: “Government must see that every American has a chance to obtain his 
fair share of our increasing abundance,” and his use of the phrase “the fortunes of the nation” 
in his argument, “We have rejected the theory that the fortunes of the nation should be in the 
hands of a few.”409 Fifth, he claimed that the “American people have pledged our common 
resources to help one another in the hazards and struggles of individual life.”410  
 These five themes frame and justify his policy proposals. In arguing for federal 
financial aid for schools and prepaid medical insurance for all Americans he declared, “In a 
nation as rich as ours, it is a shocking fact that tens of millions lack adequate medical 
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care…it is equally shocking that millions of children are not receiving a good education.”411 
Such a claim only makes sense if the people of the United States exist as a nation as a whole 
with a set of interests (in this instance in healthcare and education), the economic system is 
working in such a way that some have healthcare and education and other do not, and the 
American population can make a collective claim on the nation’s wealth. Thus, according to 
Truman, the American population’s interest in having healthcare trumps the healthcare 
industry’s interest in profits and wealthy Americans interest in low taxes.  
  
John Locke and the Founders on Punishment and the Emergence of Society  
 According to many, John Locke had a massive influence on American Revolutionary 
and Constitutional thought. Law professor David A. Richards argued that both “the American 
revolutionary and constitutional minds…framed their enterprises on the basis of Lockean 
political theory.”412 Law professor Donald Doernberg claims that “[i]t would be difficult to 
overstate John Locke’s influence on the American Revolution and the people who created the 
government that followed it.”413 Historian Ralph Ketcham argued, “The debt which nearly all 
the Founding Fathers owed to the political philosophy [of Locke] has long been 
acknowledged.”414 Political scientist Gary McDowell notes that “The Americans took the 
teachings of Locke and the Lockeans seriously when it came to their own thinking about the 
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nature and extent of fundamental laws or constitutions and how such laws could be made to 
fit within the American political context.”415 
The mechanics of punishment, both of who may punish and who may decide 
punishment’s proper form, is central to Locke’s conception of political society outlined in his 
Second Treatise of Government.  Locke argues that a viable civil society requires people to 
relinquish their right and power to punish as it exists in a State of Nature. In a State of 
Nature, which precedes the formation of civil society, people are in “a state of equality, in 
which no one has more power and authority than anyone else,” and “are perfectly free to 
order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and themselves, in any way they like.”416 
In this state, people possess the right to protect their “lives, liberties, and estates,” and thereby 
have the freedom to “judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is 
persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the heinousness of 
the fact, in his opinion, requires it.”417  
Despite this right to punish, in a state of nature “the enjoyment of [freedom and 
property] is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others…however 
free.”418 Locke surmised that people will pursue their own interests and use violence to fulfill 
them, and in a state of nature, people have no protection from violence but through whatever 
means they can muster on their own. Accordingly, the state of nature “is full of fears and 
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continual dangers.”419 According to McDowell, “the state of nature would inevitably 
degenerate into a state of war.”420 
In response to this danger, people join into society with other people in order to gain 
the protection of established law, impartial judges, and the certain ability to punish violations 
of the law, freeing them of the hazardous task of attempting to exact punishment on their 
own. Entering into society enabled their “comfortable, safe, and peaceable living, one 
amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any 
that are not of it.”421 However, in exchange for these protections, “The power of punishment 
[is] wholly give[n] up.”422 People cannot simultaneously act as judge in their own matters 
and enforcer of those judgments while also preserving uniform law and punishment. 
Accordingly,  
 
all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the 
community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, 
and the same to all parties; and by men having authority from the 
community, for the execution of those rules, decides all the differences 
that may happen between any members of that society concerning any 
matter of right; and punishes those offences which any member hath 
committed against the society, with such penalties as the law 
established.423  
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The purpose of judgment and punishment in society is “directed to no other end, but the 
peace, safety, and public good of the people.”424 Locke argues that the existence of civil and 
political society depends on the relinquishment of the power to both punish and decide on 
punishment: “Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one society, as to 
quit everyone his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there 
and only there is a political, or civil society.”425 The government in political society 
possesses the “power of making laws: that is, the power to set what punishments are 
appropriate for what crime that members of the society commit.”426   
According to Locke, the formation of political society through the uniform abdication 
of the executive power requires the establishment of a government through which society 
determines laws and punishments, and enforces the former by administering the latter. As he 
put it, “the beginning of politick society depends upon the consent of these individuals to 
joyn and make one society; who, when they are thus incorporated, might set up what form of 
government they thought fit.”427  
In rejecting British colonial rule, Americans asserted themselves as a political society. 
They then, according to Richards, were “free to decide whether to continue as a political 
community and to frame a new form of government or to disband. Americans, of course, 
enthusiastically invoked their Lockean right to frame constitutions.”428 The United States 
Constitution represented consent to a particular governmental configuration and the 
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ratification of American civil and political society itself. It was the work of a sovereign, 
discrete people who alone were capable of delegating the necessary powers to the 
government to ensure their freedom and liberty. In a sense, it was an assertion of the 
“peopleness” of Americans.  
As a work of sovereign people that ratified the existence of a political society, the 
Constitution necessarily presumed Locke’s insistence that individuals relinquish privileges of 
the law of nature, including their right to punish and prosecute. Otherwise, without this 
presumption, there would have been no society that agreed to the Constitution in the first 
place. Relinquishing the power to punish and prosecute represents a loss of individual liberty, 
but that loss is the price of political society and a necessary condition for agreements like the 
Constitution. George Washington, the President of the Constitutional Convention, argued 
that government’s work is to “secure all the rights of independent sovereignty to each, and 
yet provide for the interest and safety of all,” but “individuals entering into society…must 
give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest.”429 
Ample evidence demonstrates that early American political and legal figures accepted 
Locke’s position that the creation and maintenance of society required individuals to give up 
their personal right to prosecute and punish. Ronald Prestritto’s analysis of early-American 
theories of punishment, Founding the Criminal Law: Punishment and Political Thought in 
the Origins of America, reveals that the leading political thinkers of the time widely accepted 
political society’s requirement that people give up the right to administer or decide 
punishment.430 His review of the theories of punishment of Thomas Jefferson, George 
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Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison indicates that they were preoccupied 
with the ‘natural versus positive law’ debate, regarding whether criminal sanctions should 
achieve utilitarian goals or be derived from timeless standards of justice and morality; that 
the state, not citizens on their own, should solely have the power to prosecute and punish in 
the United States was treated as a settled matter. In fact, Madison, in The Federalist Papers 
number 10, declared “no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest 
would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.”431  
Furthermore, early commentators on Constitutional law acknowledged that the power 
to punish belonged solely to the state and not to individuals. William Blackstone, a 
distinguished 19th century legal commentator who wrote an early definitive analysis of 
American law, explained “crimes and misdemeanors…are a breach and violation of the 
public rights and duties, due to the whole community, considered as community, in its social 
aggregate capacity.”432 Blackstone echoes Locke when he explains:  
 
It is clear, that that right of punishing crime against the law of nature, as 
murder and the like, is in a state of mere nature vested in every 
individual…in a state of society this right is transferred from individuals 
to the sovereign power; whereby men are prevented from being judges 
in their own causes, which is one of the evils that civil government was 
intended to remedy. Whatever power therefore individuals had of 
punishing offenses against the law of nature, that is now vested in the 
magistrate alone; who bears the sword of justice by consent of the 
whole community.433  
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James Kent, another early American legal authority who became a Supreme Court 
Justice after his academic career, makes a clear distinction between the public nature of 
crime and private injuries. He argues 
Every person is also entitled to the preventive arm of the magistrate as a 
further protection from threatened or impending danger; and, on 
reasonable cause being shown, he may require his adversary to be 
bound to keep the peace. If violence has been actually offered, the 
offender is not only liable to be prosecuted and punished on behalf of 
the state, but he is bound to render to the party aggrieved, adequate 
compensation in damages.”434  
  
Kent explains that in American law that it is only in the civil system that individuals act in 
their own names. In the civil system individuals can pursue personal damages from 
offenders, but the pursuit of damages are separate from prosecution and punishment, which is 
the domain of the state. In the criminal justice system conceived by Kent, Locke, 
Washington, Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison, and Blackstone, the punishment of the offender 
is not considered compensation for a victim’s injuries. Instead, it is compensation for societal 
harm.  
This distinction between the civil system, in which individuals pursue damages in 
their own names, and the criminal law, in which the government pursues punishment in 
society’s name, is central to the existence of political society. If a crime is treated by the 
criminal justice system as something committed against an individual victim and not society, 
and if it is victims and not society that influences and then distributes punishment, Locke’s 
society does not exist. To grant executive powers to victims represents a return to a state of 
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nature, and this return brings severe consequences for ‘the people’ ratified by the United 
States Constitution.  
 
  
The Status of Society when Inviting Victims to View Executions.  
  In the following section, I make two observations about inviting victims to view 
executions salient to the disarticulation of the concept of society accomplished by both 
victims’ rights and conservative politics. First, possible justifications for allowing victims’ 
family members to view executions that cite society’s interests actually serve to diminish the 
salience of the concept of societal interests. Second, in any case, arguments for inviting 
victims’ family members to view executions do not cite society’s interests to justify the 
practice of inviting victims’ family members to view executions. Instead, print and television 
news media ground justifications for inviting victims to view executions in the desires of 
victims alone, and remain silent on how the policy does or does not promote society’s 
interests. Society is therefore represented as having no interests in how punishment is 
administered, a dramatic departure from longstanding and prevailing theories of the 
relationship between punishment and society. In the following pages, I will examine the 
articulation of society in two instances involving victims’ family members viewing 
executions: first, the federal government’s facilitation of victims’ family members viewing 
Timothy’s McVeigh’s execution; second, the Texas Board of Corrections 1995 decision to 
invite victims’ family members to view executions, which Board guidelines previously did 
not allow.   
 Though it is never coherently argued as such, it is possible to present an argument 
that inviting victims’ family members to view executions advances society’s interests, an 
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argument that would, perhaps, preserve the salience of society. Simply put, it is a matter of 
justice, and society has an interest that its criminal justice system promote justice. This 
argument has three steps. The first is that it is in the interests of justice to enable victims to 
gain closure through watching the condemned die. Second, it is in the interest of society that 
its criminal justice system promotes justice. Third, because it promotes justice, the policy of 
allowing victims to view executions is in society’s interests.  
 United States Attorney General John Ashcroft, briefly and incoherently, gestured to 
such an argument when explaining his decision to facilitate the viewing of Timothy’s 
McVeigh’s execution for survivors of his 1994 bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal 
Building and family members of victims who were killed. At an April 11, 2001 news 
conference in which he announced his decision, Ashcroft cited society’s interest in justice to 
justify the Justice Department’s facilitation of the viewing. According to Ashcroft, allowing 
victims to view McVeigh’s death was something that “justice required” and, therefore, was 
“an appropriate thing for the Justice Department to carry out” because certain victims’ family 
members were not able to see the remains of family members who were buried underneath 
the building’s rubble. As a result of never seeing their family members’ remains, victims’ 
family members were unable to reconcile themselves to what happened; they, as Ashcroft put 
it, experienced an “absence of closure.”435 Ashcroft reported that victims’ family members 
said it “was as if my family left one day and never came back.”436 So, Ashcroft concluded, 
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“It is with that in mind that frankly my intention to accommodate the victims was 
galvanized.”437  
 He arrived at this conception of the justice of allowing victims to view McVeigh’s 
death after meeting with 150 survivors and victims’ family members the day before he 
announced his decision to allow victims’ family members and survivors to view McVeigh’s 
execution. According to CNN correspondent Gary Tuchman, at the meeting “everyone told 
[Ashcroft] they want the chance to watch this on closed-circuit television.”438 Ashcroft 
described his meeting with victims and victims’ family members as a transformational event, 
“My time with these brave survivors changed me…I hope that we can help them meet their 
need to close this chapter in their lives.”439 He said this meeting made the attack “a reality to 
him in an emotional way that sort of displaced in many respects the intellectual 
understanding.”440  
Ashcroft’s explanation for his decision indicated that it was victims’ desires—and 
nothing else—that constituted justice and influenced his decision to facilitate victims viewing 
McVeigh’s execution. Victims said as much. Doris Jones, mother of a bombing victim, said 
“He addressed our issues. I strongly believe that he is doing everything that he possibly can 
to accommodate us, and I certainly appreciate it.”441 If victims had said something else, his 
and victims’ family members’ logic suggested, Ashcroft would have conceived justice 
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differently and arrived at an alternative decision concerning whether to screen McVeigh’s 
execution.  
Ashcroft’s deference to the wishes of victims’ family members degrades the concept 
of society. It was not just that victims’ rather than society’s interests were treated as the only 
salient consideration in his decision, but victims’ interests were defined by victims 
themselves. In this articulation, society’s interests are whatever victims deem their own 
interests to be. Accordingly, society had no interests independent of whatever victims wanted 
for themselves. This is a meager conception of society’s interests, and, as I will argue, one 
that would be catastrophic for any efforts to promote Fair Deal policies in other political and 
economic contexts. But, in invoking justice in his news conference, Ashcroft at least nods to 
the existence of society and society’s interest in some form. 
 However, as articulated in media accounts, society’s interests are not relevant to 
inviting victims to view executions. Considerations of justice or any other societal interest 
are absent from news stories about victims viewing McVeigh’s execution. Instead, the sole 
consideration cited by supporters of inviting victims to view executions is that viewing 
executions will make victims feel better. And, for the most part, neither television 
interviewers nor print journalists challenged this. Also, critics of the decision primarily based 
their opposition on the argument that it would not actually help survivors and victims’ family 
member constructively deal with their trauma, and not because viewing executions may 
violate society’s interests.  
For example, media coverage of Ashcroft’s decision to allow victims to view 
McVeigh’s death omitted any discussion of Ashcroft’s or any other invocation of justice, but 
focused on victims’ desires and putative psychological needs. Much of the coverage 
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consisted of victims explaining why they wanted to see McVeigh killed. Some felt it 
important to be near the community of people who survived or had family members killed in 
the bombing. Sharon Medearis, whose husband was killed in the bombing, said “I want to be 
around people who understand what we’ve been through” during his execution.442 Bombing 
survivor Priscilla Salyers stated, “I need to be there for my support of other family members 
and survivors.”443 Viewing the execution would, various victims predicted, “give me peace 
knowing he will be eliminated,”444 allow one to “let go of that chapter of my life,”445 “have 
the leg up” on McVeigh,446 and enable victims to “gain back some of the things that have 
been lost.”447 Victims feared that their suffering would continue without seeing McVeigh die. 
Katherine Treanor, whose son and in-laws were killed in the bombing said, “If I don’t visibly 
see this man take his last breath, I will not be able to let go of that chapter of my life.”448 
Diane Leonard, whose husband was killed in the bombing, reported that she was not allowed 
to see her mother after she committed suicide, and subsequently had terrible nightmares. As a 
result of that experience, she concluded that she must watch McVeigh die. She reasoned, “I 
have not wanted to avoid anything [regarding McVeigh]…Otherwise, my mind fills in the 
blanks. And reality is better than what my mind can do.”449 Psychologist and bombing 
                                                 
442 “CBS Morning News,” CBS, April 11, 2001.  
 
443 “CNN Live Event,” CNN April 12, 2001 
 
444 Dan Eggen and Louis Romano, “For McVeigh’s Victims, Different Paths to Peace,” The 
Washington Post, April 15, 2001. 
 
445 Eggen and Roman, “For McVeigh’s Victims.”   
 
446 “The Osgood File,” CBS, April 13, 2001.   
 
447 “The Early Show,” CBS.  April 13, 2001.  
 
448 Eggen and Romano, “For McVeigh’s Victims.”   
 
449 Eggen and Romano, “For McVeigh’s Victims.”  
 211 
 
survivor Paul Heath, after conducting his own research into victims viewing executions, 
claimed that he and other victims “want to be able to tell others in the future that they knew 
and were present at the time on the calendar and on the clock when this individual could 
never get out of prison, escape from prison, or hurt anybody else in their family or anybody 
else’s family.”450  
Politicians and commentators agreed that victims’ desires should strongly influence 
whether or not they can view McVeigh’s execution. Asked why he supported victims’ 
viewing McVeigh’s execution, then-Oklahoma governor Frank Keating succinctly stated, 
“Because that’s what the families want.”451 Keating also thought that it would “provide the 
kind of moral closure needed,” and satisfy those who “want to make sure he’s dead.”452 
Columnist and host of CNN’s Crossfire Robert Novak suggested that “it would provide 
[victims] a little comfort to ease their pain.”453 
On rare occasions, interviewers invoked the question of society, questioning 
supporters of victims’ family members viewing executions if there were adverse societal 
consequences to allowing these viewings. In response, supporters avoided discussing society, 
focusing on their own pain and desires, and interviewers let such explanations stand without 
challenge. For example, former Today and The CBS Early Show host Bryant Gumbel asked 
Dan McKinney, the husband of a bombing victim, “[w]hat do you say to the idea that once 
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you start televising it for the family members of the victims, it becomes more about revenge 
than punishment?”454 McKinney answered 
That's a hard question to answer.  As far as the term revenge, I don't--I 
don't look at this as revenge.  And as far as viewing this, I know this is a 
new avenue that we're pursuing, but I don't see any recourse other than 
do that for the people that's (sic) lost so much to try to gain back some 
of the things that they have lost.  We can't--we can't deal with it on an 
everyday basis with him still here.455 
 
CNN Crossfire host Bill Press asked Governor Keating, “are we feeding revenge here or 
justice?”456 Keating described support for victims viewing executions as a “common 
viewpoint” among victims. Keating said that victims, in their words, “need to make sure this 
execution takes place, and I want to make sure I see that the person who killed my wife 
doesn’t walk again.”457 
The McVeigh execution was an exceptional event, as McVeigh had bombed a federal 
building for political reasons and killed 168 people. Was the discourse of Ashcroft’s decision 
to allow victims to view executions also exceptional, differing in significant ways from 
articulations of decisions to allow execution viewings by family members of victims of more 
conventional crimes? A useful comparison is the 1995 Texas Board of Correction’s decision 
to allow five members of the victims’ family to view an execution, a decision supported by 
the state’s Attorney General as well as then-Governor George W. Bush.  
There are four major differences between the circumstances surrounding Ashcroft’s 
decision and the Texas Board of Corrections’ 1995 decisions. First, the Texas decision was 
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made by state and not federal officials. Beginning with Louisiana in 1984, numerous states 
have changed their execution protocols by inviting victims’ family members to view 
executions. Today, in addition to Louisiana, victims’ family members can view executions in 
Texas, Indiana, Tennessee, Alabama, North Carolina, Missouri, Oklahoma, Georgia, Florida, 
Arkansas, California, Delaware, Kentucky, Mississippi, Ohio, Nevada, South Carolina, 
Washington, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Idaho.  
Second, the Texas Board of Corrections made a policy change affecting hundreds of 
cases rather than a decision affecting one execution. Third, the inmates whose executions 
were to be affected had committed non-political crimes. Fourth, Texas had been regularly 
executing inmates before the 1995 decision, while the McVeigh execution was the first 
federal execution since 1963. Despite these differences, the justifications for inviting victims’ 
family members to view executions were identical, demonstrating the pervasiveness of the 
absence of society in articulations of policies allowing victims to view executions. These 
were not historically unique victims deserving of special treatment, as McVeigh’s victims 
were articulated; yet they still were privileged over society.  
Many victims’ family members attended the Board meetings in which the changes to 
the viewing policy were discussed. Media coverage of the Board’s decision included 
numerous quotes from victims’ family members. All of the victims quoted supported the 
change, presenting a wide array of justifications for inviting family members to view 
executions and why they themselves would want to watch someone killed. Invariably, just as 
it was with McVeigh’s execution, the justifications were based on their own desires and 
interests, rather than any benefits of the practice to society generally.  
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Some family members said they would view the execution on the deceased’s behalf: 
“It would be one of the last things I could ever do for Elizabeth,” said Melissa Pena, whose 
daughter Elizabeth was murdered.”458 Matthew Herden said that it would “give [him] the 
opportunity to stand in for my mother.”459 Others predicted that watching the killing would 
make them feel better about their relative’s death. Thomas Dillon argued, “To have that final 
closure, we need to look into the eyes of the man who did it.”460 Some did not specify any 
reason to watch an execution, but justified their support for the decision by simply describing 
their pain and anger. Elsie Carey stated “I have anger. I’ll always have anger because 
someone was taken from me. They tried to play God. I would like to go to the execution.”461 
Another argued that allowing victims’ family members to attend was a matter of fairness: 
“Our loved one had no choice. Their lives were taken. I’m begging, I’m asking, I am 
pleading. Give the victims—the survivors—that choice.”462  
Another relative expressed a desire to occupy the same position at the execution that 
the convicted murderer held at the time of the crime, in order to subject the murderer to the 
same treatment the family member received. A victim’s father proclaimed, “They looked in 
my daughter’s eyes when they murdered her. I want to look in their eyes when they are 
punished for their crime. I live for the day they die.”463 Finally, one victim averred that by 
allowing victims’ family members the option to view the execution, you provide an element 
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of agency for victims, and with this agency “you don’t feel you’re in such a deep, dark 
hole.”464 
Quotes from influential non-governmental organizations, members of the board, and 
high-ranking government officials cement the notion that this decision was for the victims’ 
benefit alone. Gary Sykes, director of the Southwestern Law Enforcement Institute, an 
organization that advises police departments, argued that allowing victims to view executions 
would make the criminal justice system a warmer and more inviting place for victims: 
“people feel the state has become impersonal and bureaucratic. Viewing an execution gives 
the individual the feeling that they’re again part of the process.”465 Board member Ellen 
Halbert said the decision was a testament to the board’s devotion to and high regard for 
victims: “It really sends a message about how the board thinks about victims and how we 
really want to help with the healing in any way we can.”466 Attorney General Dan Morales’s 
justification suggested that the state would go to any length to serve victims’ therapeutic 
needs: “If it helps bring some closure to the tragedy and trauma experienced by the victim’s 
family, then we must allow it.”467  
In both Ashcroft’s decision to allow victims’ family members and survivors to view 
McVeigh’s execution and the Texas Board of Corrections’ decision, society was simply 
bracketed out of the discourse. The beginning and end of both issues is that it will satisfy a 
variety of victim desires. Changing criminal justice policy to increase the satisfaction of 
                                                 
 
464 Potok, “Looking Death in the Eye.”   
 
465 Potok, “Looking Death in the Eye.”   
 
466 Christy Hoppe, “Board: family of victims can see executions. Texas Attorney General must approve 
policy,” The Dallas Morning News, September 27, 1995.  
 
467 Christy Hoppe, “Kin given ok to view executions; Morales says victims’ families need closure,” 
The Dallas Morning News, September 27, 1995. 
 216 
 
victim desires has been the central goal of the victims’ rights movement, which generally 
expresses no concern for society. Indeed, in the article “Allowing Victims' Families to View 
Executions: The Eighth Amendment and Society's Justifications for Punishment” in the Ohio 
State Law Journal, Douglas Janicik asserts that “strong arguments exist that right to view 
statutes are a result of the victims' rights movement. Both originated in the same time period, 
and the rationales behind the legislation appear to be similar—to give the victim a sense of 
justice that has been missing in the American criminal justice system.”468 Following Janicik, 
in his article “A Victim’s Right to View: A Distortion of the Retributivist Theory of 
Punishment” in the Journal of Legislation, Brian Skaret summarizes arguments victims’ 
rights advocates use for allowing victims to view executions. Inviting victims to view 
executions  
 
(1) provides victims' families with a sense of justice that lacks (sic) 
throughout the criminal justice process; (2) the right to view an 
execution provides victims' families with a sense of closure because 
they participate in the final sentence of the criminal; and (3) the right to 
view enables victims' family members to "ensure the prisoner pays for 
what he did.”469 
 
In this discourse, the only interests discussed are victims’, and society, for all intents and 
purposes, does not exist.  
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The Articulation of Society in Inviting Victims to Make Prosecutorial, Judicial, and 
Law Enforcement Decisions. 
Before examining the ways in which inviting victims to view executions departs from 
previous justification of punishment, disables Truman’s Fair Deal discourse, and Locke’s 
conception of political society, I will describe another way in which the articulation of 
society has been weakened in the criminal justice system, and in so doing, indicate the ways 
that the erasure of society permeate countless decisions made by American criminal justice 
institutions. Members of police departments, prosecutors, and judges are nominally agents of 
society. The ostensible embodiment of society in the criminal justice system is demonstrated 
by the terminology used in criminal cases, in which the two parties are identified as the 
geographic entity and the defendant, as in the People of North Carolina v. David Hopkins. 
However, because of victims’ rights, criminal justice professionals function not as agents of 
society but as agents of victims and their families, and their role as agents of victims trumps 
that of agents of society. Examining media accounts of the criminal justice system in South 
Carolina and North Carolina between late 2009 and early 2012, one finds numerous 
examples of criminal justice professionals representing victims, not society, pursuing 
outcomes that may be counter to society’s interests in order to satisfy victims. My hope in 
detailing examples drawn from a short period of time and limited geographic area is to 
demonstrate the ubiquity of the subordination of society to victims’ wishes in the criminal 
justice system.  
For example, Moore County (NC) Superior Court judge Stuart Albright rejected a 
plea deal for Tyler Whitaker that would have resulted in a probated sentence after “one 
victim said his family would rather see the young man accused of assaulting him go to prison 
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rather than receive $41,000 in medical bills.”470 Instead, Whitaker went to prison and owed 
$41,000 to healthcare providers and not the family. Cumberland County (NC) Superior Court 
Judge Gregory Weeks delayed signing an order determining that Marlon Curtis McKenzie 
would not face the death penalty “until prosecutors could speak with the family of the 
victim,” who “wanted to discuss the issue before a final decision was made.”471 
Lee County (NC) District Attorney Susan Doyle justified a plea deal for Edward 
Rivera by saying “I hope the victim’s family can now move forward with their lives knowing 
that the defendant pled guilty and will be punished for his crime.”472 Alleghany (NC) County 
Assistant District Attorney Nancy Lamb agreed to a plea deal with Herbert Wilson that 
involved dropping an attempted murder charge because it was something the victim could 
“live with.”473 Greenwood, South Carolina prosecutor agreed to a plea deal with Edward Lee 
Elmore that resulted in his release from prison after 30 years because the victim’s sister 
“asked him to end three decades of uncertainty and phone calls from reporters and other 
people she doesn’t want to talk to. ‘I want peace, I need peace. Can you get me peace?’ the 
prosecutor recalled her saying.”474  
Wake County (NC) District Attorney Colon Willoughby decided to pursue the death 
penalty for Jason Williford, charged with killing Kathy Taft, because of the “sentiments of 
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the victim’s family.”475 In February 2011 in Durham, North Carolina, Isaac Stroud was 
sentenced to life in prison instead of death when a judge determined he was not mentally 
capable of assisting with his defense. Durham County District Attorney Tracy Cline agreed 
to Stroud’s mental illness claim, but only “with consent from the victim’s family.”476 
Prosecutors often feel that they have failed families, and not society, when juries opt for life 
and not death sentences. For example, after failing to convince a jury to sentence Samuel J. 
Cooper to death for five murders, Wake County, North Carolina prosecutors “apologized to 
the [victims’] families after the case.”477 When prosecutions are successful, prosecutors, the 
news media, and victims suggest that the success was on the victims’ behalf.  
 Forsyth County (NC) Prosecutor David Hall agreed to a plea deal with Kate Hofmann 
because the victim’s mother, Nellie Snow, “was in very poor health and might not survive. It 
was her wish that this be concluded very soon. I respect that, so we acquiesced.”478 Snow 
reported that “she was pleased that prosecutors had listened to her wishes.”479 After Ernest 
Nichols pled guilty and was sentenced to at least 18 years for statutory rape, the Mecklenburg 
(NC) County Assistant District Attorney said, “The victim and her family supported the plea 
offers and wanted to avoid the trauma that a trial might bring.”480   
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 Victims also exert control over police decisions. Columbia, South Carolina police let 
a murder suspect, Wayne ‘Chicken Wing’ Mobley, free on bond in the hopes that he would 
lead them to another suspect. While free, Mobley allegedly killed Bobby Edwards. 
According to Columbia Police Chief Randy Scott, the “family of the [original] victim, Hector 
Carreon-Hernandez, also agreed to let Mobley go to try to nab the real killer.”481 Scott 
explained, “We do things like this. At the end of the day we have to do justice for the victim 
and the victim’s family.”482  
 In all the above cases, judges, prosecutors, and police departments justify their 
decisions by positioning themselves as agents of the victims. Even those media accounts of 
individual cases that lack explicit admissions from prosecutors, judges, and law enforcement 
that they have acted as agents of victims implicitly affirm that relationship. For example, 
after Dallas Bullock pleaded to second-degree murder, an article noted that murder-victim 
Joseph Wells’ family “expressed relief the case would soon be wrapped up.”483 The headline 
of an article detailing the plea bargain agreed to by Robert James Moyer read simply 
“Shooting Victim’s Mother Objects to Plea Bargain.”484 All in all, according to Charlotte 
Observer writer Franco Ordonez, “Prosecutors are often viewed by families as someone who 
will bring justice for their loved one.”485 Complaining about the Gaston (NC) County District 
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prosecutor’s presentation of his case against the man charged with killing her daughter, Lucy 
Johnson, Michele Dye lamented, “Lucy is not getting proper representation.”486  
This view extends beyond the choices of criminal justice professionals in individual 
case to criminal justice legislation. According to news accounts, legislation to redress past 
racism in the use of the death penalty as well as broader sentencing legislation should reflect 
the opinions and interests of individual victims. An article about the proposed repeal of 
elements of the Racial Justice Act in The Fayetteville Observer included a section titled 
“Victim’s Sister Speaks,” in which Bobbie Tornblum decried the law and the effect it may 
have on the sentence received by the person sentenced to death for killing her brother.487 
Also, media accounts often suggest that broader sentencing legislation should embody 
victims’ family members’ views. In a 2011 article titled “Second-degree murder terms 
decried,” Mary Lyons Felton, whose son was murdered in 2006, was the decrier. She 
demanded that North Carolina extend prison sentences for second-degree murder, declaring, 
“Someone with no criminal record can get as low as eight years as a result of a plea…that 
sends the wrong message to the victim’s family members.”488 In other words, as the above 
examples demonstrate, the criminal justice system’s job is to satisfy those family members 
by structuring elements of the system according to victims’ family members’ specifications.  
In each of the above cases, society had interests contrary to the victims’ interests to 
which prosecutors and judges deferred. In some cases, society’s interest would call for 
harsher sanctions; in others, lesser. For example, in the Dallas Bullock case, the victims’ 
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interest in a speedy resolution to Bullock’s case resulted in Bullock receiving a lighter 
sentence than what he would have received if he had been convicted of his original charges. 
Society has an interest in keeping crime levels as low as possible, and releasing a murderer 
years before he otherwise would have been because of victims’ desires puts that interest at 
risk. Society may also have had an interest in offenders receiving lesser sanctions. 
Incarcerating prisoners requires taxpayer money, money that could either be devoted to other 
programs or remain the taxpayer’s. For example, Tyler Whitaker was denied probation at a 
victim’s request, and ultimately was sentenced to prison. Perhaps Whitaker would have 
observed his probation conditions and not committed further crimes, an outcome that would 
have saved the state of North Carolina tens of thousands of dollars of prison costs. 
Altogether, victims’ interests and society’s interest’s do not naturally cohere. When they 
diverge, over public safety or prison costs, choosing a victim’s position violates society’s 
interests.  
  
The Centrality of Society’s Interests and the Absence of Victims’ Interests in 
Criminological Theory and the History of American Criminal Justice 
   
Is it possible for society to simply have no interest in how its criminal justice system 
operates? That contention represents a clear departure from historical conceptions of the 
relationship between punishment and society. It also differs markedly from punishment 
practices operative throughout American history, including revolutionary-era history, a time 
period glorified by the conservatives who spearhead victims’ rights efforts and have 
disarticulated the liberal consensus.  
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Philosophies of Punishment 
The interests of society are central in the four dominant theories of punishment that 
have guided criminal justice since the 18th century: retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, 
and rehabilitation. Not only are societal interests central to these theories, but victims’ 
interests are uniformly absent.   
Both Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel promoted retributive approaches to 
punishment. Kant claimed that he was not concerned with society, writing that “[j]udicial 
punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote some other good for the 
criminal himself or for civil society.”489 However, punishment served a social purpose for 
Kant, as he asserted that the punishment of criminals was essential to prevent the degradation 
of society, as without “legal justice…it is no longer worthwhile for men to remain alive on 
this earth.”490 However, he was not concerned with victims either. He argued that justice, a 
categorical imperative, required society to uphold justice, “the principle of equality…the 
principle of not treating one side more favorably than the others.”491 Thus, what one does to 
another, the same is done to him (he holds, for example, that murder must be punishable by 
death), and “everyone will duly receive what his actions are worth.”492 Hegel valued the 
expressive value of retributive punishment, arguing that punishing the criminal represents 
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“the cancellation of the crime, which would otherwise be regarded as valid, and the 
restoration of right.”493  
Such retributive theories of punishment presume that punishment functions as 
society’s condemnation of the violation of social norms and an effort to cancel the 
advantages accrued by the defendant in the commission of the crime. Punishment stands, 
according to Stanley Grupp in his introduction to the book Theories of Punishment, “as an 
orderly, collective expression of society’s natural feeling of revulsion toward and disapproval 
of criminal acts.”494 Grupp maintains that retributive punishment “vindicates the criminal law 
and in so doing helps to unify society against crime and criminals.”495 Society is not the only 
entity served by retributive punishment, offenders are as well. According to leading 
retributivist Andrew Von Hirsch, the role of retributive punishment is recognizing and 
“addressing the offender as a moral agent, by appealing to his or her sense of right and 
wrong.”496 By addressing the offender as a moral agent, retribution respects the offender’s 
moral agency, and facilitates the offender’s reentry into the community of moral agents once 
retribution has been exacted.   
Incapacitation, deterrence and rehabilitation are all utilitarian conceptions of 
punishment. Utilitarian theories originated in the work of Jeremy Bentham and Cesar 
Beccaria in the 18th Century. Bentham held that “the business of government is to promote 
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the happiness of society, by punishing and rewarding.”497 Beccaria argued that society must 
be defended against the “private usurpation by [criminals], each of whom always tries not 
only to withdraw his own share but also to usurp for himself that of others.”498 The only way 
to defend society is by imposing punishments that “directly strike the senses” and 
“counterbalance the powerful impressions of the private passions that oppose the common 
good.”499  
Deterrence presumes that people are pleasure-seeking and pain-avoiding. Penalizing 
offenders will make clear the potential costs of crime to those convicted of crimes as well as 
potential offenders, thereby deterring both groups from committing crime out of fear of its 
consequences. It is based, according to Grupp, following Bentham and Beccaria, on the 
utilitarian concept of achieving “the greatest happiness for the greatest number.”500 
Deterrence theories presume that deterrence will increase the well-being of all by reducing 
the criminal behavior all would otherwise be subject to.  
Incapacitation lacks retribution’s ethical dimensions. It presumes that offenders will 
commit crimes in the future and, according to criminologist Cyndi Banks, should be “placed 
into custody, usually for long periods of time, to protect the public from the chance of future 
offending.”501 Finally, rehabilitation works to enhance society’s safety and the “the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number” by providing treatment and other resources to enable 
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offenders to live future crime-free lives.502 According to Banks, this theory presumes that 
rehabilitative techniques can result in a “change in the offender’s values so that he or she will 
refrain from committing further offenses, now believing such conduct to be wrong.”503  
While the relative popularity and utilization of these approaches to punishment has 
changed over the centuries, all presume that punishment should advance society’s interests. 
Obviously, this presumes the existence of society. Victim influence over the mechanics of 
punishment is fundamentally incompatible with all of the above theories of punishment. 
Victim involvement alters the calculations used to establish deterrent, incapacitative, 
rehabilitative, or retributive punishment, introducing arbitrary data that perverts these 
calculations and prevents their intended benefits. As detailed in chapter one, victims’ rights 
proponents posit that victims, as a result of their victimization, have a capacity to influence 
punishment equal to or superior to that of society. That, however, has never been the thinking 
of philosophers and criminologists contemplating punishment. Altogether, each theory of 
punishment detailed above holds that society’s interests cannot be dictated by and are not 
reducible to those of the victim and victim’s family. The privileging of victim’s interests is a 
dramatic departure from the major theories of punishment.   
 
History of society in American criminal justice 
Not only are victims’ desires absent from major philosophies of punishment, there is 
little historical evidence that the American criminal justice has been organized to service 
victim’s demands until, roughly, the last twenty-five years. The three accounts of colonial 
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and post-revolutionary punishment detailed below arrive at different conclusions about the 
purposes of punishment, but in all three accounts, victims played no direct role in either 
imposing or determining it, nor was punishment imposed in the name of victims.  
Lawrence Friedman provides a comprehensive account of the uses of punishment in 
American history, from the colonial period through the 1980s. His chapters on the colonial 
and revolutionary periods make no mention of crime victims playing any role in the 
prosecution and punishment of defendants and offenders. Justifications for punishments did 
not cite victims, and victims were not given special preference in attending executions.504 
Instead, offenses were conceived of as sins against god, not individual victims. The object of 
punishment was both educative and religious, and confession was central to the criminal 
justice process. Friedman argues that the “point in punishing was repentance” to god and a 
“good swift lesson.”505  
Historian David Rothman details the advent of institutions to care for criminals and 
the insane in colonial and post-revolutionary America in The Discovery of the Asylum. In his 
book, colonial and post-revolutionary punishment was not intended to match victims’ 
desires, nor imposed to redeem or make individual victims feel better. Instead, the range of 
punishment methods was designed to maintain order and “rehabilitate or intimidate or detain 
the offender.”506 Rothman explains that after the Revolution, in a “burst of enthusiasm, 
Americans expected that a rational system of correction, which made punishment certain but 
humane, would dissuade all but a few offenders from a life in crime.”507  
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In the essay ‘‘‘An Extraordinarily Beautiful Document’: Jefferson’s ‘Bill for 
Proportioning Crimes and Punishments’ and the Challenge of Republican Punishment,’” Law 
Professor Markus Dubber argues that early-American law was deeply patriarchal, “in which 
the sovereign disciplines wayward members of his state household if, and as, he sees fit, 
without meaningful constraints on his punitive discretion.”508 Whatever reforms took place 
after the revolution and the creation of the Constitution were animated by religion, “the 
driving force behind actual reform.”509 It was not eye-for-an-eye vengeance that animated 
these religious reforms, but rather “Christian benevolence” that motivated the construction of 
penitentiaries where offenders could repent and morally improve themselves.510   
The absence of society existed throughout American history until the last 25 years. In 
his introduction to his edited collection Why Punish? How Much?, law professor Michael 
Tonry tracks the history of punishment in the United States, a history in which victims played 
no part in punishment.511 Tonry argues that utilitarian approaches to punishment dominated 
criminal justice until 1960, when state and the federal government began to move away from 
utilitarian approaches such as rehabilitation. According to Tonry, utilitarian ideas were 
replaced by retributive ideas, which influenced the institution of sentencing guidelines that 
established uniform sentences and the abolition of parole through the mid-1980s. Following 
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the mid-1980s, the United States Congress and state legislatures departed from retributive 
ideas by introducing mandatory minimum sentencing schemes and three-strikes laws that led 
to draconian punishments that made no retributive sense. Instead, these law reverted back to 
utilitarian justifications, which are, again, utilitarian, and have nothing to do with victims of 
crime. 
These tough-on-crime changes were promoted by conservatives, who have 
spearheaded the victims’ rights movement. However, influential strains of conservative 
criminology have had nothing to say about victims. In his review of conservative 
criminology in the American Journal of Criminal Justice, criminologist Richard Kania does 
not mention victims.512 The work of perhaps the most influential tough-on-crime intellectual, 
James Q. Wilson, also does not propose victim participation in fashioning sentencing policy 
or individual sentences. Wilson served on the Reagan administrations’ 1981 Attorney 
General’s Task Force on Violent Crime, which proposed limiting habeas corpus hearings and 
the exclusionary rule and abolishing parole. He attacked the effectiveness of addressing 
crime through social investment and prisoner-rehabilitation works, and instead advocated 
more certain and severe punishment to deter would-be offenders. In addition to his support 
for deterrence, Wilson supported incapacitating offenders.  
In his book Thinking about Crime, in which he articulates his support for deterrence 
and incapacitation, he does not advocate any role for victims in the criminal justice system. 
He explains his support for deterrent punishment by explaining “I believe that the weight of 
the evidence…supports the view that the rate of crime is influenced by its costs.”513 
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Therefore, raising the costs of punishment will reduce crime rates. He also supports 
incapacitation because “[w]hen criminals are deprived of their liberty, as by imprisonment, 
their ability to commit offenses against citizens is ended.”514  
Altogether, there has never been a criminological or philosophical theory of 
punishment that sought to find ways to reduce crime or make punishment more just that 
elevated the desires of victims over those of society. The pervasive deference to victims’ 
desires therefore marks a significant departure from previous philosophies of punishment and 
criminology. The consequences of that rearticulation are explored in the concluding section 
of this chapter.  
 
Victims’ Rights Disarticulation of Locke, Truman, and the “People” Ratified by the 
United States Constitution 
 
I begin this section by considering whether Truman’s liberal consensus can remain 
viable if victims’ rights sets the discursive conditions for articulations of society, and find 
that it cannot. I note that Democrats, the putative defenders of the liberal consensus, have 
themselves eviscerated the articulation of society necessary for the liberal consensus by 
supporting victims’ rights.   
I end the chapter by examining whether Locke’s conception of political society is also 
disarticulated by the ascent of victims’ rights. I find that victims’ rights undermines Locke’s 
conception of political society, a conception that partially underlies the purpose of the United 
States Constitution. The “people” that come into being through the formation of political 
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society in order to ensure their own personal safety are one of two “peoples” that make up 
those who are constituted by the Constitution. Victims’ rights effectively disarticulates that 
people. The other “people” are those who come together to establish the conditions necessary 
for economic activity. Victims’ rights does not disarticulate that ‘people,’ and thus renders 
the Constitution merely an economic document, rather than one that constitutes a political 
society. This maneuver complements those made by current conservatives, led by the Tea 
Party, to redefine constitutionality as minimal government intervention.  
 
The Disarticulation of the Fair Deal and the Liberal Notion of “society” 
In his Fair Deal advocacy, Truman argued that an American national whole—
society—existed. This society had a set of interests, and these interests were in a 
countervailing relationship with individual interests, primarily those of the wealthy. Truman 
held that government was responsible for privileging the interests of society over those of 
individual interests, even at the expense of those individual interests, and fulfills this 
responsibility by providing such goods as labor protections, quality education, protection 
from racial discrimination, and medical care, among other elements of Truman’s Fair Deal.  
Victims’ rights renders Truman’s Fair Deal articulations untenable. According to 
victims’ rights, government is not responsible for the welfare of the American people as a 
whole. Moreover, according to victims’ rights, the American people as a whole—society—
do not exist. The robust conception of a society of interconnected Americans—referred to in 
his 1949 State of the Union Speech as “the nation as a whole,” “the American people,” and 
the “our” in “our increasing abundance”—is invalidated.  
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By contrast, victims’ rights articulates government as properly providing for only the 
welfare of individual victims, not society. For example, a prosecutor who declines to pursue 
the death penalty in an individual case at a victim’s family member’s behest may violate 
society’s standards for retribution, marring the criminal justice system’s integrity. Needless 
to say, victims themselves will not assume government’s responsibility for the welfare of 
society. In victims’ rights discourse, victims themselves have no responsibility to maintain or 
improve the welfare of society through their criminal justice decision-making. Accordingly, 
victims’ rights advocates rarely try to articulate victims’ rights policies in terms of the 
benefits the policy will bring to society. Instead, as seen above, the benefits are articulated as 
being for victims and victims alone.  
If society does not exist, compromising private interests is without justification.. As 
discussed above, victims’ advocates and their political allies consistently bracket out societal 
considerations in criminal justice policy discussions, thereby erasing society. The media 
affirms this erasure by ignoring societal concerns when covering victims’ efforts to increase 
their participation in the criminal justice system and direct legislative activity about due 
process and criminal sanctions. Without society, there is no “nation as whole” to care for or 
appropriate private wealth. In other words, government cannot provide for or enhance the 
welfare of a non-entity.  
An example of a Fair Deal program incapacitated by victims’ rights is Truman’s 
national health insurance proposal, which presumed that society existed and government 
should privilege its interests over private interests. Truman justified the program by stating 
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“the health of all its citizens deserves the help of all the nation.”515 In his insurance scheme, 
which never passed, the federal government would have dictated how much doctors could 
charge for their services, potentially reducing their profits. Under this model, society would 
have gotten health care, and doctors’ profits would have been compromised by society’s 
interest in health care. If society’s interests could not be privileged over private interests, 
doctor’s interests in maximizing their profit would carry the day. If society did not exist at 
all, there simply would no entity with countervailing interests to oppose to doctors’ that 
government should privilege. Individual patients, of course, have interests, but the nation’s 
patients are not identical to “society.” Instead, patients are individuals who pursue their 
interests by using their judgment to find the best doctor for the least money. They are not 
included in “all of [America’s] citizens [that] deserve[] the help of all the nation,” as quoted 
above.  
The logic of victims’ rights would similarly devastate the discursive foundations of 
current government welfare programs such as cash and healthcare assistance for the poor, 
section 8 housing, food stamps, nutrition programs for infants and pregnant women, even 
public education. Each of these programs depends on the notions that society exists, 
government is responsible for its care, even if fulfilling that responsibility requires choosing 
society’s interests over private.  
 Democrats have a long tradition of defending a notion of a society of interconnected 
individuals. For example, on November 30, 2011, in a statement reminiscent of Truman’s 
1949 State of the Union speech, Barack Obama declared “you guys know that what America 
is about is that we’re all in this together; that each of us has to do our own individual part, but 
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we also have to be looking out for one another.”516 One wonders about the conviction of that 
articulation when leading Democrats have supported victims’ rights since the 1990s. Indeed, 
in a 2012 statement proclaiming National Victims’ Rights Week, Barack Obama hailed 
“advocates from every corner of America have worked to reinforce rights, services, and 
support for victims of crime,” and described Victims’ Rights Week as a time to “rededicate 
ourselves to securing the full measure of justice for every crime victim.”517 In 1996, then-
United States Attorney General Janet Reno told a victims’ right conference that she drew 
“most of my strength from victims, for they represent America to me: people who will not be 
put down, people who will not be defeated, people will rise again and again for what is 
right…You are my heroes and heroines. You are but little lower than angels.”518 The same 
year, Bill Clinton asserted that “[w]hen someone is a victim, he or she should be at the center 
of the criminal justice process, not on the outside looking in,” and pledged his support for an 
amendment to the United States Constitution guaranteeing victims the right to participate in 
every aspect of the criminal justice process, including plea deals, and parole, sentencing, and 
bail hearings.519 In his 2000 Presidential campaign, Al Gore also pledged his support for a 
Victims’ Rights amendment.520 In 1998, Joe Biden co-sponsored a resolution calling for the 
                                                 
516 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on the American Jobs Act,” November 13, 2011.  
Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/30/remarks-president-american-jobs-act.  
 
517 Barack Obama, “Presidential Proclamation—National Victims’ Rights Week 2012,” April 23, 2012.  
Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/23/presidential-proclamation-national-crime-
victims-rights-week-2012.  
 
518 Bruce Shapiro, “Victims and Vengeance: Why the Victims’ Rights Amendment is a Bad Idea,” The 
Nation, February 10, 1997.   
 
519 William Clinton, “Remarks Announcing Support for a Constitutional Amendment on Victims' 
Rights,” June 25, 1996. Available: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52987.  
 
520 James Dao, “The 2000 Campaign: The Crime issue, a get-tough Gore Focused on Drug Tests,” The 
New York Times, May 3, 2010.  
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Victims’ Rights amendment.521 All in all, it is hard to understand how Democrats can defend 
the welfare state when their support for victims’ rights actively works towards its 
dismantlement.  
 
 
The End of Locke’s Political Society and “the People’ of the United States 
Constitution 
Locke is clear on the relationship between judgment and punishment on one hand and 
political society on the other: “there can’t be a political society except where every one of the 
members has given up [their] natural power” to judge and punish, “passing it into the hands 
of the community in all cases.”522 This power to judge and punish ceded to government by 
private individuals constitutes political society and includes “the power to set down what 
punishment was appropriate for what crimes.”523 This is the power victims have successfully 
appropriated through the victims’ rights movement. Thus, according to Locke’s logic, 
victims’ rights represents the dissolution of political society. 
As a result of the victims’ rights movement, a discrete segment of society, victims, 
have obtained the power to make prosecutorial and judicial decisions and influence 
punishment. As the above examples illustrate, victims, not the community, direct what is the 
appropriate punishments for specific crimes. Victims strongly influence whether or not 
someone should die, which crimes individual defendants are guilty of, even whether accused 
                                                 
 
521 Senate Joint Resolution 44 1998. Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United State 
to protect the rights of crime victims. Found at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-105sjres44is/pdf/BILLS-
105sjresis.pdf. 
 
522 Locke, Two Treatises, 136-7. 
 
523 Locke, Two Treatises, 137. 
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killers can be released without bail in order for law enforcement to advance victims’ 
interests. Judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement agencies—who ostensibly represent 
society’s interests—frequently defer to victims’ wishes. Also victims play a determinative 
role in fashioning legislation defining crimes and establishing criminal sanctions. Altogether, 
victims have achieved a great deal of executive power, and that achievement signals the end 
of uniform law and punishment and a return to the state of nature.  
My analysis may seem to overstate things. Perhaps political society remains partially 
intact after victims’ rights, as government still functions as the umpire and retains executive 
power in legislative, prosecutorial, and judicial decisions. While highly influential, victims 
do not control the legislative process. Legislators have the power to vote against victims’ 
sentencing law demands, and a handful do whenever sentencing changes advocated by 
victims are debated. Voters can vote against popular initiatives to add victims’ rights 
amendments to state constitutions supported by victims, and, typically, 20-30% of voters do 
vote against such amendments. For example, North Carolina’s Victims’ Rights Amendment 
passed 78-22% in 1996.  
In addition, there are many constraints on a victim’s ability to judge defendants and 
influence punishment for offenders. Conduct must fit specific criteria to qualify as a specific 
crime. Also, the severity of the criminal sanction is legislatively indexed to the seriousness of 
the crime. Thus, a victim cannot charge a car thief with murder, and a car thief cannot be put 
to death for his crime, as would be possible in the state of nature. Also, while victims assume 
executive power, they do not assume any executive responsibilities. They do not learn police 
practices or legal procedure in order to investigate and try cases, nor assume the risk of 
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arresting whomever they conclude victimized them. They enjoy some of the privileges of 
executive power without its corresponding burdens.  
It seems that, on the one hand, victims have executive power in their ability to 
influence such prosecutorial decisions as whether or not to pursue the death penalty; on the 
other hand, victims are constrained on a range of other punishment, judicial, and legislative 
decisions, and do not assume executive responsibilities. Altogether, it seems that the United 
States has partial uniform law, which, per Locke, corresponds to a partial existence of 
political society. Can there be a partial political society? Can people partially agree to unite 
with one another to form a government to represent them? It is an odd formulation, especially 
considering that the lack of political society concerns one of society’s gravest decisions: 
whether to kill one of its members. What sort of agreement to exist in a political society 
would include an agreement to dissolve society when it faces its gravest decisions?  
 Economic changes and technological advancements have enabled this partiality. The 
federal and state governments can apparently afford to grant victims executive power and 
accede to their expensive, punitive demand to incarcerate offenders without requiring victims 
to assume the costs of executive responsibilities. The physical dangers that compelled Locke 
to assert the need for a political society no longer exist. The consistent punitiveness of 
victims creates a functional uniformity in the criminal justice system, if not the type of 
community-determined uniformity Locke envisioned.524 Victims put themselves at no risk by 
holding partial executive power. Altogether, public safety is possible, if not maximized, 
under victims’ rights, and political society as Locke theorized it is not necessary to ensure it.    
                                                 
524 Acknowledging the consistently punitive behavior by victims does not mean I see that behavior as a 
natural response to victimization. Because their involvement is facilitated by the prosecutors’ office and law 
enforcement, the primary subject position available to victims is that of the vengeful victims seeking 
prosecution and punishment.  
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Nevertheless, while the criminal justice system remains functional, much harm has 
been done to the conceptual basis of political society, or, in other words, “the people.” Locke 
knew who the people were: those who thought their safety would be enhanced by the 
creation of the government, the creation of which constituted them as a people. What is the 
status of Locke’s people today? It seems that “the people” are those who will continually 
deny their peoplehood in deference to victims. This perpetual transience of “the people” 
indicates that they never realize a stable form or location.  
Locke’s idea that people form governments to enhance their personal safety is the 
basis of the American Constitutional agreement. As outlined in its Preamble, personal 
protection of the people is the central purpose of the Constitution: “We the people of the 
United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic 
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this 
Constitution.”525 Arguably, the rest of the Constitution, such as its description of the 
separation of powers, is dedicated to describing how government will accomplish the goals 
of the Preamble. Victims’ rights has inaugurated a strange state of affairs. In the name of 
public safety, it eviscerates “the people” of the Constitution’s Preamble, the protection of 
whom gives rise to “the people” in the first place. As I have attempted to demonstrate, the 
Preamble’s objectives can now be achieved without the people constituted in the Preamble, 
making that constitution unnecessary. In the moments when victims influence the course of 
the criminal justice system, it is they, not government, who ensure the objectives of the 
Constitution’s Preamble, placing both the Constitution and political society in abeyance.  
                                                 
525 The Constitution of the United States 1787. Available at http://www.constitution.net/const.pdf.  
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However, the Constitution does more than establish protective conditions for the 
people of the Preamble. It also contains provisions to establish and maintain an orderly 
economy. For example, the Constitution provides Congress the power to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations, fix weights and measures, and establish currency.526 Since the 
government delegates public safety obligations to victims and public safety no longer 
requires a consistent and coherent notion of “the people,” it seems that “the people” are 
strictly oriented around economic activity. That is, “the people” are economic actors who 
form government to promote and ensure the conditions necessary for economic activity.  
Perhaps it can be said that before victims’ rights, the Constitution constituted two 
‘peoples’: those seeking to ensure their personal safety through the creation of government 
and uniform law and those seeking to ensure economic activity. Victims’ rights eliminates 
the former while preserving the latter. “The people” are rearticulated as a confederation of 
economic actors, and the Constitution is rearticulated as a statement of economic principles, 
primarily of minimal government economic activity and intervention. As a result, measures 
that implicitly or explicitly articulate “the people” as more than economic actors are 
unconstitutional or non-constitutional, and are outside the proper scope of Constitutional 
governance.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 American liberal politics appear badly compromised. Though many Americans lack 
essential medical, financial, and housing resources, politicians of both parties appear 
prepared to reduce social welfare programs. In advocating for such reductions, politicians 
                                                 
526 Constitution of the United States.  
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attack the viability of the articulation “society,” promoting in its place familial, professional, 
or religious relations. Also, conservatives vociferously allege that many forms of government 
activity, including environmental and economic regulations and welfare spending, are 
unconstitutional, articulating the Constitution as a merely a document organizing economic 
relations.  
This paper has attempted to demonstrate the felicity of victims’ rights to the 
decimation of liberal politics. Criminal justice is a potent presence in American life, 
pervading news media, film, and television. Therefore, its rearticulation played, and 
continues to play, a central role in the rearticulation of broader American politics.  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Conclusion:Restorative Justice and the Liberal Consensus 
 
Before the institutionalization of victims’ rights, the victim’s role within the criminal 
justice system was confined to that of witness. They provided evidence through their 
testimony, but had no opportunities to influence or participate in prosecutorial, sentencing, or 
parole decisions. Also, victims and victims' family members did not exploit their victim-
status to lead tough-on-crime campaigns. As I have attempted to demonstrate, all of this has 
changed. Victims and victims' family members participate in the criminal justice system in 
comprehensive ways, and are America’s foremost tough-on-crime warriors.  
Victims’ rights has penetrated many important American institutions, including 
academia, judicial organizations, professional organizations, law enforcement, the federal 
government, and media. Lewis and Clark Law School houses the National Crime Victim 
Law Institute. The federal government has an Office for Victims of Crime, dedicated to 
providing hundreds of millions of dollars in grants for victims’ organizations to provide 
victims’ services, and working to guarantee victims participatory rights through an 
amendment to the United States Constitution. Every state government has offices dedicated 
to crime victims. The American Bar Association has a victims’ committee, which has 
promulgated guidelines advocating for victims’ rights to participation. The American 
Psychological Association established a Task Force on Victims of Crime, whose report was 
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strongly supportive of victims’ rights.527 The APA works with victims groups to study the 
benefits of victim participation in the criminal justice process. Prosecutor’s office employ 
victims’ advocates to engage with crime victims and ensure their legal rights are protected. 
Police departments have officers and outreach workers specifically dedicated to crime 
victims, and the International Association of Chiefs of Police also has a victims’ committee, 
which supports a victims’ rights amendment to the United States Constitution. Finally media 
personnel receive training concerning the most sensitive ways to interview victims.528 
Judging by the ways that concern for and engagement with victims permeates these 
institutions, victims appear to be a permanent presence in American politics, media, and 
criminal justice.  
I have argued that victims’ rights runs stands as a rejection of the liberal consensus. 
As it seems that victims are here to stay, defenders of the liberal consensus must promote a 
response to victimization that coheres with its tenets. It must base authority on knowledge, 
incorporate a robust conception of society into its precepts, insist on larger systems of 
relationality than that of the family, and counter narratives of socioeconomic mobility.  
One approach that gives victims a central role in the criminal justice process whose 
assumptions are consonant with those of the liberal consensus is restorative justice. John 
Braithwaite, one of restorative justice’s leading advocates, offers a provisional definition: 
“Restorative justice is a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offense 
come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its 
                                                 
527 See Kahn, Arnold. 1985. Victims of crime and violence: Final report of the APA Task Force on the 
Victims of Crime and Violence. Available at  http://psycnet.apa.org/books/11098.  
 
528 See Rentschler, Second Wounds.   
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implications for the future.”529 Its core values include “moral learning, community 
participation and community caring, respectful dialogue, forgiveness, responsibility, and 
making amends.”530 What is restored through restorative justice practices are “whatever 
dimensions of restoration matter to the victims, offenders, and communities affected by the 
crime…deliberation determines what restoration means in a specific context.”531 In contrast 
to the traditional criminal justice system, restorative justice is not adversarial, and victims, 
the community, and offenders creates sanctions, not judges. Because restorative justice 
conceptualizes sanctions as reparative rather than punitive, incarceration, which victims may 
not see as reparative, is rarer. Generally, it seeks to maximize compassion and human 
connection, rather than the alienation of victim and offender instituted by the conventional 
criminal justice system under victims’ rights.  
 An example of restorative justice is “family group conferences” in New Zealand. 
Such conferences are possible after both violent and non-violent crimes. After a crime is 
committed and wrongdoing is admitted, victims and their supporters meet with offenders and 
their supporters, a meeting of “two communities of care.”532 The group discusses what 
happened and the harms suffered by the victim, the victim’s family, the offender, and the 
offender’s family. The group then discusses how to repair such harms. A successful family 
group conference concludes with the group creating a plan of action to repair each party’s 
                                                 
 
529 John Braithwaite, “Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts,” Crime and 
Justice 25 (1999): 5. 
 
530 Braithwaite, “Restorative Justice,” 6.  
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harms, which all parties sign. Harm-repairing measures include financial compensation for 
victims, victims’ services, and apologies from offenders to victims.  
 Restorative justice coheres with each of the tenets of the liberal consensus I discuss in 
my dissertation. Chapter one argues that victims’ rights has effectively silenced societal 
interests in favor of those of atomized individual victims. This runs contrary to the political 
statements of Truman, who predicated his political agenda on the existence of an American 
society. In contrast to victims’ rights, restorative justice is socially focused through its 
emphasis on community participation and well-being. Crime is seen as a breakdown in pre-
existing social relationships that need repair through the restorative justice process. Repairing 
such relationships benefits the parties to the restorative justice proceeding themselves, as 
well as enriching community and improving social harmony overall. Restorative justice aims 
to achieve, according to the introduction to the anthology Restorative Justice: Critical Issues, 
the “strengthening of institutional relationships; the enhancement of processes of public 
participation; the development of the capacity for self-help, mutual responsibility and self-
regulation; and the promotion of structures of empowerment, connectedness and cohesion” 
and “the re-establishment of social bonds.”533Thus, in many restorative justice iterations, 
representative of the community at large, even those unaffected by the victimization itself, 
are involved in the restorative justice process.  
 In addition to its efforts to harmonize communities through its practices, restorative 
justice relies on societal support to achieve its aims. A central element of repairing the harm 
of victimization is providing victims’ services. According to Gordon Bazemore, restorative 
justice programs “give first priority to meeting the needs of crime victims” who are referred 
                                                 
533 Ross Ferguson, et al., Introduction to Restorative Justice: Critical Issues, ed. Ross Fergusson, et al. 
(Thousand Oaks: Open University, 2003), 3.  
 245 
 
“for needed help and assistance,” to service providers who receive resources from societal 
contributions, primarily taxation.534   
Chapter two argues that Mark Lunsford’s narrative suggests that socioeconomic 
mobility is possible in the United States for those without power, contrary to Roosevelt’s and 
Johnson’s skepticism about the possibilities of socioeconomic mobility for those without 
power. I argue that Lunsford’s crusade was only successful because it served powerful 
interests. Restorative Justice, which increases socioeconomic mobility through the reduced 
use of incarceration and enhanced victims’ services, serves no powerful interests and has 
failed to become institutionalized on any significant basis in the United States. It functions as 
the negative image of Lunsford in two ways: first, in its failure relative to his success; 
second, its egalitarianism compared to his hierarchical, punishment-focused policies. The 
failure of the institutionalization of restorative justice counters the implications of the 
Lunsford narrative by demonstrating that criminal justice measures must meet powerful 
interests to succeed. In other words, those without power need help from those in power to 
achieve mobility.  
This was precisely Johnson’s and Roosevelt’s point, and they both attempted to 
distribute power to those without it to enable widespread mobility. Roosevelt feared that 
serving the interests of those in power would never result in increased mobility for those 
without it. The difference between the minimal success of efforts to institutionalize 
restorative justice and Lunsford’s comprehensive legislative accomplishments confirm 
Roosevelt’s fears. The policy that served powerful interests succeeded, yet with decreased 
mobility for those who lacked it. The policy that serves no powerful interests failed, at the 
                                                 
534 Gordon Bazemore, et al., “Conferences, Circles, Boards, and Mediations:  The ‘New Wave’ of 
Community Justice Decision-making,” in Restorative Justice: Critical Issues, ed. Ross Fergusson, et al., 
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expense of increased mobility. This example is evidence that those with power dominate 
economic and political life at the expense of the socioeconomic mobility of those who lack it. 
Restorative justice demonstrates that Roosevelt’s concerns about the relation between power 
and socioeconomic mobility still hold true.  
 Chapter three discusses two connected conservative arguments. First, that relations 
between family members in two-parent households guarantee their well-being and self-
sufficiency. Second, conservatives allege that welfare programs undermine the solidity of the 
two-parent family unit. In so doing, they have successfully attacked justifications for and 
weakened the welfare state, one of the central elements of the liberal consensus. However, 
the prevalence of domestic violence within the nuclear family suggests that family dynamics, 
in fact, can be a threat to its members. Victims’ rights-influenced domestic violence 
discourse has silenced concerns about the family by positing that domestic violence is 
committed by bad actors for unknown reasons, who need punishment in order to be cured of 
their violent tendencies. In other words, conservative discourse about victims’ rights holds 
that the family is not the problem.  
 Restorative justice counters the conservative glorification of the family by alleging 
that the family is not enough to ensure well-being, as community involvement is necessary 
when domestic violence occurs. According to criminologist Lois Presser, it “builds on the 
community focus of the shelter movement,” which has worked to establish an array of 
victims’ services, including subsidized housing and legal assistance to enable the abused to 
live independently of their abuser.535 The community itself participates in restorative justice 
                                                 
535 Emily Gaarder et al., “Can Restorative Justice Reduce Battering? Some Preliminary 
Considerations,” Social Text 27 (2000), 186. 
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proceedings, attempting to rectify abusive behavior by expressing their disapproval of it.536 
Altogether, care for the couple comes from outside of the nuclear family, with the nuclear 
family itself treated as inadequate to the task of repairing the harm of and preventing future 
victimization. Because welfare rhetoric also holds that community care is necessary to 
supplement or stand in for familial support, restorative justice works to buttress welfare 
arguments.  
Chapter four provides a history of the articulation of authority in governmental 
responses to victimization in the 1970s and 1980s, concluding that an articulation of 
authority as properly based on experience emerged as hegemonic in victims’ rights. At first 
glance, restorative justice may appear even more deferential to victims’ authority than 
victims’ rights. It grants them wider decision-making power than they have under victims’ 
rights. Victims can influence more than just the dimensions of defendant’s punishment, but 
also whether the offender apologizes to them or does reparative labor to attend to the harm 
inflicted. In restorative justice, however, victims’ knowledge is only privileged when it 
concerns themselves, either the harms they have sustained or the measures they propose to 
repair them. It does not extend to the offenders’ future danger to society or conceptions of the 
justness of the offender’s sentence, which are conjectures frequently made by victim 
‘experts’ in victims’ rights.  
In addition to the experienced-based authority victims wielded within the criminal 
justice system, the victims’ rights movement granted victims immense authority during 
policy discussions and legislative processes. Many tough-on-crime efforts were spearheaded 
by victims. By contrast to victim-led tough-on-crime advocacy, restorative justice advocates 
have typically been academics or criminal justice professionals. In fact, many justifications 
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for restorative justice draw on “extensive anthropological sources” to argue that “restorative 
methods of conflict resolution were dominant in non-state, pre-state and early state 
societies.”537 No victims or victims’ family members have been prominent advocates for the 
institution of restorative justice measures. Beyond these differences in their backgrounds, the 
evidence marshaled by restorative justice and victims’ rights advocates qualitatively differs. 
Victims’ rights advocates who are victims or victims’ family members root their views in 
their emotional desires or broad conceptions of justice. By contrast, when restorative justice’s 
non-victims make arguments, they are based on evidence of historical conflict resolution 
practices, established ethical systems, and empirical evidence of victims’ and offenders’ 
well-being.   
Restorative justice responds to each of the criticisms of the liberal consensus implicit 
in victims’ rights. Also, restorative justice is a more humane response to victimization. It 
utilizes government resources to care for people who cannot care for themselves, not just to 
inflict pain. Restorative justice offers compassion to victims and victims’ services. By 
contrast, victims’ rights offers victims punishment and little else. Restorative justice sees 
victims as capable and beneficiaries of compassion, an altogether more complex vision of 
their humanness than the one-dimensional vengefulness of victims’ rights.  
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